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Chapter 1
Animal biotechnology is controversial. It is one of the fastest-growing areas 
of technological innovation in the life sciences. Its rapid developments, 
ranging from new drug therapies to genetically engineered livestock, hold 
a great promise for a variety of fields of application. At the same time, its 
potentially high impact gives rise to numerous political and cultural concerns 
with regard to the distribution of risks and benefits. Moreover, this high 
impact leads to an elevated level of concern in society about related wider 
issues such as the alteration of social meanings, identities and forms of life 
(Jasanoff, 2005). 
 Throughout this thesis, the term ‘animal biotechnology’ refers to the 
procedures, products and services related to the technical intervention in 
animal life at the level of the gene. It has a history of less than three decades. 
The Dutch society first came into contact with animal biotechnology in the 
1980s when scientists from a small biotechnological company in Leiden 
introduced the later famous “Herman the Bull”, one of the first genetically 
modified animals in the world. The increasing media coverage of bioethical 
issues at that time and the strong influence of interest groups instantly heated 
the socio-political debate. Concerns about animal biotechnology were not 
only related to possible negative consequences for health and welfare of 
the modified animals, but also to the perceived ‘unnaturalness’ of technical 
intervention in the animal’s genome (Devos, 2008). The arrival of animal 
biotechnology in the public sphere immediately turned it into a social 
controversy.
1.1 The aim of this thesis
There are four reasons why animal biotechnology constitutes a particularly 
complex social controversy. First, animal biotechnology is a moral problem. 
Whereas all developments in technology sooner or later involve moral 
decisions because choices have to be made that potentially harm the interests 
and desires of others, animal biotechnology forms a special case. The moral 
character of decisions in animal biotechnology is particularly present 
because at least one ‘other’ is directly affected in the technological action: 
the animal. Although the moral relationships between humans and animals 
have been rather ambiguous throughout most of Western intellectual 
history, the past three decades turned the treatment of animals into a major 
area of both philosophical and public concern (Rollin, 2006). Most ethicists 
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now acknowledge that animals deserve some sort of moral consideration, 
although the appropriate grounds for justification of the animal’s moral status 
remain a matter of philosophical debate (Garner, 2005). Also the broader 
public has demonstrated a significant support towards the expansion of the 
circle of moral consideration to animals (Singer, 2006). The Dutch situation 
is no exception. In both academic and public circles in the Netherlands, 
animals are widely recognized as a proper subject of moral reflection (Brom, 
1997). 
 The second reason why animal biotechnology is a complex 
controversy concerns the notion that developments in animal biotechnology 
are subject to the open-ended uncertainty of technological change. As Beck 
(1992) noted, scientific and technological developments not only generate 
many benefits, they also bring about new uncertainties. These uncertainties 
obscure the understanding and evaluation of the morally problematic aspects 
of animal biotechnology and its artefacts. 
 The third reason is related to the deeply entrenched disagreements 
about values that are characteristic of animal biotechnology’s public sphere. 
Conflicts of values are at the heart of the public debate and political decision 
making. Values that are difficult to reconcile pull the moral reflection of 
individuals and groups in different, sometimes contradictory directions 
(Smith, 2003). The value pluralism of contemporary society challenges the 
traditional foundationalism of moral philosophy and ethics. Also, it prompts 
the question how animal biotechnology decision making can be made 
sensitive to the plurality of values that is present in society.
 Finally, decision making about animal biotechnology takes place in 
a political environment which is under significant pressure. The controversy 
of animal biotechnology is but one example of the changing relations 
between science, technology and society. The public trust in the progress 
of science and technology appears to be declining as the naive enthusiasm 
for its accomplishments has gradually made way for more concerns 
about its ethical, social and physical consequences (Joss & Durant, 1995). 
Furthermore, the voice of the scientific expert seems to have lost much of 
its traditional authority (Leach, 2005). These changes have made the place of 
science and technology in society more and more problematic. In addition, 
traditional political institutions, such as parliaments and political parties, are 
increasingly thought to have lost their ability to connect to the preferences 
and desires of the citizenry (Hajer, 2003). These developments suggest an 
increasing problem of democratic legitimacy of the governance of science 
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and technology issues. The appraisal of new emerging technologies like 
animal biotechnology has long left the protected environment of laboratories 
and government offices, as the public reaction to the introduction of 
“Herman the bull” illustrated. These technologies are now contested in a 
public arena.
 The moral dimension of animal biotechnology, its inherent 
uncertainty, the value pluralism of society and the changing relations 
between technology, politics and society make animal biotechnology into 
a persistent moral and social problem. This thesis acknowledges the key 
importance of both ethics and governance in handling the controversy of 
animal biotechnology. In order to deal effectively with animal biotechnology’s 
uncertainty and value pluralism however, current practices of ethics and 
governance in the Netherlands need to be reconstructed. This thesis argues 
for a democratization of the deliberation of animal biotechnology. As will be 
clarified in part A, democratizing animal biotechnology requires the creative 
management of the various value perspectives present in the public arena. 
Central to creative management of value perspectives is a broad societal 
process of reflective learning about these perspectives. The primary objective 
of this thesis is:
To contribute to the development of a conceptual and methodological 
framework for the democratic deliberation of animal biotechnology.
A secondary aim of this thesis is to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
value diversity in the moral reflection on the human-animal relationship in 
the Netherlands and the value conflicts that may occur when different value 
perspectives meet for the discussion of animal biotechnology examples. 
This will provide an improved understanding of the possible ways of creative 
management of the different value perspectives in the animal biotechnology 
controversy.
1.2 The outline of this thesis
Part A of this thesis sets the stage for the reconstruction of ethics 
and governance in order to democratize animal biotechnology in the 
Netherlands. Chapter 2 shows, from a ‘Science and Technology Studies’ 
perspective, that the animal biotechnology controversy is inherently 
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characterized by technological uncertainty and value pluralism. 
Subsequently, chapter 3 argues that the rational foundationalism of 
mainstream animal ethics insufficiently recognizes these characteristics 
of animal biotechnology and the technological culture we live in. The 
strongly dynamic nature of the development of animal biotechnology, 
in combination with the plurality of legitimate framings of the animal 
biotechnology controversy, requires a conception of ethics that is pluralistic, 
democratic and creative. The experimental, open and flexible approach 
of Deweyan pragmatist ethics offers a viable alternative. In this approach, 
values and principles emerge through the method of experimental inquiry 
and democratic deliberation. With respect to the governance practice, the 
pragmatist ethics approach is complemented by the insights of argumentative 
policy analysis, as is outlined in chapter 4. The appropriate policy strategy 
for the policy problem of animal biotechnology is argued to be policy as 
learning, aimed at structuring the problem. The central activity of this 
reflective learning approach is frame reflection. It requires the participation 
of a broad range of citizens to examine the ways in which their framings of 
the problem are discursively constructed. The concluding chapter of part 
A, chapter 5, provides a description of the research design and research 
questions that have guided the social experiments with public deliberation 
that we have conducted. This research design enabled us to investigate how 
participatory inquiry and deliberation can be implemented in a frame-
reflective learning approach. 
 The first social experiment is presented in part B. This part reports 
on the results of an empirical study into the value diversity present in the 
various ways of thinking and talking about animals in the Netherlands. In 
chapter 7, the interactive methodology of the value lab tool, the deliberative 
instrument that was developed to facilitate frame-reflective inquiry in small 
discussion groups, is evaluated. Chapter 8 presents the four different moral 
value frameworks reconstructed in this study. Together, these frames of 
reference constitute in-depth knowledge of the different ways in which a 
broad range of Dutch citizens thinks about the value of animals. Chapter 9 
evaluates the value lab methodology and elaborates on the implications of 
the reconstructed value frames for future practices of animal biotechnology 
ethics and governance in the Netherlands.
 Part C focuses on the articulation of (possible) value conflicts and the 
range of potential solutions. To this end, the experimental dialogues tool, a 
second deliberative instrument, was developed (chapter 11). The dialogues 
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provide a deeper insight into the (im)possibilities of achieving understanding 
and consensus when different frames meet in dialogue. Chapter 12 presents 
this articulation of value conflicts. Chapter 13 discussed the reciprocal 
relationships between the value frames and the attitude towards animal 
biotechnology.
 The fourth and final part of this thesis, Part D, reflects on the 
extent to which the objectives of this thesis have been achieved. Chapter 
15 focuses on the question how a reflective learning process should be 
designed. It examines the extent to which the application of the value lab and 
experimental dialogues tools have articulated value diversity, in the reflection 
on animals, and value conflicts, in the discussion of animal biotechnology. 
Chapter 16 examines the extent to which application of the value lab and 
experimental dialogues tools has contributed to problem structuring with 
respect to the animal biotechnology controversy. Chapter 17 revisits the 
design and execution of the research project itself. The chapter closes with 
some recommendations for future social experiments. Chapter 18 discusses 
the theoretical implications of the research project for the ethics and 
governance of animal biotechnology. It sketches two different scenarios for 
the governance of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands. Both scenarios 
aim to reconcile the recognition of uncertainty and pluralism in democratic 
practices of ethics and governance. Furthermore, it reflects on the role of the 
developed pragmatist ethics tools in the creative management of different 
perspectives in social controversies surrounding life science innovations like 
animal biotechnology.
15
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As was mentioned in the introduction, the Dutch society first made contact 
with animal biotechnology in the 1980s when “Herman the Bull”, one of the 
first genetically modified animals in the world, was introduced. From this 
moment on, animal biotechnology in the Netherlands has manifested itself as 
an intractable controversy, characterized by uncertainty and value pluralism. 
This chapter further analyzes these aspects. They will largely determine the 
shape and structure of any appropriate reflective learning approach towards 
the animal biotechnology controversy. 
2.1	 Scientific	uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty is an important element of the context of animal 
biotechnology. Many public concerns about animal biotechnology involve 
potential impacts on human or animal health and the environment. 
The governance of animal biotechnology ultimately involves making a 
judgment about those potential impacts in the face of uncertainty. This is 
a general feature of regulatory decision making on science and technology 
developments. Animal biotechnology however may constitute a special 
case because of the novelty of the technology’s potential effects and the 
lack of established scientific methods to measure these effects. In addition, 
as has been argued by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992), factual uncertainties 
surrounding technology development are not only produced by an existing 
lack of knowledge, but also by systemic indeterminacy. These authors have 
categorized the different types of uncertainties associated with technology 
development as follows. First of all, there is statistical uncertainty, due to a 
lack of available scientific knowledge. Second, there is model uncertainty, 
due to a lack of understanding of all the system interactions that take place. 
Third, there is a fundamental type of uncertainty, which results from the 
indeterminacy of complex evolving systems. All three types of scientific 
uncertainty are present in the context of animal biotechnology. 
 Statistical uncertainty is related to the numerical value of scientific 
variables and is as such an inescapable aspect of scientific research. One of 
many examples from biotechnology is the measurement of transgenic protein 
levels. Such measurements have a statistical uncertainty that can often easily 
be reduced by additional data collection. 
 Model uncertainty is more difficult to reduce. It is due to a lack 
of understanding of the interactions between the different variables of a 
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scientific model. For example, the introduction of transgenic fish into the 
natural environment might have effects on the condition of ecological 
systems that introduce new variables and interactions, which would have 
to be addressed by new scientific questions and methods. The explorative 
character of animal biotechnology makes it into an open-ended process. 
New developments, or solutions to certain problems, simultaneously open a 
window to new problems. As Beck (1992) noted, the production of scientific 
knowledge or technological artifacts may resolve some uncertainties, but 
immediately generates new uncertainties as well. 
 The third type of uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty, is due to a 
complex system’s inherent indeterminacy but may also be due to ignorance 
or even ignorance-of-ignorance, as the United States National Research 
Council (2002) concluded. Research into the potential effects of animal 
biotechnology on the environment, human and animal life concerns a 
complex and dynamic system of humans and animals in their ecological 
environments. The impossibility of mapping out all elements and internal 
relations of such a system entails that for every moment in time, the 
questions guiding this research are formulated based on the provisional 
state of scientific knowledge of that time. The developments of animal 
biotechnology will therefore always result in at least some outcomes that 
have not been foreseen.  
 Another aspect that contributes to the scientific uncertainty of the 
context of animal biotechnology is its value-ladenness. The actors involved 
in the development of animal biotechnology differ in the extent to which 
they are prepared to accept the factual uncertainties, depending on their 
respective worldview. Actions and decisions of those actors can often be 
related to deeper values and beliefs. Social-constructivist analysis emphasizes 
that scientific knowledge and technological artefacts are human products, 
shaped by the socio-cultural context in which they are constructed (Hacking, 
1999; Kitcher, 2001). In contrast to the common sense idea of a neutral 
world of science and technology, opposing the cultural world of values and 
beliefs, technology development is perceived as a practice of endless actions, 
decisions, negotiations and interactions involving a diverse range of social 
actors (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987). It is argued that animal biotechnology 
and society are in a co-evolution. Contingency and change make the 
development of animal biotechnology an on-going process, shaped in the 
interactions between knowledge, technology and the choices of the actors 
involved (Jasanoff, 2005; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001). 
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2.2 Value pluralism
The second feature characterizing the complexity of the animal 
biotechnology controversy is value pluralism. As was mentioned above, 
the co-evolution of animal biotechnology and society has been tumultuous 
ever since the introduction of the first genetically modified animals. 
Animal biotechnology produced new ideals; especially the applications 
in the biomedical field raised people’s hopes for a better future (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2002). Because of its high impacts, animal biotechnology however 
also generated a wide range of concerns about the technology itself and its 
potentially hazardous effects for humans, the environment and of course the 
animals themselves. The appraisal of animal biotechnology moved outside 
of the walls of the laboratories to become a public debate, extending the 
range of actors involved (Devos, 2008). The extension of the range of actors 
implied an extension of the range of attitudes towards biotechnology and 
therefore a broadening of the issues and concerns that could, or should be 
addressed in the discussion. This again complicated the public debate, as 
Wynne (2001) explained. The differences in values and beliefs among various 
social actors produce different framings of the social controversy. Because 
of their different framings, social actors differ in the aspects they felt should 
be publicly discussed. From a scientific perspective, assessment of the risks 
of animal biotechnology for health and welfare would suffice, whereas non-
scientific publics tend to include the evaluation of broader concerns like its 
‘usefulness’ and the ‘respect for nature’ (Devos, 2008). 
 When dominant technocratic institutions of science and policy-
making determine the agenda of public discussion, wider issues and concerns 
might never receive the attention of the public debate. 
 This thesis aims to develop a democratic approach towards animal 
biotechnology in order to encompass the value pluralism of society. Values 
are in this thesis rather broadly defined as those aspects of the animal or 
the human-animal relationship that make the animal matter; those aspects 
that make the animal an important subject of moral concern. Pluralism 
is regarded as the acknowledgement that there is more than one way to 
view the animal and more than one way to construct the animal’s moral 
status. The existing value pluralism in society challenges both the practice 
of moral philosophy and ethics as well as the practice of political decision-
making. The Netherlands is a pluralist society containing a diversity of 
views on “what is right”. Van der Scheer (1999) has indicated this might 
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threaten the foundations of traditional ethics. In a secularized world there 
is no commonly accepted authoritative institution to determine the moral 
good. According to MacIntyre (1981), the belief in an absolute, universal 
moral truth slowly gives way to the recognition of moral pluralism and the 
awareness of the socio-cultural historicity of morality. Moreover, insensitivity 
to value pluralism seems to misrepresent our experience of the diversity and 
richness of our relationships with the non-human world (Smith, 2003). Note 
that a distinction is made here between moral pluralism – the pluralism of 
moral values that can be observed in society – and ethical pluralism, which 
is regarded to be the approach of ethics that recognizes moral pluralism and 
attempts to take it into account. The next chapter will argue for an approach 
to ethics that is pluralistic. Still, the recognition of moral pluralism in ethics 
invokes its own set of problems. How can the moral considerability of 
animals be ethically justified in the absence of an absolute point of reference? 
Is it possible to adhere to a normative ethical theory and at the same time 
recognize value pluralism? How can an ethics policy be developed in the 
light of legitimate value conflicts? As Chapter 3 will show, the approach 
of philosophical pragmatism offers some useful insights to embrace value 
pluralism in the development of structures for deliberation and decision-
making.
2.3 Transformations of the public sphere
Discussions about the engagement of the public in science and technology 
development take place in the context of a much wider debate about 
the changing relations between science and society. The place of science 
in society has become more and more problematic. Public trust in the 
progress of science and technology has declined, while concerns about its 
consequences have increased (Joss & Durant, 1995). Nowotny et al. (2001) 
characterized these changing relations as the rise of the mode 2 society. 
They argued that science and society have become transgressive arenas 
that develop according to the same co-evolutionary trends (Nowotny et al., 
2001). Social processes like individualization, privatization and globalization 
undermine the fundamental categories of modernity: state, economy 
and culture. Because these categories are no longer recognizable in their 
identities and functions, also science and technology lose parts of their 
autonomy. In the 21st century’s mode 2 society, scientific knowledge will 
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increasingly become contested in the public arena, when society, as Nowotny 
et al. (2001) phrase it, begins to speak back to science. The production of 
knowledge and artifacts is no longer the exclusive domain of traditional 
institutions and professionals. Other organizations and movements 
become involved. According to Beck (1992), this shift from scientific 
knowledge towards socially robust knowledge established the introduction 
of subpolitics, forms of politics outside and beyond the representative 
institutions of the traditional political system. Nowotny et al. (2001) have 
metaphorically identified these emerging communicative spaces as the agora: 
the public sphere where different social actors, with pluralistic views meet for 
discussion and new developments are contested. Hajer (2003) characterizes 
it as the making of policy and politics in an institutional void. New political 
spaces emerge in the struggle to address the increasing complexity of 
contemporary problems. Similar to the concept of the agora, these new 
political spaces are inhabited by a wide range of actors deliberating the 
multiple dimensions of dynamic controversies. Many studies have signaled 
the desire of the contemporary public to become included in a dialogue 
with scientists and policy-makers. The evolution of new (sub)political 
spaces is marked by a growing range of initiatives to engage stakeholders 
and the wider public in the discussion of new emerging technologies (Irwin 
& Wynne, 1996; Joss & Durant, 1995; Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990). According to Latour (1998), the development of a new 
technology like animal biotechnology is a collective experiment, in which we 
are all embarked. This implies a number of role changes. Science is no longer 
expected to end social controversies by providing the accurate and final 
evaluation of the problem at hand. Science rather forms one of the players 
in the field, providing new, uncertain ingredients for a collective process of 
development. The participating publics need to develop an appreciation of 
citizenship in order to meaningfully participate in the democratic process. 
Policy-makers and politicians need to increase their awareness of other 
views, values and interests. Ethicists are no longer the gatekeepers of the 
universal standards of morality, but much rather they are concerned with the 
development and implementation of methods of inquiry and deliberation. In 
the discussion part of this thesis, these role changes will be further explored.
Chapter 3
The ethics of animal biotechnology
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Animal biotechnology is not merely a new emerging technology with a 
number of morally problematic aspects; it is a social controversy. Both in the 
academic domain of ethics and in the public arena, there is an apparent need 
for moral reflection and judgment with regard to the developments of animal 
biotechnology. However, the value pluralism associated with the societal 
context of animal biotechnology significantly complicates moral reflection 
and judgment, as this chapter will address. Section 3.1 examines the current 
practice of animal ethics. It is argued that the rational foundationalism of 
traditional ethics still results in a focus of contemporary animal ethics on 
the justification of the animal’s moral considerability in a single (set of ) 
moral principles. The practice of animal biotechnology ethics displays the 
same focus on theoretical discussions. Evidently, there is a tension between 
the aim to develop a monistic ethical theory and value pluralism. Section 
3.3 proposes an alternative conception of ethics, building on the insights of 
Deweyan philosophical pragmatism.
3.1  Ethical monism in animal ethics    
Despite the long history of relationships between humans and animals and 
the major – often technological- changes taking place in these relationships 
over the past hundred years, it is only recently that a significant rise in the 
moral reflection on human-animal relationships could be witnessed. Peter 
Singer’s publication of Animal Liberation in 1975 marked the growing 
concern for animal welfare that started in the late 1960s in both the academic 
and public domain. Singer (and others) compared the animal welfare and 
rights movement with the liberation movements that ended discrimination 
on the basis of arbitrary characteristics like race or sex. The claims of 
emancipation were extended to animals as people began to protest against 
the treatment of animals in scientific experimenting and what was called 
“factory farming”. The expansion of the circle of moral consideration to 
animals now has become more and more acknowledged. But on what kind 
of grounds should we care for animals? What is it about animals that they 
deserve our moral consideration? Light and McKenna (2004) signified 
that although developments in the moral reflection on animals are moving 
quickly, the question of justification still is at the centre of the battleground 
in professional animal ethics as well as the public realm. The majority of 
philosophical arguments in animal ethics center on justification of the claim 
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that animals are proper objects of moral consideration. Although these 
accounts rely on different and sometimes contradictory arguments, their 
basic concern is the same: justification of the moral status of the animal on 
neutral grounds (Aaltola, 2005). Many philosophers have proposed that there 
is something intrinsically valuable about an animal. Saying something has 
intrinsic value is saying that it is valuable as an end-in-itself, not merely as 
a means to another end. There is an on-going disagreement however what 
quality or entity related to the animal we should regard as the end-in-itself. 
Is it the animal itself? Its genome? Or its interests and needs? The literature 
on animal ethics contains many elaborated and worthwhile accounts of 
the moral considerability of animals offering different and sometimes 
mutually exclusive arguments (Armstrong & Botzler, 2003; Garner, 2005). 
Many of these philosophical accounts of the moral considerability of 
animals are examples of ethical monism. This is the belief that there is a 
single, comprehensive and systematic account of morality that can end 
indeterminacy and value conflict (Smith, 2003). It aims for a unifying 
principle or set of principles that enables judgment of morally problematic 
situations by evaluating competing values against overarching criteria. The 
desire for a single ethical theory for the justification of our interactions with 
the world is not something unique to animal ethics. The quest for a universal 
ethical truth is common within mainstream moral philosophy (Williams, 
1996). It dominates a long tradition exemplified by the identification and 
justification of general principles that will resolve the conflicts between the 
incompatible claims of different traditions. In the field of animal ethics, the 
disputes between opposing ethical theories and traditions are abundant. 
 The two most elaborate and best-known philosophical accounts 
of the moral considerability of animals have been put forward by Peter 
Singer and Tom Regan. Their positions correspond to the two major lines of 
reasoning in traditional ethics, respectively utilitarianism and deontology. 
Both their arguments will be briefly outlined here. It is not my intention 
to provide an extensive discussion of their arguments. They have been 
elaborately assessed elsewhere (DeGrazia, 1996; Light & McKenna, 2004). 
Merely, I want to put forward that although these arguments build on 
different criteria for moral considerability, they share a similar structure: the 
monistic justification of moral considerability in one, single moral standard.
 Singer’s account of animal ethics is a straightforward application of 
the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. Singer (1975) argued that animals 
and humans, despite all of their differences, are equal in their sentience, the 
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ability to experience states of pain and pleasure. According to Singer, sentient 
beings should not be exposed to (unnecessary) suffering. In his view, the 
capacity for suffering and enjoyment is the necessary and sufficient reason 
to give equal consideration to the interests of a being. However, Singer’s 
approach runs into a series of demarcation and definition problems. How can 
we know where to draw the line between the domain of sentient beings (that 
deserve our moral consideration) and the domain of non-sentient beings 
(that do not)? In the meantime, a vast amount of ethics and biology literature 
has accumulated, scrutinizing the various cognitive capacities of animals (see 
Armstrong & Botzler, 2003). 
 Also Regan’s (1988) view does not escape demarcation and definition 
issues. In a response to the sentience views of Singer and others, Regan 
firmly rejected the superiority of a being’s interests over the being itself. 
He argued that animals are something more than the “vessels of sentient 
welfare” utilitarians make of them. His animal rights perspective is based on 
the idea that every individual being is a ‘subject of life’ and should therefore 
be treated with respect. Being a subject of life, according to Regan, requires 
a specific set of psychological capacities, such as the ability to have beliefs, 
desires and memory. Regan holds that at least some animals, like mammalian 
animals and birds, do possess these capacities, therefore are subjects of life 
and should be respected as ends-in-themselves. His deontological approach 
can be seen as an extension of the Kantian principle of ‘respect for others’ 
as they are ends-in-themselves. However, also with regard to Regan’s animal 
rights approach, we would have to decide on what it means to be a subject of 
life. Regan (1988) refers to a specific subset of beings; other theorists argue 
that all living beings are a subject of life (see for example Taylor, 1986). The 
philosophical accounts of both Regan and Singer have made a remarkable 
contribution to the moral reflection on human- animal relationships as well 
as the movement of animal liberation. Although other approaches have 
emerged, like for instance Midgley’s (1983) ‘ethics of care’ or the coherence 
model of DeGrazia (1996), the utilitarian and deontological positions have 
predominantly shaped the animal welfare and rights debate since its rise in 
the late 1960s.
The	ethics	of	animal	biotechnology	 	 	
In the context of animal biotechnology, the discussion whether individual 
animals or their qualities, states and experiences are intrinsically valuable as 
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ends-in-themselves became even more dominant (reviewed in Thompson, 
1997). Like Jasanoff (2005) noted, animal biotechnology immediately 
interferes with the form and identity of animal life. This feature of animal 
biotechnology not only attracted the public’s attention; it stimulated the 
philosophical debates about the moral considerability of animals as well. 
Again, many of the attempts to justify the value of animals have been 
examples of the ambition of ethical monism. Philosophers and ethicists 
stumbled on each other in their search for a single, timeless and essential 
trait in which the moral standing of animals can be grounded. Due to its 
monistic focus, the philosophical debate on the moral dimensions of animal 
biotechnology has turned into an abstract process of endlessly defending and 
refuting rival theories. This section aims to illustrate this point by giving a 
short overview of the diverse philosophical arguments.
 The sentience perspective articulated by Singer and others holds little 
objections to animal biotechnology because many modifications of animal 
genomes have little impact on the animal’s health and welfare. Philosophers 
defending the moral position of individual animals as ends-in-themselves 
have however argued that some important morally problematic aspects are 
not accounted for in the sentience view (see for a review Holland & Johnson, 
1998; Thompson, 1997). A large part of this philosophical discussion centres 
on two notions developed to justify the individual moral value of the animal: 
the animal’s telos and the animal’s naturalness. Conceptual issues surround 
both. The concept of telos refers to the Aristotelian idea that animal’s have 
a purpose, a goal in life. Rollin (1989), one of the primary contributors 
to the ethics of animal biotechnology, adopted an evolutionary version 
of the concept, describing it as the unique, evolutionary determined and 
environmentally shaped set of needs and interests that characterize the 
animal in question. He sees no moral problems in changing an animal’s telos 
per se, since it will only change the set of functional needs of the animal, 
which will subsequently be the set of needs to be respected. In Rollin’s 
conceptualization it is only wrong to intervene in an animal’s telos when 
the interests constituted by its telos are harmed. For example, the genetic 
engineering of a mouse is only morally problematic when that intervention 
restricts the mouse’s specific patterns of behaviour, such as foraging and 
patrolling. According to Holland (1995) however, this definition of telos is 
historically mistaken. The original Aristotelian concept of an animal’s telos 
refers to its final cause, offering a teleological explanation of why an animal 
is like it is (i.e birds have wings to fly), whereas Rollin claims to adhere to an 
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evolutionary account. Also Verhoog (1992) argued that telos relates to the 
nature of an animal itself. He furthermore argues that a particular telos is 
characteristic of a species and instantiated in the individuals of that species. 
Changing its telos therefore tampers with an animal’s nature as being a 
potential member of a species. Verhoog argued that Rollin misuses the 
word telos stating that human beings can change the telos of an animal by 
creating a substitute. Whatever has been done to an animal’s original natural 
endowment, he asserted, it has not been supplied with a new telos of its own. 
Rather, it has had a human telos imposed on it, i.e. the functional purpose of 
a mouse in biomedical research (see also Holland, 1995). Verhoog’s point is 
that respect for telos as a ground for the intrinsic value of individual animals 
simply implies a strong objection to the departure from the natural. He 
concluded that an animal deserves “to be treated as a goal in itself, and not 
merely as a means towards the well-being of others” (Verhoog, 1992). 
 Holland (1995) also argued that changing an animal’s telos puts 
respect for the states of a subject above the respect for the subject itself. Like 
Regan (1988), Holland and Verhoog expand the Kantian principle of ‘respect 
for others’ as they are ends-in-themselves. Holland acknowledged that 
Kant was referring to human relationships, although he sees no convincing 
argument why this principle should not be extended to human-animal 
relationships. However, the justifications of the claim that animals are ends-
in-themselves remains surrounded by conceptual issues. The reference to 
‘species’ begs the question whether species are real existing categories. A 
similar objection can be made to the use of the concept of ‘naturalness’ 
(Sagoff, 2001). It is the teleological character of the concept of telos that 
makes it difficult to ground it in the external world. Being a member of the 
sheep species somehow means sheepness is one’s purpose. But according to 
the theory of evolution, animals are in constant flux. Contemporary biology 
does not recognize teleological factors as ‘facts of nature’, like Aristotle did. 
‘Species’ and ‘naturalness’ are categories of human experience rather than 
that they actually exist in an external world. In that perspective, ‘sheepness’ 
might say more about what it is to be human than about what it is to be a 
sheep.
Endless discussions
Of course, these and other accounts in animal ethics and the subfield of 
animal biotechnology ethics have greatly contributed to our philosophical 
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understanding of the moral aspects of the relationships between humans 
and animals. The attempt to justify the moral considerability of animals on 
neutral grounds has yielded a number of powerful underpinnings of the 
moral value of animals. Then, what is so problematic about their monism? 
First of all, the richness and diversity of the field itself not at all suggests that 
there is a single fundamental trait in which the value of animals is grounded. 
Rather, the monistic desire of animal ethics appears to be unproductive 
and perhaps uncreative. In the attempt to ground the respect for animals 
in a single and fundamental ethical concept, philosophical debates run 
into a number of epistemological and metaphysical problems as well as 
enduring disagreements. The never-ending definition and demarcation 
discussions, which were outlined above, constitute a good example of this 
trend. McReynolds (2004) has indicated that the assumption that there is 
some essential characteristic that one should have to be included in the 
set of beings with moral status, always displays some kind of historical 
development. First, a certain trait, like rationality or intelligence, is observed 
as a quality of a specific subset of beings, whereas later this domain of 
moral considerability is extended to other beings as well. This pattern of 
development not only suggests a never-ending prolongation, but is, according 
to McReynolds, also a sign of misdirection. The selection of a certain trait 
that is necessary and sufficient for animals to have moral status appears to 
say little about the value of animals in general. Rather is says something about 
who’s valuing and the things we tend to value.
 Smith (2003), evaluating the role of ethical monism in environmental 
ethics, has noted that not only in environmental ethics itself, but also in the 
broader field of moral philosophy the main preoccupation of philosophers 
seems to be the defense and refutation of competing systematic theories. In 
the pursuit of irrefutable arguments, Smith indicated, thought experiments 
have become more and more hypothetical, trying to create an ethical theory 
that can deal with all potential situations. Like Musschenga (1992) noted, it 
seems impossible that philosophers will ever find conclusive arguments to 
“end such debates, not even those inside themselves.” The quest for a single, 
systematic theory to guide our ethical judgments presumably originates from 
the desire to overcome the conflict and indeterminacy present in many of 
the complex moral situations we have to deal with. Here we find a second 
shortcoming of ethical monism in animal ethics. It excludes a variety of 
values and ideals that are present in our societies and do pertain to morally 
problematic situations in the relationships between humans and animals. In 
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line with Smith (2003), we argue here that ethical monism needlessly limits 
the necessary consideration of the variety of relationships between humanity 
and non-human nature. This thesis is concerned with the role of ethics in the 
governance of the animal biotechnology controversy. If animal biotechnology 
ethics is to take the pluralism of moral values in society into account, a more 
open and flexible approach is needed.
3.2	 An	alternative	way:	the	revival	of	pragmatism
The philosophical debates about animals and animal biotechnology are 
symptomatic of a dissociation of theory and practice in the mainstream 
approaches to ethics. The practice of animal biotechnology is subject to 
contingency and change and shaped in co-evolution with society’s diverse 
values and ideals. Dominant approaches in animal ethics, on the other hand, 
appear to focus on the application of general rules and principles. These 
approaches seem to be pre-occupied with the justification of those principles 
instead of the careful examination and discussion of the problematic context 
of animal biotechnology. This section examines the possibilities of new ways 
of ethics in order to improve the understanding and evaluation of animal 
biotechnology. That means seeking the development of normative guidelines 
without disregarding the dynamic character of animal biotechnology and 
the value pluralism of the Dutch society. The perspective of philosophical 
pragmatism, particularly the pragmatism of John Dewey, may offer such 
an approach. Dewey’s conception of ethics is pluralistic, democratic and 
creative. The inquiry and deliberation of a wide range of moral values and 
ideals is a central activity. This section will argue that the perspective of 
Deweyan pragmatism offers an appropriate conceptual framework for a 
reflective learning approach to the social problem of animal biotechnology.
The pragmatist shift to contextualism
The co-evolution of animal biotechnology and society results in an on-
going process characterized by contingency and change. The context of 
the Dutch society encompasses a mixture of arguments, beliefs, values and 
ideals. It is questionable whether foundationalist, purifying approaches to 
ethics constitute the most productive way of conceptualizing moral inquiry 
under these circumstances. Keulartz et al. (2004) argue that the rational 
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foundationalist orientation of traditional applied ethics produces a lack 
of ethical vocabulary to effectively understand and evaluate this strongly 
dynamic character of animal biotechnology. Furthermore, these approaches 
insufficiently take account of the value pluralism of the socio-cultural 
context. The implications of technological change and value pluralism for the 
moral evaluation of animal biotechnology require a shift to contextualism. 
This means that ethicists, as Minteer (2004) has put it, should start working 
from the opposite direction in the ethics-practice relationship. Rather than 
scrutinizing a priori formulated general ethical principles, they might start 
an inquiry into the empirical circumstances of the animal biotechnology 
context. Animal biotechnology ethics should turn to the concrete situations 
in which various values and concerns come into conflict. This will open up 
the possibility to rethink the diversity of relationships between humans, 
animals and technology and find new ways for addressing social conflict.
 Philosophical pragmatism offers an approach to ethics that is open 
to contextualism and at the same time active in the production of moral 
guidelines. Light and McKenna (2004), the editors of ‘Animal pragmatism’, 
state that the strength of the pragmatist alternative is that it is grounded in an 
approach that is pluralistic, fallibilistic and flexible. It can adapt to changing 
circumstances and practices, because it is not tied to principles “that are 
too often divorced from people’s everyday lived experience. According to 
Minteer (2004), the pragmatist alternative celebrates value pluralism, because 
it accepts the historical context of moral experience, and it embraces an 
open, experimental approach to ethical claims. The school of philosophical 
pragmatism originated from the work of the American philosophers 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and particularly John Dewey in 
the late 19th and early 20th century. Recently, a new wave of pragmatist 
philosophers has arrived, criticizing the rational foundationalist approaches 
in ethics for their failure to get a full grasp on the complexity and diversity 
of our contemporary moral problems (Dickstein, 1998; Light & McKenna, 
2004). Also in the field of animal and environmental ethics the pragmatist 
alternative is increasingly suggested (Keulartz et al., 2002b; Light & Katz, 
1996; Minteer & Manning, 1999). These proposals mainly follow the work of 
John Dewey. This philosopher strongly criticized many ethical theories and 
institutions because of their distrust in the capacity of human intelligence to 
find innovative resolutions for new moral problems that arise. His main focus 
was therefore the reconstruction of philosophy. Dewey was convinced that 
the complexity of human experience required a more open, experimental 
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and creative approach to moral inquiry. The following paragraphs discuss 
Dewey’s philosophical program and specifically his orientation to ethics. 
Subsequently, I will sketch the contours of a pragmatist ethics approach 
towards new emerging technologies.
Dewey’s	reconstruction	of	ethics
Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism is known for its anti-foundational 
character. He viewed ethics as a process of inquiry and action, originating in 
response to a problematic situation, aimed at the resolution of that situation 
(Albrecht, 2004). Dewey (1920) understood reality as a process, characterized 
by continuity, contingency and change. The changing circumstances of 
reality demand the permanent adjustment of judgment. Hence, Dewey 
firmly rejected the search for absolute foundations or absolute truths. All 
our convictions have a provisional nature and should remain susceptible to 
critical appraisal. Dewey strongly objected to the habit of moral philosophy 
to treat its favoured categories and distinctions as if they were real 
existing entities, independent of any context or its human interpretation. 
He criticized the view of morality as an external, autonomous domain, 
independent of the context of moral experience (Dewey, 1932). On the 
contrary, he emphasized the central role of experience in the development 
of our relations and interactions with the world around us. Dewey felt that 
the pre-occupation with irrefutable theories and universal moral standards 
had distracted moral philosophers from moral experience as it was actually 
felt and lived. He was convinced it is always a “felt” question or confusion 
that makes us aware of a morally problematic aspect of a certain situation 
(Pappas, 1998). Minteer (2004) pointed out that the role of past experience 
is important in Dewey’s philosophical program, because it demonstrates 
our persistent struggle with the presence of conflicting values in our moral 
judgment due to the complexity of morally problematic situations. Dewey 
regarded the tendency to absolutize ethics as a failure to see that any 
meaningful inquiry occurs within the unique context of a situation. He 
criticized traditional approaches to the dilemmas of moral experience for not 
recognizing the complexity of morally problematic situations as well as the 
novel demands and circumstances of new situations (Minteer, 2004). The first 
important element in Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics thus is a transfer of 
its focus from the justification of absolute moral principles to the inquiry of 
morally problematic situations. 
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Dewey regarded the uncritical approval of fixed notions and ideas as 
extremely unproductive. The complexity of human experience much rather 
requires an experimental, open and flexible method of moral inquiry. In 
order to meet the demands of morally problematic situations arising in 
our experience, we have to develop creative-intelligent responses to these 
situations. The importance of creative-intelligent inquiry is the second 
important element of Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics. It testifies to a firm 
belief in the ability of individuals (and communities) to examine the needs 
of a problematic situation and reconstruct the moral resources accumulated 
in experience in order to critically appraise and evaluate it (Minteer, 2004). 
This relates to the third aspect of Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics. The way 
moral experience is ‘felt’ and ‘lived’ is always constructed in relation to other 
members of a moral community. The undeniably social context of morality 
therefore not only requires individual reflection but also public deliberation.
Dewey’s	critique	of	monism
Because of the complex and changing circumstances of morally problematic 
situations, Dewey’s radical pragmatism rejects the monistic application of 
a single principle or set of principles developed prior to reflection on those 
situations. In Dewey’s (1932) view moral principles should be seen as only a 
part of the entire process of appraisal and inquiry into our moral experience 
of problematic situations. A priori selection of one (or a few) of them 
would merely hamper open intelligent moral inquiry. Minteer (2004) has 
argued that, in understanding the open-ended nature of moral experience, 
philosophical pragmatism embraces the truth of value pluralism. Since there 
is no a priori, context-independent way to rank the diverse values present in 
our moral experience, Minteer proceeded, morally problematic situations 
will have to be resolved by practical deliberations of those values. 
 This does not mean that moral values or principles have to be 
dismissed. They are merely conceived of as hypothetical solutions to a 
morally problematic situation. In such a way, the ‘rightness’ of a moral claim 
does not depend on the intrinsic nature of a value or principle underlying this 
claim, but on the extent to which it contributes to the resolution of specific 
morally problematic situations. This contribution can only be determined in 
a process of thoughtful and reflective inquiry. 
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Minteer concludes that ethical theories in a pragmatic sense are seen as 
critical tools - instruments- for analyzing and interpreting moral problems 
and conflicts, no fixed ends or positions that we have to grant some 
privileged philosophical status. 
Ethics	as	a	process	of	inquiry	and	deliberation
Traditionally, the focus of animal ethics has been substantive, aimed at the 
justification of the moral considerability of animals. Dewey’s fear was that 
fixed ends, because of their a priori, absolutist and foundational character, 
would merely obstruct moral inquiry (Minteer, 2001). If one looks at the 
value debates in animal ethics and animal biotechnology ethics, Dewey’s 
fear at least to some extent became reality. The standards for grounding the 
individual value of the animal are often treated as non-negotiable ends-in-
themselves. In their attempts to justify these standards, philosophers end 
up in endless boundary and definition discussions. In the meantime, a rich 
diversity of values that can have a meaningful relation to the problematic 
situation at hand is precluded from thoughtful inquiry and deliberation. 
Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics results in a procedural view of ethics in 
which values and principles emerge through the method of experimental 
inquiry and deliberation. It redefines ethics as a particular way of solving 
moral problems. It suggests that we should address the moral conflicts in 
animal ethics as practical disputes that demand for cooperative inquiry and 
deliberation rather than abstract philosophical debates. 
Pragmatist ethics for a technological culture
The previous chapters repeatedly stressed that the problems of animal 
biotechnology possess an undeniably complex and political character. In line 
with Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics, a pragmatist approach to the ethics 
of animal biotechnology should therefore be democratic and pluralistic. 
Furthermore, the development of animal biotechnology has a strongly 
dynamic character, constantly confronting us with new moral problems. A 
pragmatist approach to the ethics of animal biotechnology should therefore 
also be flexible and creative. 
 Keulartz et al. (2002b) have indicated that the pre-occupation with 
general and abstract truths is counterproductive because it distracts attention 
from the concrete problems and conflicts associated with the dynamic 
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context of those technologies. The emergent character of these problems and 
conflicts much rather is in need of creative-intelligent activity in a permanent 
process of inquiry by means of which traditions, customs and institutions 
are tested against new conditions. Following Rorty (1979), Keulartz et al. 
(2002b) consider the central theses of pragmatism anti-theses, directed at 
some basic philosophical principles that form an obstacle for the productive 
solution of real-life problems. The obstruction of creative-intelligent inquiry 
is the main reason for pragmatists to turn against the foundationalism 
and essentialism of traditional ethics in situations that actually require 
flexibility and context-sensitivity. Keulartz et al. (2004) point out that also 
the dualism of traditional ethics is highly counterproductive, because it 
encourages ‘black and white’ thinking. According to Dewey, dualisms are 
the disappointing result of starting moral contemplation with theory instead 
of the experience of the lived situation (Pappas, 1998). Dewey considered 
human thought and knowledge as instrumental in the adaptation to natural 
and social environments. The human agent is inseparably connected to these 
environments in a contextual unit of interaction. Experience is described 
as the process which results from this transactional relationship (Van der 
Scheer, 1999). It is important to note here that in a pragmatist view humans 
are not opposing the world but an integral part of it. Experience does not 
serve to have knowledge of the world, but to solve practical problems in 
the world. The dualisms marking traditional moral thought only obstruct 
our experience of and reflection on concrete moral problems in real life 
situations. Dewey turned against philosophy’s pre-occupation with solving 
theoretical and abstract problems. He preferred a philosophy that “ceases 
to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a 
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men” 
(Dewey, 1920).
 Keulartz et al. (2002b), largely following a Deweyan approach, 
have outlined a pragmatist ethics for a technological culture. They argue 
that the first merit of pragmatism in the understanding and evaluation 
of new emerging technologies is the recognition of the co-evolution 
between science, technology and society. Also Hickman (2001), one of the 
contemporary American proponents of philosophical pragmatism, has 
noted that one of the important insights of pragmatism is that our culture 
is basically a technological culture, characterized by the entanglement of 
ethical, social and technological aspects. Pragmatism shares this insight with 
the academic field of Science and Technology Studies. Although in Dewey’s 
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time technologies might have been less complex, the relationships between 
humanity and technology are an important aspect in his philosophy. Dewey 
considered the technologies with and by which we live to be an integral part 
of our ‘existential matrix of inquiry’, which he understood as the locus of 
our interactions - biological and cultural- with the environment (McGee, 
2003). Like language, technologies shape the way we look at others, and 
ourselves, providing the context of meaning we inhabit. Dewey rejected the 
idea that technologies are a simple, neutral means to achieve our cultural 
ends. In his perspective, means and ends transgress each other such that 
they can only be separated retrospectively. Building on this line of argument, 
Keulartz et al. (2004) maintain that the strongly dynamic and uncertain 
character of emerging technologies endlessly presents us with new moral 
problems, giving rise to social conflict. They emphasize the need for creative 
management of those conflicts. According to Caspary (2000) the resolution 
of social conflict is the central focus of attention in pragmatist ethics. 
Also Keulartz et al. (2004) assert that the moral focus of pragmatist ethics 
revolves around the possibilities for living and working together. The source 
of morality in a pragmatist view is not expelled to some abstract, external 
domain, but situated within the collective human experience of democratic 
communities. Peaceful cohabitation and fruitful cooperation between people 
with different views serve as the moral touchstone. 
Reconstructing the activities of ethics 
The pragmatist reconstruction of ethics implies a transformation of the 
activities of ethics, referred to by Keulartz et al. (2004) as ‘two progressive 
problem shifts’. The first is a shift from product to process. According 
to Caspary (2000), pragmatism’s centre of attention has always been the 
process of inquiry rather than its end-products. Ultimately aimed at the 
resolution of social conflict, pragmatist ethics is articulated as a process 
of experimental inquiry and deliberation in order to consider the entire 
range of values and claims relevant to the resolution of a problematic 
situation. The activities of pragmatist ethics shift to the refinement of the 
process of inquiry and the development of effective methods of cooperative 
problem solving. Furthermore, ethical inquiry is framed as a more creative 
and dynamic process, in which discovery and invention are important 
characteristics of moral deliberation (Minteer, 2004). This constitutes the 
second problem shift Keulartz et al. (2004) have in mind: a shift from the 
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context of justification to the context of discovery. In the context of a strongly 
dynamic and uncertain co-evolution between technology and society, new 
constructs and hypotheses are needed in order to understand and evaluate 
new moral problems. Keulartz et al. refer to discovery in pragmatist ethics 
as “the creative capacity for the innovation and invention of vocabularies 
which provide new meanings and open new perspectives”. Dewey too 
viewed the reconstruction of concepts and visions no longer adequate in 
resolving problematic situations as the most important activity of philosophy. 
Traditions and customs but also language and concepts will always have to be 
adjusted to new problematic contexts.
 In the light of the two problem shifts, Keulartz et al. (2004) have 
manufactured a task package for pragmatist ethics (see Table 3.1). Each 
combination of a specific operational context and focus requires a different 
task of ethics and a different role for ethicists. Different aspects of a problem 
ask for activity in different tasks domains. In practice, the activities of 
pragmatist ethics will revolve around the boundaries of the various task 
domains. For an extensive discussion of these tasks and roles we refer to their 
paper. 
Table 3.1 The tasks for a pragmatist ethics. Adapted from Keulartz et al.  
  (2004).
product process
context of justification traditional ethics            (a)
providing arguments and 
justifications for courses 
of action
discourse ethics             (b)
structuring fair public 
deliberation and decision 
making
context of discovery dramatic rehearsal         (c) 
criticizing and renewing 
vocabularies; exploring 
possible future worlds
conflict management    (d)
aiding open confrontation 
of moral vocabularies and 
worldviews
Box (a) refers to the traditional task of ethics. The ethicists’ role is that of a 
moral analyst who provides and clarifies moral arguments, endowing moral 
rules and principles with justification. Box (b) refers to discourse ethics, as 
it is developed by Habermas (1993). Its goal is to improve the rationality of 
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public deliberation and decision making. The role of the ethicist is that of 
a referee, developing procedures and institutions warranting equal access 
and fair representation. Box (c) refers to the Deweyan concept of ‘dramatic 
rehearsal’: the imaginative evaluation of the possible consequences of 
different courses of action (Caspary, 2000). The role of the ethicist here 
is twofold. First, providing a critique of existing patterns, customs and 
vocabularies. Second, creating new concepts and constructs in order to 
understand future arrangements. The use of future scenarios and vision 
assessment in contemporary science and technology studies can be seen 
as examples of this activity (Grin & Grunwald, 2000; Roelofsen, 2008). 
Box (d) involves handling the deep-seated, fundamental value conflicts 
that often arise from the development of new technologies. Keulartz et al. 
(2004) stress the importance of pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism with this 
respect. Participants of an ethical discussion can never completely leave 
their own, historically situated, perspective behind. In modern, pluralistic 
societies, ethical discussions take place between people holding different and 
competing worldviews (see also Bohman, 1996). The question becomes how 
to handle fundamental value conflicts if the possibilities for consensus and 
compromise are diminished. Keulartz et al. (2004) put forward the ideal of 
“equal coexistence”. This however requires an attitude of reflexive awareness 
of the actors involved. They should become aware of the existence of other, 
equally legitimate views. This would entail rejecting the naivety of dogmatic 
beliefs, recognizing one’s own fallibility and leaving room for “reasonable” 
dissensus. The ethicist plays a role in facilitating the open confrontation of 
worldviews and the achievement of reflexive awareness.
Chapter 4
The governance of animal biotechnology
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The practice of ethics would benefit from a pragmatist approach in the 
understanding and evaluation of the strongly dynamic and contingent 
character of the animal biotechnology context. Pragmatist ethics recognizes 
the technological culture and is pluralist, democratic and creative. A 
pragmatist approach moves away from abstract philosophical debates about 
the justification of a priori values and principles. Rather, moral conflicts 
are perceived as practical disputes that demand for cooperative inquiry 
and deliberation. This chapter reviews the implications of this pragmatist 
orientation to ethics for the governance of animal biotechnology. 
 Section 4.1 first reviews the current practice of animal biotechnology 
governance in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the inherent uncertainty 
and social polarization of animal biotechnology has led to a special form of 
ethical regulation. A central role is dedicated to the concept of the intrinsic 
value of animal, developed to sustain the animal’s own interests in the 
ethical judgment of animal use. Section 4.1 however analyzes the use of the 
intrinsic value concept as an example of the ethical monism discussed in 
the earlier sections. It is argued that the use of this concept has merely led 
to an obstruction of the deliberation of a wide range of values and concerns. 
Section 4.2 therefore explores an alternative way of governing animal 
biotechnology. The theoretical perspective of argumentative policy analysis 
provides a promising approach. It assumes a fallibilist, pragmatist rationality, 
emphasizing the importance of democratic deliberation in the process of 
policy analysis and decision making.
4.1 The Dutch approach 
The notion that individual animals have a value of their own has played a 
prominent role in the Netherlands, both in the legislative process as well as 
public and political debates. Since 1981, the Dutch law on the treatment of 
animals endorses the ‘intrinsic value’ of the individual animal as the reference 
point of their policy on animal health and welfare. As such, it expresses the 
desired attitude of respect towards animals (Brom, 1999). The increase of 
genetic engineering in animal experimentation led to ethical regulation in 
which respect for intrinsic value was explicitly incorporated. The Dutch 
government recognized that management of the rising social controversy 
was important and responded by proposing the no, unless policy in the 
Draft Animal Health and Welfare Act of 1992 (Brom & Schroten, 1993). 
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The act stated that biotechnological procedures that harm the ‘intrinsic 
value’ of animals are prohibited unless it can be substantiated that these 
procedures serve a significant important purpose and no reasonable 
alternatives exist. The animal welfare act has been further developed in the 
Animal Biotechnology Decree of 1997. An independent research ethical 
advisory committee, the Committee for Animal Biotechnology (CAB) 
assesses whether a license can be granted in a case-by-case format. The 
CAB represents a range of scientific expertises. It is composed of four life 
science scientists, a social scientist, a laboratory animal scientist and an 
ethicist. All committee members are explicitly appointed on grounds of their 
independent expertise. Every citizen has the (legal) opportunity to contest 
the pre-advice of the CAB in specially organized public hearings. Next to its 
advisory role, the CAB is explicitly provided with two additional tasks. First, 
the objective of the CAB’s ethical assessment is to clarify and strengthen the 
moral status of the animal. Second, it is the task of the committee to signal 
and formulate problematic developments in an early stage and stimulate 
public discussion of the larger ethical questions and concerns surrounding 
these developments (Brom & Schroten, 1993). 
Evaluating the Dutch governance approach
The effectiveness of the Dutch governance approach to regulation of 
animal biotechnology was evaluated by Paula (2001). He concluded that the 
government’s formal recognition of the intrinsic value of animals did not 
have the desired effect of clarifying and strengthening the moral position of 
the animal. Also the aim of stimulating the public discussion of larger ethical 
issues was insufficiently achieved. What happened? One of the main reasons 
for the low effectiveness of the CAB policy, as follows from Paula (2001), 
is the institutionalization of a procedural mode for ethical assessment, 
characterized by a technical-scientific rationality. According to Paula, the 
CAB mainly operated in a legislative and strategic context. In addition, 
the majority of the committee members was involved in the life sciences 
themselves, which influenced them to avoid risks in the preparation of their 
advice. As a consequence, the CAB activities became of a highly formal 
and juridical character; the committee’s advice lacked the articulation of a 
substantive ethical view. This effect was even enlarged by the case-by-case 
format that was used. A problematic aspect of the institutionalization of 
moral behaviour and decision-making is the likely disappearance of the moral 
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character of the decisions that were taken. By the installation of an expert 
advice committee, the practice of moral deliberation was expelled from the 
political arena. The legislative-strategic context eliminated moral deliberation 
also within the committee. But what about the public hearings? 
 Here we find another problematic aspect of regulation by means 
of an expert advice committee. It is based on the model of an authoritative 
institution that is providing policy guidelines. All committee members of 
the CAB, apart perhaps from the ethicist, have a scientific background. 
Their framing of the moral issues of proposals might have excluded other 
ways of framing. Indeed, the interviews of Paula (2001) showed that the 
committee’s  viewpoints often deviated from those of other societal actors. 
Like is criticized by Wynne (2001) and MacNaghten (2004), the more narrow 
framing of scientific experts excluded the framings of actors in the public 
domain. Due to the scientific framing of moral issues, in combination with 
the procedural character of the CAB practice, there was little space for 
moral reflection on wider issues, such as values and ideals with regard to 
the human-animal relationship or the role of technology in this relationship. 
Whereas actually, as Paula’s analysis (2001) has demonstrated,  public 
concerns about the application of biotechnological procedures on animals are 
often related to these wider issues. Although it was one of the committee’s 
official tasks, the legislative structure of its advisory practice did not provide 
the appropriate framework required for the thoughtful moral reflection on 
wider issues of concern. 
The concept of intrinsic value
Another reason that moral values were not deliberated in the CAB practice 
was the obscurity of meaning of the intrinsic value concept for both the 
committee members as well as the involved social actors. As mentioned 
above, the concept of intrinsic value played a central role in the Dutch 
animal biotechnology policy. Although the concept was supposed to serve 
as a fundamental notion of respect, the law gives no concrete directions on 
how to put the recognition of the intrinsic value into practice (Brom, 1999). 
Despite the efforts of philosophers and ethicists to justify the intrinsic value 
of animals (see Musschenga, 2002; Rutgers & Heeger, 1999), there have 
been ongoing debates in and outside of academia on how the concept of 
intrinsic value should be interpreted and operationalized. Different social 
actors refer to different animal values when they use the concept of ‘intrinsic 
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value’ to express their concerns about animals (Brom, 1999; De Cock Buning, 
1999). In the parliamentary debate about the animal welfare act, it was said 
that “intrinsic value is not an issue: what we are concerned here with is its 
interpretation, which is different for everyone” (Brom, 1999). 
 The evaluation study of Paula (2001) demonstrated the 
complicatedness of the role of intrinsic value in the ethical judgment 
of animal biotechnology cases due to the ambiguities surrounding the 
concept. First of all, in the CAB itself no consensus could be reached on 
the interpretation and relative weight of the concept of intrinsic value. 
In practice, the purpose of biomedical research always overruled the 
impairment of the intrinsic value of the animal. Second, Paula’s expert 
interviews with representatives of non-governmental organisations, license 
applicants, civil servants, politicians, media experts and others showed 
a diversity of interpretations of the meaning and function of the concept 
of intrinsic value. Moreover, the majority of the interviewees thought the 
concept of intrinsic value was too difficult, too abstract or ill-defined to 
express their moral concerns about the biotechnological use of animals and 
therefore to play a meaningful role in the public debate. The obscurity of 
meaning of the ‘intrinsic value’ concept hampers moral deliberation because 
it fails to provide a shared conceptual framework to structure public debate. 
As a result, social actors can only dispute violation of their moral values 
within a legislative context and find themselves repeatedly trapped in a ‘ritual 
dance’ against licensing procedures. The legislative framework seems to lacks 
the appropriate concepts and language to voice deeper moral concerns.
 The concept of intrinsic value was developed to sustain the 
animal’s own interests in the moral judgment of animal use. It serves as the 
conceptual opposite of the instrumental value animals have for their human 
users (Tuuk, 1999). Because it seemed to address the moral concerns that 
go beyond the animal’s health and welfare so well, it was often brought into 
play in “the struggle against anthropocentrism” (Musschenga, 1994). In 
practice however, the conceptualization of intrinsic value as the opposite 
of predominant instrumental values did not clarify the heated value 
conflicts in the biotechnology debate. Because of the obscurity of meaning, 
(possible) value conflicts in the public debate on animal biotechnology in the 
Netherlands could not be not fully articulated nor deliberated. As a result, 
the central role of the intrinsic value concept has rather turned the debate 
into a polarized deadlock (Paula, 2001).
44
Chapter 4
4.2	 Argumentative	policy	analysis	 	 	 	
The perspective of pragmatist ethics implies that a ‘robust’ resolution of the 
social conflicts related to animal biotechnology requires both the renewal of 
moral vocabularies and the creative management of different perspectives. 
The reconstruction of ethics should therefore not be restricted to the practice 
of (academic) philosophers. The public nature of the animal biotechnology 
controversy demands for a reconstruction of the practice of policy making 
as well. The governance of animal biotechnology should incorporate an 
on-going public discussion of its acceptability, addressing the full range of 
concerns related to moral, cultural, political and socio-economic aspects. 
Simultaneously, it should investigate the emergent moral problems the 
technology is associated with. Section 4.1 has indicated that the Dutch 
approach to animal biotechnology governance did aim for these objectives 
but only achieved a low effectiveness. What is needed are new ways of 
making policy, incorporating both the contingency and change of animal 
biotechnology and the value pluralism of the Dutch society. 
The	argumentative	turn	in	policy	analysis
The need for new strategies may benefit from recent changes in the way 
of thinking about policy analysis and policy making. During the past 
decades, policy scientists have increasingly started to focus on the role of 
argumentation in policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). 
The argumentative turn in policy analysis has emerged in response to the 
epistemological limitations of ‘neopositivist’ policy analysis and technocratic 
decision-making practices. The so-called postpositivist movement argued 
that the traditional understanding of the role of policy analysis in settling 
social conflicts was based upon an epistemological misunderstanding of 
the relation between knowledge and politics (Fischer, 2003). Neopositivist 
epistemologies are characterized by the implicit, but mistaken assumption 
of a fixed reality with a necessary and universal character. Fischer (2003) 
has indicated that the goal of neopositivist policy analysis is to generate a 
body of empirical generalizations to explain the behaviour of policy actors 
across social and historical contexts. The main underlying principle is a 
dichotomy between facts and values (Bernstein, 1976). The basic idea is that 
the accumulation of objective, certified knowledge will provide a final answer 
to political conflicts. 
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According to the postpositivist critique however, the policy sciences have – 
less that the natural sciences did- insufficiently incorporated the lessons of 
the epistemological debate of the 2nd half of the twentieth century (Fischer, 
2003). The claim that the application of scientific rationality would provide us 
with certainty about the world has long become untenable. As Hoppe (1999) 
pointed out, scientists of today almost universally acknowledge that scientific 
knowledge is fallible. A contemporary conception of scientific rationality 
recognizes that although every inquiry must begin with prejudgment, there 
is no belief that is not open to further interpretation and criticism. Adopting 
a pragmatist perspective on the nature of knowledge, the provisional nature 
of all judgment implies a willingness to revise one’s view in the confrontation 
with other views or new circumstances. Also the conceptual division 
between facts and values has been fairly criticized by a range of sociologists 
and philosophers of science (see for example Kuhn, 1970; Latour, 1987; Rorty, 
1979). These authors showed that scientific facts are not the “discovered” 
truths about the world, but the products of scientific communities in a 
continuous interaction with reality. Science itself was revealed as a human 
and social activity in which historical and cultural dimensions shape the 
nature of the knowledge that is produced.
 Postpositivists have been accused of attacking a straw man, because 
no modern-day social scientists would recognize themselves in the positivist 
caricature that is drawn. Fischer (2003) however argued that inclinations 
of this view are still present, expressed in methodologies like cost-benefit 
analysis or rational choice models, but mainly in a particular attitude towards 
knowledge. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) even asserted that this attitude is not 
restricted to the practice of social science, but also, and more importantly 
according to these authors, stretches towards the normative beliefs and 
habits of governance and policy making. Indeed, as discussed in section 4.1, 
the evaluation of the Dutch policy approach towards animal biotechnology 
showed that, although the importance of stimulating rather than settling 
public debate was initially acknowledged, the members of the ethical 
assessment committee adopted a more and more technocratic rationality as 
the years – and conflictuous debates- progressed (Paula, 2001).       
 What can be learned from the postpositivists? Their critique has 
two interrelated implications. The first implication concerns the practice 
of policy analysis. The underdetermination of the empirical world requires 
policy analysts to make many interpretive judgments. Data and theory have 
to be connected on the basis of arguments rather than proof (Fischer, 2003). 
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This does not mean that scientific experimentation should be banned from 
the practice of policy analysis and policy making. Rather, it means that 
improving the quality of policy making ultimately depends on argumentative 
practices (Hoppe, 1999). The other implication concerns the role of scientific 
knowledge and expertise in the resolution of social problems. If sociological 
investigation has shown that scientific practices are not bound to the pursuit 
of truth but to conventions and rules like other practices, this suggests that 
scientists are not the only ones capable of making judgments about the 
world. The extent to which a particular line of argumentation, scientific or 
otherwise, contributes to conflict resolution has to be determined within the 
argumentative practice. The provisional and constructed nature of knowledge 
and the importance of processes of argumentation and deliberation thus 
suggest an extended concept of rationality. According to Habermas (1984), 
the scientific rationality aimed at producing empirical knowledge about the 
world only corresponds to one knowledge interest of humanity. Because 
argumentation and deliberation always take place in a social environment, 
interaction and mutual understanding form a second interest. Habermas 
therefore advanced the concept of communicative rationality as a necessary 
complement to a cognitive-analytical rationality. The legitimacy of means and 
ends should always be discussed in a democratic process of argumentative 
exchange.
Intractable	policy	controversies
A focus on the processes of argumentation and deliberation in policy analysis 
and policy-making is particularly important in the face of intractable policy 
problems. The first two chapters of this thesis already characterized animal 
biotechnology as an example of an intractable social controversy. These 
controversies constitute a category of policy problems that contemporary 
societies are increasingly confronted with. They are also described as 
“wicked” (Rittel & Webber, 1973), “messy” (Ackoff, 1974) or “ill-structured” 
(Dunn, 1981). They easily lead to intractable policy controversies because of 
their complex and contested nature. Harmon and Mayer (1986) have argued 
that wicked problems are problems for which there are no solutions, only 
temporary and imperfect resolutions. The boundaries of these problems 
are diffuse; it is hard, if not impossible, to separate them from other 
problems or to distinguish technical, social and environmental aspects. 
First and foremost, the problem of these intractable problems is how to 
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define them. They way in which they are defined, determines the scope of 
potential solutions. Defining a wicked policy problem however, is inherently 
problematic (Fischer, 1993). Policy problems involve a gap between a 
normative standard and an empirical description of a situation. Both the 
standard and the definition of the situation, however, are the result of social 
action and judgment. They are social constructs. Hence, also policy problems 
are not given facts, but social constructs. The acceptability of normative 
standards depends on the level of consensus about them in the democratic 
community. The acceptability of the empirical definitions of a situation 
depends on the degree of uncertainty that is associated with the situational 
context (Hoppe & Peterse, 1993).
Frames
The social construction of problem definitions clearly complicates policy 
practice. Schön and Rein (1994) have offered an eloquent understanding of 
this phenomenon. The publication of ‘Frame reflection’ provided insight into 
why controversies such as abortion, poverty or environmental destruction 
are highly resistant to resolution by an appeal to evidence or reasoned 
argument. Also the animal biotechnology controversy constitutes an 
excellent example. The policy practice of animal biotechnology is flooded by 
different interpretations, belief systems, ideologies and worldviews. Schön 
and Rein argued that different policy positions rest on underlying structures 
of belief, perception and appreciation. They called these structures ‘frames’, 
the perspectives that actors use to make sense of a complex reality and to 
guide their actions. According to Schön and Rein, difficulties in handling 
intractable controversies have therefore more to do with problem setting 
than with problem solving. Multiple views regarding the controversy at 
hand result in various ‘problem-setting stories’. Each story represents a 
specific way of seeing reality. From a problematic situation that is vague and 
indeterminately complex, each story selects and names different features 
and relations that become the elements that the story is about. In the case 
of animal biotechnology, these features and relations may include the 
wellbeing of animals, the impacts of biotechnology, technological progress, 
the wellbeing of humans, the unnaturalness of the technology, the dignity of 
animals et cetera. Each story places the selected set of features and relations 
within the frame of a particular context; for example, the development of 
new drugs and therapies, responsible innovation or the preservation of 
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natural life. Schön and Rein have called this process, by which a specific 
view of social reality is constructed, the complementary process of naming 
and framing. Together, these authors argued, the acts of naming and 
framing construct a problem out of the vague and indeterminate reality 
that John Dewey called ‘the problematic situation’. Schön and Rein have 
distinguished two problem setting functions of frames. First, a diagnosis of 
what the problem is, consisting of a coherently organized, selected set of 
features. Second, a prescription of the way the problem should be resolved 
in the future, based on an evaluation of what is right and wrong with the 
situation at hand. Note that, in this line of thinking, it is the – sometimes 
overwhelming- complexity of the social reality of the genetic modification 
of animals that makes it a problematic situation. What the precise problem 
of genetic modification is and how it should be resolved, depends on the 
framing of the situation. Schön and Rein have indicated that naming and 
framing proceeds through generative metaphor, the transportation of 
a familiar idea to a new situation. In the words of Schön and Rein, “one 
thing is seen as another.” What does that mean for the context of animal 
biotechnology? Some may frame the genetically modified animal as a toolkit 
for scientific research. The animal might be appreciated as just the same 
being except for the presence of some extra base pairs. Others however may 
see a monstrous disruption of natural kinds. Again others may see a wholly 
new manifestation of life. Once we are able to see the genetically modified 
animal as one of these ideas, it becomes clear what is right and wrong about 
it and what should be done.
 Schön and Rein argued that the presence of multiple conflicting 
frames is what makes intractable policy controversies so resistant to 
resolution. Although these actors will have probably entered the policy 
arena on the basis of their interest in the situation, their underlying frames 
determine what they see as being in their interest. More than the negotiation 
of interests, the policy dispute might be seen as a dispute over the “right” 
definition of the problematic policy situation. The different problems and 
solutions that are put forward are grounded in different problem setting 
stories which are again rooted in different frames. What is making the 
presence of conflicting frames even more complicated, Schön and Rein 
asserted, is the fact that they are not free-floating entities. They are grounded 
in the institutions, associations, networks and practices that sponsor 
them. Dryzek (1993) has labeled professional frames as the languages and 
cultures of “tribes of experts”. In that sense, frames can hold institutional 
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arrangements together. In the policy controversy of animal biotechnology 
for example, molecular scientists, biotechnology companies and animal 
protectionists represent mutually incompatible ways of seeing the policy 
situation. The institutional arrangements of those actors merely reinforce the 
habitual ways in which they view the policy situation. According to Schwarz 
and Thompson (1990), professional frames create “contradictory certainties” 
that determine what is seen and judged as relevant by specific actors.
 Finally, there is no possibility of falsifying frames (Schön & Rein, 
1994). The dazzling complexity and information-richness of reality 
necessarily requires the selection and organization of salient elements. The 
only possible way of perceiving and making sense of social reality is through 
framing it. Hence, there is no frame-neutral way to evaluate a particular 
frame. Schön and Rein have pointed to the similarity with Kuhn’s (1970) 
position in the philosophy of science. Kuhn made a distinction between 
periods of normal science, in which scientists work within a shared paradigm 
and agree upon rules and conventions, and periods of scientific revolution, 
in which there is a paradigm crisis. In periods of scientific revolution, there 
is no rational standard to decide between competing paradigms, because 
every possible standard already presupposes a particular paradigm. Rorty 
(1979) has later generalized Kuhn’s distinction to other fields of inquiry, 
emphasizing the same point: frame conflicts can not be solved by an appeal 
to facts or reasoned argumentation, because the involved actors’ conflicting 
frames determine what is perceived as a fact and what arguments are deemed 
to be relevant and persuasive.     
Dealing	with	unstructured	policy	problems
The question remains how best to respond to the animal biotechnology 
controversy. The Dutch policy analysts Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001) have 
argued that the only way to approach these kind of problems is to explicitly 
consider the different ways in which the policy problem is defined, or as 
they call it, structured. According to Hisschemöller and Hoppe, the way in 
which policy problems are structured, determines whether a particular policy 
strategy is appropriate. They have developed a model of policy problems 
distinguishing four ideal typical categories of policy problems: unstructured, 
badly structured, moderately structured and structured  problems (see Table 
4.2). In line with the above, the structuredness of a policy problem depends 
on two characteristics. The first is the degree of consensus amongst policy 
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actors about the certainty of facts relevant for making policy decisions. The 
second is the degree of consensus amongst policy actors about the norms 
and values that are relevant in relation to the policy problem. 
Table 4.1 Different types of policy problems require different policy   
  strategies. Adapted from: Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001). 
consensus about the relevant norms and values
no yes
consensus 
about  the 
certainty of 
relevant facts
no
unstructured problem
policy as learning
moderately structured 
problem
policy as negotiation
yes
badly structured 
problem
policy as accomodation
structured problem
policy as regulation
Paula’s (2001) evaluation study of the Dutch policy approach to animal 
biotechnology used the same typology to understand the structure of the 
policy problem of animal biotechnology. The strongly dynamic nature 
of animal biotechnology significantly enlarges the uncertainty of the 
situational context. As has been discussed in chapter 3, the context of animal 
biotechnology is characterized by persistently low degrees of statistical 
uncertainty, model uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty. Moreover, the 
involved social actors differ in their interpretation of these uncertainties and 
the degree to which they are prepared to accept them. Thus, there is also a 
low degree of consensus about the certainty of relevant facts. Simultaneously, 
the value pluralism of the societal context complicates the acceptability 
of (the relevance of ) normative standards. The policy problem of animal 
biotechnology can be categorized as an unstructured policy problem. 
 The typology of Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001) shows that 
diverging frames can easily be overlooked in policy practice. They stated 
that adopting a strategy suited for the “wrong” policy problem easily leads 
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to intractable controversies. As Table 4.2 indicates, each type of problem 
demands for a different policy strategy. What about the policy problem of 
animal biotechnology, highly infused with value conflicts and uncertainty? 
Policy strategies opting for ‘regulation’ or ‘negotiation’ would mistakenly 
assume a consensus on the values and norms that are at stake. The strategy 
of ‘regulation’ ignores both the uncertainty of the empirical context as 
well as the presence of value conflicts. The strategy of ‘negotiation’ also 
regards the existing value conflicts because the negotiation of interests 
will leave the underlying value frames undeliberated. Both strategies are 
thus likely to contribute to polarization. Also the ‘policy as pacification’ 
strategy is most likely to add to polarization. In order to appease the political 
conflicts, general statements and compromises are sought that comprise 
different problem formulations. However, the strongly dynamic character 
of the development of animal biotechnology would undermine the found 
compromises. Moreover, the value conflict is not solved but “frozen”. 
Eventually, citizens will feel unheard and disrespected by the government’s 
actions. It is a matter of time until the conflict is again incited.
Problem structuring
All three policy strategies discussed so far have in common that the policy-
makers office imposes a problem definition and concordant solution on 
the policy arena. It is characteristic of the technocratic habits of policy-
making practices Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) referred to. Schön and Rein’s 
(1994) account of framing and frame conflicts has indicated that intractable 
controversies are not likely to be solved by the top-down choice of a problem 
frame. Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001) have advocated a policy as learning 
approach aimed at finding out about the nature of the problem. According to 
these authors, the main activity of a ‘policy as learning’ approach is problem 
structuring. Eventually, problem structuring aims at the creation of a new 
and shared vision on what the problem actually is. It is important to note, 
that this new and shared vision does not imply agreement about the problem 
itself, but rather about the structure of the problem. The activity of problem 
structuring prevents us from approaching the “wrong” problem, because 
it aims at problem finding in stead of problem resolution. Hisschemöller 
(1993) has defined it as a “specific form of socio-political interaction aiming 
at awareness of a problem by generating, using, exchanging, confronting, 
evaluating and integrating as much as possible (conflicting) information, 
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which is laid down in causal, normative and final assumptions about the 
problem and its solution”. According to Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001), 
problem structuring is a mutual learning process amongst the social actors 
involved. Social actors with different views should be able to interactively 
deliberate their perceptions of the problem and its potential solutions. 
The	characteristics	of	a	reflective	learning	approach
Hence, the first characteristic of a reflective learning approach towards 
the animal biotechnology controversy is citizen participation. The 
unstructuredness of the policy problem implies that the widest range 
of different viewpoints has to be taken into account in the creation of a 
new vision on the problem. Participation of citizens is required for both 
contextual and instrumental reasons (Hoppe, 1999). The instrumental reason 
argues that, because of the deeply entrenched value disagreements of the 
animal biotechnology controversy, the social robustness of any solution 
strongly depends on the public’s support. The contextual reason concerns the 
relative contributions of experts and non-experts. Animal biotechnology is a 
moral problem. Therefore, scientific or ethical experts do not have privileged 
knowledge about which values are relevant to this problem. Moreover, the 
analysis of animal biotechnology as an unstructured problem indicates 
that experts are strongly divided over the issue. Especially in the context of 
intractable public controversies, citizens have an indispensable contribution 
to make in the process of problem characterization and the consideration of 
potential solutions. 
 The second characteristic of the problem structuring approach 
towards animal biotechnology is frame reflection. According to Schön and 
Rein (1994), ‘frame reflection’ means becoming aware of one’s own frame 
and the frames of others is a central element in the learning process. Th e 
frame-reflective approach of Schön and Rein testifies to the belief that 
human beings have the ability to reflect on and learn about the game of 
policy-making. Hoppe (1999) has argued that the concept of frame reflection 
completely corresponds to the extended concept of rationality advanced 
by Habermas (1984) and others. Frame reflection aims at achieving mutual 
understanding through reflective learning about one’s own frame and 
the frames of others. Eventually, the act of frame reflection may lead to a 
reframing of the policy problem. Schön (1979) has argued that intractable 
controversies are in need of frame restructuring: the process by which we 
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“respond to frame conflict by constructing a new problem-setting story, one 
in which we attempt to integrate conflicting frames by including features and 
relations drawn from earlier stories”. The activity of problem structuring, a 
participatory process of frame reflection, explores the possibilities for frame 
restructuring. Ultimately, problem structuring aims at integrating different 
views into a new and shared vision. In that sense, problem structuring and 
frame reflection revive the Deweyan theme of the creative and constructive 
resolution of conflicts in public life. 
 Although Schön and Rein (1994) provided a rather comprehensive 
account of the attitudes, skills and practices required for their frame-
reflective approach, Hoppe (1999) has argued that more thought should 
be given to the institutional aspects of frame-critical and frame-reflective 
policy analysis. The research project reported in this thesis has developed, 
and experimented with, two deliberative and participatory tools for frame 
reflection. Furthermore, we reflected on the place and function of frame-
reflective tools in the practices of ethics and policy-making. Ultimately, the 
project aspired to contribute to the development and implementation of new 
arrangements for frame-reflective practices.

Chapter 5
Research design
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The introduction of animal biotechnology into the Dutch society has 
from the start been a social controversy. Many of the disagreements are 
not merely conflicts of interests, but conflicts of value. We have argued 
that, in order to deal effectively with the deep-seated value conflicts of the 
animal biotechnology controversy, a more open and democratic approach 
to ethics and governance is required. This thesis reflects on the potential 
of a pragmatic reconstruction of the practices of ethics and governance in 
order to democratize the moral deliberation of animal biotechnology in the 
Netherlands. The primary objective of the thesis is:
To contribute to the (further) development of a conceptual and 
methodological framework for the democratic deliberation of animal 
biotechnology.
We conducted literature studies to develop an approach to ethics and 
governance that suited the context of the animal biotechnology controversy. 
As chapter 3 has discussed, the plurality of legitimate framings of the Dutch 
animal biotechnology controversy requires a conception of ethics that is 
pluralistic and democratic. The experimental, open and flexible approach of 
Deweyan pragmatist ethics offers a well-suited approach to the pluralism of 
the animal biotechnology controversy. In this approach, values and principles 
emerge through the method of experimental inquiry and democratic 
deliberation. With respect to the governance practice, the pragmatist ethics 
approach is well complemented by the insights of argumentative policy 
analysis. According to these insights, the appropriate policy strategy for the 
problem of animal biotechnology is a policy as learning strategy, aimed at 
structuring of the policy problem. Literature study learned that the main 
concept of a methodological framework for democratic deliberation is 
reflective learning (chapter 4). The first main research question of this thesis 
is therefore:
How could an appropriate reflective learning process be designed in order to 
structure the social problem of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands?
To answer this question, we performed a number of social experiments with 
the public deliberation of values and animal biotechnology. The experiments 
we conducted not only yield insight into the appropriate design of public 
deliberation exercises, but also provide an improved understanding of 
the complexity of the animal biotechnology context. Ultimately, the value 
57
Research design
pluralism and factual uncertainty of this context shape the nature of 
successful public deliberation considerably. It has therefore been a secondary 
objective of our research project to obtain an in-depth understanding of 
the value diversity in the reflection on animals in the Netherlands and the 
value conflicts that may occur when different value perspectives meet for 
the deliberation of animal biotechnology. This will provide an improved 
understanding of the possible ways of creative management of the different 
value perspectives in the animal biotechnology controversy. The second main 
research question of this thesis therefore is:
What are the possibilities for problem structuring and reframing of the 
animal biotechnology controversy in the Netherlands?
The empirical work reported in this thesis was performed in 2004 and 
commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for the 
regulation of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands. In response to the 
evaluation study of Paula (2001), the Ministry of Agriculture assigned the 
Athena Institute of the VU University Amsterdam to start an in-depth 
exploration of the diversity of ideas about animals, in particular about the 
intrinsic value of animals, in the Netherlands. This project resulted in an 
advisory report that was handed to the Ministry in the beginning of 2005. In 
the period between 2005 and 2008 we further conceptualized the reflective 
learning approach to animal biotechnology ethics and governance from a 
more academic perspective.
Concepts	and	questions
From the perspective of pragmatist ethics, the moral problems arising from 
the development of animal biotechnology should be addressed as practical 
disputes that demand for cooperative inquiry and deliberation. As chapter 
3 described, this view implies a shift in the activities of ethics from product 
to process and from the context of justification to the context of discovery. 
The focus of a reflective learning approach towards the animal biotechnology 
controversy should be directed to the development and facilitation of 
processes of inquiry and deliberation. From an argumentative policy analysis 
perspective, it becomes clear that the central element of these processes 
of inquiry and deliberation should be frame reflection (see chapter 4). In 
addition, these processes involve the participation of a broad range of citizens 
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in order to examine the ways in which their framings of the problem are 
discursively constructed.
 A first important element of our research design is the separation 
of the context of values and the context of animal biotechnology in the 
facilitation of inquiry and deliberation. Public technology debates often turn 
into the mere negotiation of interests instead of the moral deliberation of 
values. With respect to the Dutch public debate about animal biotechnology, 
it was observed that the strategic context of licensing procedures even 
obstructed the deliberation of a wide range of values (see chapter 4). We 
aimed to structure the deliberation of values explicitly by devising a stepwise 
approach. The first experiment we conducted focused on the articulation 
of the diversity of value frameworks in the reflection on the animal and the 
human-animal relationship in the Netherlands. The second experiment 
would introduce the context of animal biotechnology. We formulated a 
number of research questions to guide the social experiments that were 
conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of how to design a 
reflective learning approach towards the animal biotechnology controversy.
1. How can the frame-reflective participatory inquiry of the value 
diversity in the reflection on animals and the human-animal 
relationship be realized?
2. What are the different ways in which Dutch citizens frame the value 
of animals in the discussion of animals and the human- animal 
relationship?
We needed to create a space for moral inquiry into the intuitions, values 
and beliefs of the cultural contexts in which our interactions with animals 
take place. The meanings of such values and beliefs however do not exist 
as mental entities inside the heads of people, but are actively negotiated 
and constructed during the course of social interaction. It is therefore 
recommended to adopt a more reflexive framework for research into those 
meanings of values and beliefs (Waterton & Wynne, 1999). In recent years, 
the method of focus groups has become recognized as a site of social 
interaction through which meaning and understanding are co-constructed 
(Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999; Madriz, 2000). The deliberative instrument we 
have developed in this project – the value lab- builds on a modified version 
of the focus group methodology. It merges the idea of social interaction in 
59
Research design
focus groups with an explicit in-depth focus on the articulation of underlying 
value frameworks. In the small discussion group setting of the value lab, 
participants acted as co-researchers, inductively constructing their own 
frames of reference. Subsequently, our own team of researchers analyzed the 
discursive products of the value lab sessions again, using a grounded theory 
approach to incorporate the participants’ associations and categorizations. 
The methodological steps taken to facilitate the participants’ philosophical 
reflection on their own ways of thinking and the subsequent grounded 
theory analysis will be elaborately reported and discussed in part B. The value 
lab methodology has been evaluated using the methods of participatory 
observation and short evaluation forms.
The second experiment continued the contextualization of animal 
biotechnology ethics and governance. Building on the empirical 
understanding of the diversity of value frames achieved by the value labs, 
this experiment focused on the articulation of (possible) value conflicts in 
the deliberation of animal biotechnology cases and the understanding of 
the possibilities and impossibilities for reframing the animal biotechnology 
controversy.
3. How can the frame-reflective public deliberation of animal 
biotechnology be realized?
The different frames of the value of animals, reconstructed in the value 
lab discussions, were used as instruments to arrange and structure the 
exercises of public deliberation in the second experiment. Although the 
literature on public participation in science and technology issues contains 
an extensive list of criteria to safeguard the equality and fairness of public 
deliberation exercises (see also part B), there are little references to the 
practical designs that should effectuate those criteria. It was therefore 
one of our objectives to explore the effectiveness of some design elements 
that might improve the dialogical encounter of participants representing 
different perspectives. Part C of this thesis discusses how we, on the basis 
of the reflective learning approach established in chapter 4, developed and 
implemented the experimental dialogues deliberative instrument. In the 
experimental dialogues, participants representing different frames engaged 
in a discussion of concrete animal biotechnology cases. Almost the same 
population of participants that had participated in the value lab discussions 
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also participated in the experimental dialogues. An important aspect of 
the research design was the decision to confront representatives of only 
two value frames at a time. In this way, we carefully explored the range of 
(possible) value conflicts between every combination of frames. 
4. What are the different conflicts of value when Dutch citizens meet to 
discuss cases of animal biotechnology?
The dialogues were arranged according to a semi-structured design in which 
the participants eventually were asked to make a decision together about 
concrete animal biotechnology cases. The assignment to make a decision 
was thought to contribute to the urgency of the discussion. Furthermore, the 
decision formulations would provide us with a means to evaluate the extent 
to which deliberation of frame differences would occur. We were interested 
in the question whether the participants representing different frames were 
able to engage in frame reflection and even reframing of the issues discussed. 
The dialogue methodology has been evaluated by means of participatory 
observation and a group reflection rounds during the sessions and individual 
evaluation conversations by telephone within two weeks after the session.
The final part of this thesis, part D, reflects on the contribution of the social 
experiments with value inquiry and public deliberation to the development of 
a reflective learning process towards the animal biotechnology controversy. 
Furthermore, it reflects on the implications of the implementation of a 
reflective learning process for the roles and activities of ethicists and policy 
makers. A pragmatic reconstruction of the practices of ethics and governance 
demands the incorporation of frame reflection into the production 
and communication of policy guidelines and a continuing focus on the 
facilitation of processes of moral inquiry and deliberation. Democratizing 
animal biotechnology offers the opportunity to acknowledge and appreciate 
uncertainty and pluralism in the moral deliberation of animal biotechnology.
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Part two
Value diversity
Chapter 6
The inquiry of values
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This part of the thesis explores the diversity of values that is present in 
the moral reflection on animals and the human-animal relationship in the 
Netherlands. As was explained in part A, in order to obtain an understanding 
of the value pluralism in the context of animal biotechnology, it was crucial 
to first investigate the value diversity in the reflection on animals in general. 
For this purpose, we designed a social experiment of participatory moral 
inquiry for which we developed a deliberative instrument we have called the 
value lab. This part of the thesis discusses the methodology and results of the 
value lab discussions.
6.1 Humans, animals and the meaning of their relationships
Animals are present in our lives. Throughout history, the relationships 
between humans and animals have contributed to the meaning of human 
life. The diversity of relationships between humans and animals is huge. We 
use animals to satisfy our needs. We manage their lives and environments to 
conserve what we belief is a part of natural life. We destroy them. Worship 
their magnificence. And, we build strong and intimate emotional connections 
with them. Animals play important roles in our societies. They provide 
us with food and other resources we need; they provide us with company. 
They give us symbols and metaphors that we use to make sense of the world 
around us. Additionally, there is a great variety in the meaning of those 
relationships across history, culture and practice. The nature and meaning 
of our relationships with animals is influenced by the way we think about 
animals. At the same time, a change in the practice of these relationships due 
to changes in social organization or technological development influences 
our views and habits. Macnaghten (2004) argued that the relationships 
between humans and animals have undergone profound transformations in 
the 20th century. At least since the industrial revolution, these relationships 
were based on a categorical distinction between humans and animals. 
Animals primarily figured as a resource for human progress (Franklin, 
1999). As discussed in chapter 3, this modernist distinction was seriously 
questioned in the later part of the 20th century when efforts were made to 
expand the domain of moral consideration to animals. The same century is 
however characterized by an on-going intensification of livestock production 
and other forms of systematic animal use. Paradoxically, the increasingly 
instrumental use of animals also generated new forms of empathy towards, 
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and identification with, animals. According to Macnaghten (2004), most 
people nowadays seem to be caught up in a complex web of contradictory 
responses to the current practices of human-animal relationships. They feel 
empathy towards animals, identify with them. Simultaneously they benefit 
from the diverse ways in which animals are instrumentally used for meat, 
clothing, research and leisure. The increasing technological possibilities to 
use animals as a model for laboratory experiments in science and industry 
only increase the complicatedness of our relationship with animals. Animal 
biotechnology is an excellent example. It has the potential to change not only 
forms of life but also the meaning of life. Its high impacts may change the way 
we relate ourselves to animals forever.
 Van ‘t Hooft and Millar (2005) have pointed out that the presence, 
nature and meaning of human-animal relationships in a society and the 
different ways of thinking about animals in that society are mutually 
dependent. From a pragmatist perspective, the reflection on morally 
problematic situations concerning human-animal relationships therefore 
necessitates the moral reflection on the ways of thinking about animals. 
We become aware of a moral problem in our relationships to animals 
through our experience of that relationship. Our moral experience is 
structured by the way we think; the values and beliefs that we adhere to. 
A deeper understanding of the diversity of animal values will result in 
a better appreciation of the moral dimensions of our relationships with 
animals. In addition, moral inquiry into the diversity of values respects 
the value pluralism of society. Ethical monism needlessly limits the moral 
consideration of the variety of relationships and ways in which these are 
valued. Instead of searching for absolute foundations from an detached, 
external perspective, moral inquiry should therefore be located within the 
life of communities or public life in general (Minteer & Manning, 1999). As 
Walzer (1988) has argued, “it is better to tell stories, even though there is no 
definitive and best story”. 
 If we look at the development of animal biotechnology in the 
Netherlands, a plurality of perspectives has been present since its 
introduction in the early 1980s. As anticipated by Schön and Rein (1994), 
these perspectives give rise to various problem-setting stories with respect 
to the social problem of animal biotechnology. Different stories are told 
that each express a different vision on the animal itself and the relationship 
between humans and animals. Furthermore, what is valued within these 
perspectives is expressed using different concepts and vocabularies. In other 
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words, the Dutch public debate contains a variety of frames of reference that 
each construct a different interpretation of the value of animals and thereby 
even of the animal itself. Of course, also values related to technology, social 
organization or other aspects play a role in these problem-setting stories. 
However, we decided to start our exploration of value diversity with the ways 
in which people experience and reflect upon animals in their daily lives. We 
believe these experiences and reflections, embodied in social practices, form 
the initial context of meaning in which the biotechnological use of animals is 
interpreted.
6.2	 Participatory	inquiry:	learning	about	diversity
 
The first step of our pragmatist approach to animal biotechnology ethics 
is creating the space for a process of moral inquiry into the intuitions, 
values and beliefs of the cultural contexts in which our interactions with 
animals take place. Also from a policy as learning perspective, learning 
about the diversity of animal values would be considered the first step of 
the problem structuring process. In order to empirically study the value 
pluralism present in the diverse ways of thinking about animals in the 
Netherlands, we developed a deliberative instrument based on the focus 
group methodology. Focus groups are known to provide non-threatening 
conversation environments that are well suited to study the construction of 
meaning through social interaction. Our semi-structured design explicitly 
focused the participants on the deliberation of values. Therefore, we have 
named this deliberative instrument the value lab. Application of the value 
lab facilitated the joint reflection of a broad range of Dutch citizens on their 
values and beliefs regarding animals and the human-animal relationship in 
small discussion groups. The methodology of the value lab will be extensively 
discussed in chapter 7 and evaluated in chapter 9. 
 Analysis of the narrative processes of value lab sessions throughout 
the Netherlands resulted in the construction of four moral frameworks in 
which the value of animals and in particular the ‘intrinsic value’ is framed. As 
chapter 8 will reveal, these frameworks consist of a distinctive set of moral 
values considered to be important with respect to animals and the human-
animal relationship. Moreover, they each constitute a typical way of thinking 
and talking about animals. By this act of thinking and talking citizens are 
making the human-animal relationship meaningful to themselves and others. 
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The value lab methodology proved to be particularly worthwhile as an ethical 
instrument in the transformation of the public discussion of animal issues, 
frequently dominated by interest negotiations, into a true dialogue in which 
moral values are deliberated. Originally, the value lab method was developed 
as a policy instrument for science-society interactions in commission of the 
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, which is responsible for animal biotechnology 
policy in the Netherlands. The discursive products of the value lab provide 
ample opportunity for the Dutch government to develop a frame-reflective 
approach to both policy-making and policy communication for animal 
biotechnology. This opportunity will be further discussed in part D of this 
thesis. Part B will finish with an evaluation of the value lab methodology 
and a discussion of the implications of value pluralism for animal ethics in 
chapter 9. 
 

Chapter 7
The value lab methodology
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There is an increasing trend of public participation in the development of 
science and technology (see for example Dryzek, 2000). Among the variety of 
public participation exercises and mechanisms reported in literature, many 
deal with the involvement of the public in making actual decisions on specific 
developments (Joss, 1999; Leroux, 1998; Rowe & Frewer, 2005). Consensus 
conferences and citizen panels are two of the most famous examples 
(Hörning, 1999; Joss & Durant, 1995). Also the focus group methodology, on 
which the practical setting of the value lab is based, has become widely used 
to involve the public in science and technology issues (Dürrenberger, 1999; 
Fiorino, 1990; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Public perceptions of biotechnology 
were also investigated using focus groups (Barns, Schibeci, Davison, & Shaw, 
2000; Marris, 2001; Martin & Tait, 1992; Michael, Grinyer, & Turner, 1997; 
Priest, 1994). Many of these studies concentrate on the entire participatory 
process from the development of a vision to the production of a decision on 
propositions or actions (Abelson et al., 2003). However, there has been little 
attention to the actual practice of deliberation within a participatory session 
itself (see also Ryfe, 2005). Focus group studies for example mention the use 
of semi-structured sets of questions, but do not go into detail on how the 
focus group process enabled deliberative talk and on what actually happened 
within the focus group sessions. 
 This chapter presents the methodological steps taken to facilitate 
the participants’ philosophical reflection on their own ways of thinking and 
the subsequent reconstruction of value frameworks: the conditions to create 
a conversational context in which deeper values can be discussed freely; 
the appropriate criteria to select participants concerning both discursive 
participation and representation; choices in the workshop design and 
procedures for systematic analysis of the discussion products. Together 
these steps constitute the value lab. In sum, the deliberative instrument we 
have developed merges the idea of social interaction in focus groups with 
an explicit in-depth focus on underlying value frameworks. In the small 
discussion group setting of the value lab participants acted as co-researchers, 
inductively constructing their own frames of reference (see also Kitzinger, 
1994). By focusing our attention on the participatory session itself, we hope 
to make a new contribution to the development of methodologies to facilitate 
the public deliberation of complex ethics and policy issues.
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7.1 Constructing meaning, creating understanding
 
The participants in this study were explicitly addressed as citizens, with their 
own sets of values and concerns. We furthermore strived for participation 
of the widest range of interested publics. One of the commonly used 
instruments for estimating public views on animal biotechnology is the 
public opinion survey (Eurobarometer, 2002). Although public opinion 
polls investigating public attitudes towards biotechnology yield valuable 
information, they often construct a public discourse framed in terms of 
individual (market) preferences rather than much wider civic matters, 
because they are usually consumer-oriented and assume the existence of 
a unitary public (Davison, 1997). Deeper, and often poorly articulated, 
motivations and concerns are thus left out of the discussion, inducing a 
simplified image and inhibiting a more sophisticated social dialogue on the 
citizens’ moral issues. Recently, it has become more widely recognized that 
qualitative studies could increase in-depth understanding of the complexity 
and diversity of citizen concerns (Eurobarometer, 2006). 
 We created a setting in which participants were able to freely discuss 
their own motivations and concerns about animals. When people talk about 
their values, beliefs and ideals they do so in highly complex ways. Waterton 
and Wynne (1999) have described this as the relational construction of 
beliefs. The meaning of values, beliefs and ideals is actively negotiated and 
constructed during the course of conversation (Burningham, 1995; Potter, 
1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Waterton and Wynne recommend that 
research into the meaning structure of values, beliefs and ideals needs a more 
reflexive research framework than surveys or individual interviews provide. 
In recent years, focus groups have become recognized as those sites of social 
interaction through which meaning and understanding are co-constructed 
(Madriz, 2000). The explicit recognition of group interaction as a crucial 
part of the research process distinguishes focus groups from ordinary group 
interviews (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999). Usually they are set up as once-only 
meetings of 5-12 participants where a selective set of individuals discusses a 
specific topic from their own experience (Greenbaum, 1998; Morgan, 1997). 
According to Kitzinger (1994) the ‘group work ensures that priority is given 
to the respondents’ hierarchy of importance, their language and concepts, 
their frameworks for understanding the world’. In line with these ideas, we 
organized small discussion sessions to actively construct the moral value 
frameworks associated with public perceptions of animal biotechnology 
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in the Netherlands. In these settings, participants acted as co-researchers, 
constructing their own frames of reference. Subsequently, we interpreted 
those frames of reference using a grounded theory approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Thus, the first step of the value lab was understanding the 
various meanings participants themselves assign to their own lifeworlds and 
experiences. The next step was the inductive development of conceptual 
value frameworks based on the documented ways participants have ordered 
their thoughts and experiences.
7.2 Building a conversational context
In order to create a fruitful conversational context it was necessary to create 
a trustworthy and non-threatening environment in which participants feel 
at ease and open to freely express their thoughts and beliefs (Greenbaum, 
2000). Furthermore, the participants should not waste too much time and 
energy disagreeing with each other. This is what would happen in group 
discussions in which conflicting values and ideals are present. In the value 
lab design, these process conditions are met by the implementation of two 
guiding principles. First, we strived for homogeneity within the groups 
and heterogeneity between the groups. Homogeneity in this context meant 
that the participants in a particular group approximately shared the same 
perspective on the animal issue. Heterogeneity was obtained by including 
a wide range of discussion groups. The second guiding principle entailed 
working with structured exercises. Although a free floating discussion 
certainly helps in the creative generation of ideas, sometimes a more 
directive structure is needed to allow in-depth exploration or to prevent 
dominant participants to claim dominance over other participants.  
 Finally, the group facilitators played a vital role in keeping the focus 
on the dialogical element of the group work. In order to understand the 
socially shared meanings emerging from the group discussions, they adopted 
a hermeneutical approach (Freeman, 2006; Thompson, Pollio, & Locander, 
1994), repeatedly asking ‘why’ questions to reach an in-depth understanding 
of the underlying factors why participants expressed themselves the way 
they did. For the rest, they were limited to process statements and the use 
of group assignments. In realizing a relaxed and friendly atmosphere the 
facilitator also played an important part. During the session, the facilitator 
had to maintain a continuous balance between structure and freedom, both 
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by being an empathic, active listener and presenting him or herself as the 
authority on the process (Greenbaum, 2000; Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 
1996).
7.3 Selecting and grouping the participants
The selection of participants explicitly aimed at the qualitative variation, 
not quantitative presentation, of ideas about animals, i.e. a cognitive 
representation of the diversity of viewpoints. We made use of various 
criteria to establish groups of (more or less) congenial minds. We grouped 
on profession and membership of social organizations. Also, we expanded 
our research population to groups of a specific religion or philosophy of life, 
because these are social groups that normally consider themselves unheard in 
the public debate about technology issues. For the entire range of viewpoints 
we formed 10 groups that we assumed to be homogeneous with respect 
to their perspective on animal issues (Table 7.1). Note that the concept of 
homogeneity in this study was merely used as an instrument to facilitate 
the construction and sharing of beliefs, values and ideals about animals. We 
hypothesized that the grouping parameters listed in table 8.1 would allow us 
to create a safe and friendly conversational context. The collected material of 
the group discussions was used afterwards to analyze the actual perspectives 
on animal issues.  
 We searched the media for comments and expressions on the animal 
and on the human-  animal relationship, hereby estimating the particular 
viewpoint of various social groups. Next, we identified organizations 
that were associated with a specific social group and received the names 
of participants through them. As a rule, we explained the importance 
of contacting individuals in their network that were not a spokesman or 
strategic professional. The underlying argument here was that we expected 
professionalized citizens to take (or be granted by others) a too dominant role 
in the construction of value frameworks. In their moral reflection on animals, 
we did not expect them to necessarily differ from non-professionalized 
citizens. Invitation of the participants was preceded by a short telephonic 
intake conversation to assess in general terms their concordance with the 
composition of the intended group and their level of professionalization with 
respect to the public debate on animal biotechnology. 
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Table 7.1 Selection and grouping of discussion group participants.   
  Abbreviations: hg = homogeneous group; mg = mixed group. 
group thematic grouping parameters
ra
ng
e o
f v
iew
po
in
ts
hg1 industrial farming
hg2 laboratory animal research
hg3 pet breeding & retail/ fishing sports/ animal zoo workers
hg4 farming/ countryside/ hunting/ foresting/ veterinary 
medicine
hg5 catholic and protestant Christianity
hg6 Islam
hg7 organic farming/ nature conservation & protection/ nature 
recreation/ vegetarianism/ humanism
hg8 pet owners/ assistance animals/ animal sanctuary/ animal 
protection
hg9 eastern religions
hg10 biodynamic farming/ veganism/ deep ecology/ 
anthroposophy/ nature religion
mg1-5 random  cross-sections of society
Additionally, we formed 5 mixed groups to critically assess our pre-
suppositions about the advantage of this selection and grouping strategy. 
We also used the mixed groups to critically assess the specific structure we 
designed for our discussion sessions. The mixed groups were assembled from 
cross-sections of society, not related to specific viewpoints on animals or 
technology (Table 7.1).  
 All sessions were organized between 26 January 2004 and 8 April 
2004. The workshops were held in different regions of the Netherlands, 
geographically spread across the country. The groups ranged in size from 5 
to 11 participants but contained a total number of 109 participants. The age 
of the participants ranged from 22 to 80 years, with an average of 42 years. 
The overall participation of men and women was balanced. The education 
levels of the participants ranged from lower to higher eduction, in a variety of 
disciplines. All participants volunteered to join the focus group workshops.
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7.4 Designing the workshop
  
The value lab design was standardized for all groups and semi-structured. 
Each group discussion was 2-3 hours in duration. Sessions were recorded on 
video and audio tape for further analysis. All participants consented to these 
recordings on conditions of anonymity and restricted use of the recordings 
just for the purpose of this study. A facilitator guided each group discussion. 
A monitor/ secretary, who observed the group dynamics and made notes 
of the form and content of the discussion, accompanied the facilitator. The 
monitor also assisted the facilitator in carrying out the exercises. The overall 
structure of the program was designed to promote in-depth exploration in a 
relaxed and trustworthy environment.
 The collective activity of the group consisted of a step-by-step 
circling in on the variety and richness of ideas. The group conversation 
gradually moved from intuitions to conceptualized values through the 
repetitive use of structuring exercises (see figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1      The value lab spiraling structure visualized.
collect and 
share intuitions
systematize
converge
make it explicit
articulation of contextual stories
focus on priorities
articulation of the ‘why’
categories, connections
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A session started out with sharing and collecting the participants’ direct 
intuitions and associations about animals. This simultaneously served as an 
icebreaker in the group process. The next step was to move from intuitions 
towards value concepts and the articulation of contextual stories. Both the 
facilitator and the participants joined in this articulation by asking each 
other questions of clarification. The next step was to systematize the value 
concepts by clustering them in value categories and ranking them in order of 
importance. Then, the group focused on a specific category and the process 
of association, articulation and systematization recommenced. This way, the 
participants constructed an interrelated network of concepts, beliefs and 
ideals they particularly valued about animals (see Box 7.1). The facilitator and 
monitor continually visualized the outcomes of discussions and exercises on 
flip-over sheets to make sure the group was able to continue working on the 
material that had come up in their interaction. The workshop design made 
sure that the groups themselves, using their own language and concepts, 
constructed the value frameworks. 
 
 
Box 7.1  The workshop program step by step. The concept maps were taken  
  from one of the mixed groups, which can be recognized by looking 
  at the diffuse value image.
Round 1 Associations and intuitions
The participants were asked to write down three associations, which they 
immediately felt were typically related to animals. Subsequently, the associations 
were shared with the group. The facilitator asked the participants why they felt 
particularly those associations to be typical in order to deepen the associations, 
revealing the values behind them. These values were collected on a flip-over sheet. In 
order to check whether the values mentioned by one person were part of the group’s 
view as well, the facilitator continually asked the group for feedback. In this round, it 
was important that the participants listened to each other and understood what the 
others meant by the values they brought up. These values were to be used for the rest 
of the meeting.
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Figure 7.2     Illustration of intuitive association
Round 2 Guided association 
The first round was based on free association. We expected the participants to 
have been thinking of a specific animal, for example their pet. To encourage the 
participants to associate on other contexts as well, in the second round, the facilitator 
used examples of various “functions” of the animal (i.e. the rabbit as a pet, as a 
laboratory animal or as an animal that is hunted). Again, by asking why-questions the 
facilitator revealed the values underlying the associations. The additional values were 
collected on the same flip-over sheet but in a different color (italics).
Round 3 Categorization and clustering
The first two rounds generated a great diversity of values all collected on the same 
flip-over sheet. In this round the flip-over sheet was put on a table, the participants 
grouped around the table and discussed why they think some values belong together. 
We changed the physical configuration of the meeting to enhance creativity. 
Participants were told to make a categorization of values that was shared by the 
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group as a whole. They were encouraged to explain to one another why they regard 
a particular clustering of values as important. The formed categories were given 
an appropriate name on which all participants agreed. This way a concept map 
was created, made up out of the value categories the group as a whole attached 
importance to.
Figure 7.3     Illustration of clustering and categorization.
Round 4 Ranking the values
Next, we wanted to find out which of the values were deemed to be the most 
important. Therefore, every participant was asked to rank the list of values by 
assigning ‘credit points’ to the three values they considered the most important 
to them. The participants assigned 3, 2 and 1 points to these values, in order of 
importance. Next, the separately assigned points were added to create a group image 
of the central values in this group’s framework.
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Round 5  Focusing on the animal’s value ‘of its own’ 
In this round, the facilitator explicitly focused on those of the values or value 
categories that were related to the intrinsic value of animals, while retaining the 
bottom-up approach of this workshop. The facilitator therefore did not mention the 
notion of intrinsic value (possibly known from the legal debate on Dutch animal 
policy), but suggested that animals have a ‘value of their own’. The participants were 
asked to collectively decide which of the values on the concept map refer to the 
animal’s ‘value of its own’. Next, the participants were asked to complete this category 
with other values they considered to be important, but that were not yet mentioned.     
Figure 7.4     Illustration of concept map ‘value of its own’.
Round 6 Ranking the intrinsic values of animals 
The new concept map now contained categories of intrinsic values. The participants 
were asked to perform the same ranking exercise as in round 4, but now only for the 
intrinsic values.
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Mixed groups
 
All of the homogeneous groups and three of the mixed groups worked 
the above program. For the other two mixed groups a different set up was 
chosen. In the standard program, the participants started at the level of 
intuitive association and slowly moved towards making moral intuitions 
explicit in a group-specific conceptualization of the intrinsic value of animals. 
The two remaining mixed groups started directly with an introduction of the 
intrinsic value concept and its role in the public debate. Subsequently, these 
groups completed the same exercises but now from the perspective of the 
intrinsic value concept in order to see what meaning the participants would 
attribute to this concept when it was imposed on them and whether they 
would use it at all, if they were to formulate their ideas and opinions about 
animals.
7.5 Reconstructing the value frameworks
 
The value lab sessions provided us with group stories about those features 
of the animal and the human-animal relationship that mattered from a 
particular perspective. During the sessions, as was mentioned above, the 
participants acted as co-researchers on the articulation and structuring of 
their own beliefs and ideas (see also Kitzinger, 1994). The next step of the 
value lab methodology was to construct the value frameworks in which these 
stories were grounded, following a grounded theory approach (Baarda, 2005; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Coding and analysis of the discussion material was 
an iterative process in a continuous exchange between raw data and the 
analytical categorizations the researchers developed during the study.  
From text to concepts and categories
 
In the first ordering phase raw transcripts were cut into relevant fragments. 
To each of the relevant fragments a conceptual label was assigned, referring 
to the value concept underlying that fragment. During the process of coding 
some concepts appeared to be closer together than others, sharing some kind 
of common feature that interconnected them. These features were labeled as 
value categories, linking a particular set of value concepts. 
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Figure 7.5     Systematic coding model, containing three levels of analysis: value 
categories, value concepts and value descriptions.
Figure 7.5 for example shows that the concepts ‘natural beauty’ and ‘natural 
life’ share a distinctive common feature, the ‘naturalness’ of an animal. The 
notion of ‘value description’ in Figure 7.5 corresponds to the explanation 
that was given by the participants to convey why they felt a particular animal 
value was important. Throughout the coding process, descriptions were kept 
in the participants’ own phrasings in order to preserve an understanding of 
the language and concepts citizens themselves use to express their thoughts. 
Table 7.2 provides an example of the coding scheme, illustrating how 
concepts and categories indeed related to the participants’ actual expressions. 
natural life living being 
natural beauty 
Naturalness 
Life 
why 
intrinsic
value 
label: categories 
label: concepts 
descriptions 
why 
why 
why 
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Table 7.2 The coding scheme: categories, concepts and descriptions. The  
  descriptions are the actual utterances of participants in the  
  value lab discussions. The concepts and categories are inductively  
  developed, either during the session by the facilitator and   
  participants, or after the session by the researchers.
Category Concept Description
Individuality individual behaviour animals behave in their own specific 
way
natural behaviour animals display a natural kind of 
behaviour
Use economic interest animals are of great important to 
the meat industry
source of food animals play an important role as a 
source of food
Naturalness natural beauty all animals have a natural beauty
natural behaviour animals display a natural kind of 
behaviour
part of nature animals are a part of nature
Some sets of value categories, concepts and descriptions were quite unique 
for a specific group whereas other seemed to reappear in almost the same 
wordings in every group. The eventual categorization resulted in 12 value 
categories each relating to a specific subset of values. The substantial content 
of the abstract value categories is rooted in the literal statements of the 
participants (value descriptions). Careful interpretation of these constructs of 
meaning resulted in category ‘definitions’. Table 7.3 provides a few examples 
of value categories. In chapter 8, all 12 categories will be discussed, as they 
are the building blocks of the reconstructed framings of the value of animals 
in the Netherlands. 
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Table 7.3 Illustration of value category definitions. For every framework that  
  was constructed, one of the important value categories is shown. 
Value category Description
Bond the personal connectedness or dependence that is there 
when humans and animals live together
Individuality A distinctive kind of character and behavior making the 
animal into what it is: a unique organism
Naturalness The background of a system that is able to develop itself into 
what it is without the interference of humans.
Use The human use of animals, at the expense of the animal
From concepts and categories to value frameworks
 
The systematic coding procedures produced relationships between various 
value concepts and categories. Also categories themselves are interconnected 
when the same value concept figures as a specification of more than one 
category, i.e. the concept ‘natural life’ was regarded a specification of the 
category ‘naturalness’ as well as ‘life’. Through this process of categorization 
and linkage a complex network of interconnected value concepts was 
constructed. Also the meaning and function of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ 
was constructed in the same way. In the final step of the workshop program 
(see table 7.2) the participant groups constructed a specific category of values 
containing values they considered were important for the animal’s value ‘of 
its own’. Interpretation of this material rendered distinct patterns of values 
related to the intrinsic value of the animal. 
 Our next step was to investigate the relative weight of value 
concepts. During the workshops the participants explored this weight by 
making a priority ranking of all gathered value concepts. In the subsequent 
content analysis the frequency by which a particular concept was expressed 
throughout the workshop was taken as a measure for the relative weight of 
value concepts. By using these two different approaches we were able to form 
a more accurate (triangulated) interpretation of the relative weight of value 
concepts in the group stories. 
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Table 7.4 Example of the category frequency and category priority ranking of  
  value lab discussion group 7, 8 and 9. Discussion groups 7 and 9  
  appeared to use and rank value concepts in a similar way, different  
  from the pattern of for example group 8. This table shows the five  
  most frequently used or highest ranked concepts for each of these  
  discussion groups.
group 7 group 8 group 9
Category fre-
quency
priority fre-
quency
priority fre-
quency
priority
Functionality 14% 24% 26%
Bond 8% 20% 24%
Individuality 10% 8% 11%
Life 9% 11% 13%
Naturalness 28% 34% 5% 7% 22% 21%
Experience 21% 16% 11%
Sprituality 15%
System 17% 27% 11% 38%
Use 7% 16% 7% 4%
Each of the discussion groups went through its own unique process of 
interaction, producing particular patterns of expression (value descriptions). 
Analyzing the group stories by systematic coding and frequency analysis 
however enabled us to distinguish differences and similarities between the 
groups at the conceptual level of value concepts and categories. We decided 
that participant groups shared a common value framework on the following 
criteria. They had to refer to the same value categories using the same or 
comparable value concepts. In addition, they had to assign comparable 
priorities to the value categories that were referred to. Finally, those value 
categories and priorities were not to be expressed in the same way in the 
majority of other groups. As Table 7.4 shows, in the discussion groups 7 
and 9, the categories ‘Nature’, and ‘System’ were frequently referred to. In 
other groups, like for example group 8, these categories were hardly referred 
to. The utterances of participants in group 8 did refer to categories such as 
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‘Functionality’, ‘Bond’ and ‘Experience’. Interpretation of such relationships 
along the above mentioned conditions rendered a pattern of four distinct 
value frameworks. It is important to note here that we did not a priori define 
a relationship between a particular group story and a value framework that 
was to be constructed. Our analysis rendered four stable patterns of value. 
Sometimes, two different patterns were present in one group’s story.  
 
Quality	Control 
 
Several procedures were applied to establish and evaluate the quality of 
our research process. The first procedure to be discussed here is empirical 
grounding of the four delineated value frameworks. Corbin and Strauss 
(1990) have argued that the quality of qualitative research results can be 
evaluated by the process by which these results are constructed. Consistent 
with their grounded theory paradigm, the quality of our coding procedure 
is in the stepwise methodology (from text to concepts to categories). The 
continuous interplay between our categorizations and the original text 
warranted the robustness of the coding system, i.e. the consistent use of value 
concept and category definitions. In this way, coding itself acted as a warrant 
against subjectivity and bias.    
 Furthermore, we pursued investigator triangulation. Throughout 
the process, the four of us (FK, LK, HB, TdCB) contributed independently 
to the analysis of the discussion group material. Systematic coding of 
the participant group transcripts into value concepts and categories was 
performed independently by two of us (FK and LK). Subsequently, they 
rejoined to develop a shared understanding of the attributed labels. After 
confronting the independent analysis they established a final list of categories 
(table 4). The consistency of this category list was again independently 
evaluated against the original transcripts and amended where necessary. The 
next analytical step was to arrive at the construction of value frameworks. 
This step was performed independently by the same two researchers (FK 
and LK) and the two project leaders (HB, TdCB), not priorly involved in the 
practical work of data collection and coding. Based on the above-described 
criteria distinctive value patterns were constructed. The four of us then 
rejoined to confront our independent analysis and find agreement on the 
amount and characteristics of value frameworks. These cycles of independent 
analysis and joint interpretation have warranted the shared interpretative 
validity of research process and products (Maxwell, 1992).
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Asbury (1995) has argued that participant expressions should not be taken 
out of their original context. Because of their sensitivity to the context 
the expressed viewpoints may just be a reflection of the specific pattern 
of interaction. In line with Kitzinger (1994), we have counteracted this 
limitation by using the same structured exercises for every group, which 
made it possible to compare them. Furthermore, what participants find 
interesting to discuss is not necessarily what they think is important 
(Morgan, 1995). In our workshop design, we explicitly asked the participants 
to indicate themselves which of the collected values they felt to be important. 
For example, in several groups values concerning the bond between humans 
and animals were mentioned quite frequently in the beginning, but did not 
end up at high rankings in the assignment of priorities.  
 
Chapter 8
Framing the value of animals
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Application of the value lab methodology in the winter of 2004 reconstructed 
four distinctive frameworks of the value of animals that frame the experience 
and reflection of Dutch citizens. This chapter provides some more insight 
into the metaphor of ‘framing’ and the way the frameworks produced in 
the value lab should be interpreted. Next, I will discuss the structure and 
meaning of the reconstructed value frameworks in detail. In conclusion of 
this chapter, I will show how the concept of the animal as an end-in-itself 
acquires a different interpretation in all four frames. As chapter 3 elaborately 
discussed, this value is laid down in the Dutch ethical regulation as the 
‘intrinsic value’ of the animal. Interestingly, the interpretation of none of the 
four frames matches the legislative definition.
8.1	 Framing:	making	the	animal	meaningful
We defined the reconstructed frameworks of the value lab investigation 
as moral ‘frames of reference’. The concept of ‘frame’ is used in several 
theoretical traditions, such as cognitive and social psychology, sociology 
and social movement studies (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992; 
Goffman, 1974). As chapter 4 explained, the concept of ‘framing’ was picked 
up by Schön and Rein (1994) in their groundbreaking analysis of policy 
controversies (see also Rein, 1983; Schön, 1979). It initiated a still increasing 
use of the ‘frame’ concept in public policy analysis, as isummarized by 
Swaffield (1998). According to Schön and Rein (1994), frames are particular 
ways of making sense of a complex reality and guiding our actions. They 
consist of structures of values and beliefs about a certain situation or object. 
When individuals describe or define the ‘same’ situation or object using 
different concepts and language, they are using different frames (Douglas, 
1986). Also the frames of animal value provide the constructs and patterns 
to make the animal itself and the human-animal relationship meaningful to 
ourselves and others. It is important to note that these frames are, as Fisher 
(1997) has argued, ‘unfinished constructions’. Frames are representations 
of meaning that belong to a social rather than individual level. They are 
selectively used whenever actors like a farmer, policy maker or citizen 
articulate their interests and ideas about animals. At the same time, the 
actors’ interests as well as the changing context of discussion influence the 
way they frame a situation. In the communicative action regarding animal 
issues, frames are continually produced and reproduced. Furthermore, 
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although perhaps everyone uses preferred frames, other context may invoke 
– in the same person- a use of language and concepts belonging to one of 
the other frames. In this study, we explicitly do not embrace an a priori 
relation between a particular frame and a particular individual or social 
group. Like Layder (1997) commented with regard to social representations 
of meaning, they have an “existence above and beyond the consciousness and 
intentionalities of people”.
Four frameworks of animal value 
 
The analysis of the value lab discussion material produced four distinctive 
value frameworks, comprising both a descriptive sense (a vision on what the 
animal is) and a normative sense (a vision on why animals are important and 
how humans should treat animals). The frameworks were named after their 
central value concept: ‘Use’, ‘Relation’, ‘Balance’ and ‘Source’. The next section 
discusses the different frameworks in detail. First, we will focus on the system 
of value categories that were inductively developed from the discursive 
materials produced by the value lab sessions. Each of the frameworks 
contains a specific set of interrelated moral value categories. Together, these 
categories represent the diversity of values observed in the reflection on 
animals in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.1. Value categories that constitute the different value frameworks.
Category definition
Being way the animal is in-the-world and relates itself to its environment.
Bond personal connectedness or dependence when humans and animals 
live together.  
Capacity elements of an animal’s biological structure or function
Experience human mental state evoked by the perception of, or the interaction 
with, animals.
Functionality human use of animals, while the animal itself either derives a bene-
fit too or is not significantly harmed.
Individuality distintive kind of character and behavior that make the animal a 
unique organism
Life continued existence of the animal on earth, in interaction with 
other forms of life and the environment.
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Naturalness background of a system able to develop itself into what it is without 
human interference.
Spirituality reference to a supernatural force in the lives of animals and their 
relationships with humans
System whole of which the parts show such interconnectedness and 
interdependence that they cannot be perceived separately anymore.
Use human use of animals, at the expense of the animal
Table 8.1 shows the list of value categories. Also their definitions are 
inductively developed from the value lab discussions. The value categories 
relate to elements of the animal itself or the human-animal relationship and 
each contain a subset of values. Broadly, these ‘values’ are defined as those 
features of the animal or the human-animal relationship that our participants 
cared about, that mattered to them. In each of the four frameworks all 10 
major value categories are recognized. The frameworks however differ 
significantly with respect to the relative weight they attribute to these 
categories. This is visualized in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1.     Every framework (grey), recognizes all 10 value categories. The distance 
between a category and a framework illustrates the relative importance of that 
category in that framework. ‘Naturalness’ for example plays a role in the Use and 
Relation frame, but is more profoundly present in the Balance and Source frames.
Rela�on
experience
Use
Balance Source
func�onality
capacity
use
bond
life
naturalness
individuality
system
being
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Each of the frameworks consists of a differentiated structure of animal 
values. Like Douglas (1986) noted, the same ‘object’, in this case the animal 
and its relationships to humans and the surrounding world, is defined in a 
different way, using different concepts. In this sense, the frameworks each 
provide a specific perspective on the animal. 
 The Use framework primarily approaches the animal as a member 
of its species, whereas the Relation framework recognizes the individual 
animal. The Balance framework emphasizes the animal’s role in living (eco)-
systems, while the Source framework defines the animal as a manifestation 
of the greater whole. This perspective on the animal has its consequences 
for the direction of the human-animal relationship. The Use framework 
is characterized by an I-it perspective (note: the use of a capital here and 
below is indicative of the specific emphasis of the perspective). The animal 
is objectified, looked at from a distance. The meaning of the animal is 
coloured by the interests of the human agent or by a greater human cause 
or concern. The Relation framework recognizes the animal itself as an 
individual component of the bond between humans and animals, resulting in 
an I-you perspective. It is an asymmetrical relationship however, in which the 
hierarchy is set. 
 The Balance framework on the other hand emphasizes that humans 
and animals are part of the same system of life. Seeking a balance between 
human and animal needs, the individual is perceived as less important than 
the common interest in the system, resulting in an i-WE perspective. The 
Source frame too holds a holistic perspective, the i-THOU perspective. 
However, the individual animal is also important here. According to the 
Source frame, the supremacy of the greater whole is manifested not only at 
the level of the whole itself, but in every individual animal. Figure 8.2 shows 
the different ways in which the animal and the human-animal relationship 
are defined. The next section will explain the four frameworks in detail.
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Table 8.2. Four different framings of animal meaning.  The arrows indicate  
  how the level that is considered most important in a particular  
  frame, colours the understanding of the other levels of that frame  
  as well. The Use frame for instance constructs individual animals  
  as members of a species rather than individual beings. The Source  
  frame is the only frame that integrates an emphasis on two different  
  levels. The use of capitals indicates the direction of the perspective  
  on the human-animal relationship.
Frame Use Relation Balance Source
direction I-it I-you i-WE i- THOU
animal
relation
experience
relation
experience
functionality
individuality
individuality
being
species
capacity
use
functionality
ecosystem
life
naturalness
whole
system naturalness
system
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8.2	 Use:	the	animal	objectified
Two distinctive features characterize the Use framework. It is human-
centered and the animal is objectified to the level of its species, resulting in 
the I-it perspective. Also in a single animal, not the individual but the general 
is what is perceived and appreciated. Certain qualities of the animal offer the 
opportunity to use the animal for human benefit. A dog’s build makes it a 
good guard. The most salient is the use of animals for the production of food 
and other consumption goods like clothing. This use of animals as a resource 
for human needs is accepted as a natural and necessary phenomenon. 
 
 “The fact that people use animals is an element of biology. Both are 
 part of the biological food chain.” 
 
Next to a natural resource, the animal is also perceived as a valuable source of 
knowledge. The Use framework recognizes the benefits of using animals for 
scientific experiments and product testing in for example the pharmaceutical 
industry. Although the use of animals for human benefits is seen as 
important, this does not mean that humans can do anything they like with 
animals. They have to treat animals in a responsible way, paying attention to 
their health and welfare. However, the health and welfare of the animal and 
human benefits often go hand in hand: 
 
 “Production animals are living beings. Therefore you should take care  
 of them. If you do that, you will get something in return. They are  
 your livelihood.”        
 
Here, the value of ‘animal welfare’ is primarily rooted in its ability to satisfy 
the productive needs of human beings. This is a recurring phenomenon in 
the Use framework. Values that refer to features of the animal itself, or its 
natural environment, are primarily appreciated for their instrumentality 
in the fulfillment of human needs. Another example is provided by the 
frequent reference to the biological capacities of animals, both with respect 
to structure and function. 
 
 “The ingenious complexity of animals makes them interesting as an  
 object of study.”  
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The Use framework greatly appreciates the animal’s internal complexity. 
Examples are the sometimes exceptional perceptual and cognitive capacities. 
Simultaneously, these capacities form a starting point of scientific research 
and food production.  
 The Use framework constructs the nature of the animal in terms of 
its biological structure and its function in a human-centered environment. 
The animal is not perceived as an individual being, but as “an animal”, a 
member of a species. This conveys the technical-instrumental rationality that 
is characteristic of the Use framework. 
8.3	 Relation:	the	animal	personalized
 
The bond between humans and animals is at the heart of the Relation 
framework. The animal is defined in Relation to a human being. Although 
animals and humans live together, the hierarchy is set. The asymmetrical 
Relationship is primarily conceived as functional to the satisfaction of human 
needs, which results in the I-you perspective. 
 
 “Nature and character of the animal can be employed for all kinds of 
 purposes”    
 
It is important to note that this type of use is different from the type most 
frequently referred to in the Use framework. In the Relation framing, humans 
do benefit from the use of animals, but either not at the cost of, or beneficial 
to, the animal itself. Therefore we labeled this kind of use as ‘functionality’. 
An example of functionality is the support an animal companion grants its 
owner. One of the group discussion participants expressed it as follows: 
 
 “The contact with animals has a positive influence on both the   
 physical and mental health of people.” 
 
The functionality of the animal refers to a type of use that relates to the 
perception of the animal as an individual being. In the Relation framework 
the animal is personalized, appreciated for its individual qualities and 
contributions to the relationship. This is another typical difference with the 
Use framework, in which animals are approached as members of a species. 
The Relation framework treats every animal as an individual character. Its 
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features, be it that they are often appreciated for their functionality, are 
perceived to constitute the individuality of the animal. 
 
 “Every animal has its own character, built up from a diversity of  
 traits. This is something you can take pleasure in.”         
 
Note that this quote not only refers to individuality but also to the value 
category of ‘experience’. This category, one of the main categories of the 
Relation framework, is defined as the human mental state evoked by the 
perception of, or the interaction with, animals. It contains concepts like the 
animal’s beauty, adorability, but also creepiness. Also the caressability of 
the animal, a notion frequently encountered in debates about animal issues, 
belongs to this category. 
 
Finally, one of the most important elements of the Relation framework is the 
personal bond between humans and animals.   
 
 “You can really develop a personal connection with an animal.”  
 
When humans and animals live together, a deeper connection can develop in 
which both human and animal become involved.  
 
 “It is hard to maintain a distant relationship with an animal. You will  
 get emotionally involved.” 
 
The importance of the ‘emotional connection’ that humans and animals may 
develop, does not change the asymmetry of the humans-animal relationship 
in the Relation framework. The emotionality is primarily appreciated as an 
aspect that is worthwhile for the human being.
8.4	 Balance:	the	animal	naturalized
The value categories ‘system’ and ‘life’ are two of the most important 
categories of the Balance framework. Often in the group discussions, values 
were expressed that refer to both value categories at the same time, for 
example the ‘interconnectedness of life’. Central to the Balance framework is 
the i-WE perspective, based on the observation that animals and humans are 
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part of the same system of life. 
 
 “All life on earth is interconnected in a permanent way.” 
 
The value of the greater whole is appreciated. The interdependence of 
animals and humans means they cannot exist without each other and 
the system as a whole. It is important to note however, that the Balance 
framework approaches the system of life in a naturalistic sense. It refers to 
natural (eco)-systems in which every inhabitant has its own functions and 
needs. 
 
 “An animal acquires its own place in the ecosystem; it plays a   
 functional role in the maintenance of that system.” 
 
The Balance framework recognizes the fact that animals are alive. It not only 
refers to basal biological phenomena as breathing, feeding and reproduction, 
but also to the animal’s conscious awareness of its environment and of 
what happens to him/ her; to the animal’s capacity for feeling. Animal 
consciousness does not mean they foresee the consequences of their actions. 
Rather, they live in the here and now and react instinctively. Unlike humans, 
they act spontaneously and authentically. 
 
 “The animal is always genuine in its appearance; it presents itself like 
 it truly is.” 
 
A third feature of the animal that is particularly valued, is the naturalness of 
the animal. In contrast to the Use and Relation frameworks, the animal is 
not defined in relation to human ends, but as the product of an evolutionary 
development in interaction with its environment.  
 
 “An animal exists in the interaction with its natural environment by  
 showing its natural behavior.” 
 
According to the Balance framework the animal’s reason for existence is 
the animal itself, not the fulfillment of human ends. As a consequence, the 
optimal life environment for an animal would be a natural environment. Here 
the animal can behave in an natural way. 
 Also the Use and Relation frameworks have a descriptive and 
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a normative sense. In the case of the Balance framework however, the 
normativity becomes more explicit.  
 
 “We should leave animals alone. In that way, they can live their own 
 life and behave in their own natural way.”  
 
Recognizing that an animal has a natural way of living has the normative 
implication that we should adjust our own behavior in order to enable 
animals to live their own natural lives. Both humans and animals are 
perceived to be inhabitants of this planet. The existence of the one cannot 
be without the existence of the other. In the Balance framing, this situation 
implies that both humans and animals should give and take. 
8.5	 Source:	the	animal	mystified
 
In the Source framework, both the individuality of every single animal 
as well as its interconnectedness with the whole of existence plays a very 
important role. It is impossible to separate them because both features spring 
from the ‘source’ of existence. Individuality and interconnectedness in the 
Source framework refer to some kind of universal order and are perceived as 
essential traits of the animal’s identity. 
 
 “Animals have a personal character and an identity of their own.  
 Their behavior  follows what lives inside them.”   
 
Note the difference with the Relation framing in which the animal’s identity 
is personalized. In the Source framing it is mystified. The animal’s nature and 
character provide it with a unique identity, which is seen as fundamental to 
the animal’s being in the world. 
 
 “Animals express themselves in the way they want to, the way that fits 
 them. It is characteristic for them to take this freedom.” 
 
The Source framework values the animal’s own way of expressing itself as a 
kind of fundamental beauty, present in all animals. 
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 “An animal is naive; it lives like a child, without negative thoughts or  
 feelings of guilt.” 
 
Also the naturalness of the animal is valued in the SOURCE framework. 
More than is the case in the perspective of the Balance framework, the 
naturalness of the animal contributes to its individuality. 
 
 “Animals are able to live a life in contact with the earth and with  
 nature. They develop a kind of behavior characteristic for their  
 species.” 
 
 “Living together in a natural group – especially parents and children-  
 is essential for life and development of an animal. It grants the animal  
 its identity.”    
 
The value category ‘system’ is deeply appreciated in the Source framework. 
This is another element of the framework in which it is comparable to 
the Balance framework. However, there is a difference. Although both 
frameworks share a holistic perspective, the holism of the Balance 
framework is more rational, whereas the holism of the Source framework 
is more spiritual. The Balance framework talks about the functional role 
of every organism in the system of life. The Source framework talks about 
the necessary interconnectedness of everything that exists. In the Source 
framing, the greater whole is perceived as incomprehensible to the human 
mind. This insight demands for respect and reticence. Breaking the essential 
bond between humans, animals and the earth will eventually strike back.  
 
 “An animal is an essential part of a complex, interwoven ecosystem.” 
 
 “Both humans and animals are essential parts of a greater,   
 interconnected whole.  Affecting any animal will eventually lead to  
 disintegration of the whole.”  
 
Also the naturalness of the animal is established by its connectedness to the 
greater whole. In the perspective of the Source framework, the animal is 
seen as a manifestation of the wonder of existence. Humans can only humbly 
participate. 
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In the reasoning of the Source framework, whenever we use animals, respect 
for the animal’s individuality and its interconnectedness with all of existence 
should be the guiding principle. There is a strong sense that in the current 
situation humans deprive animals of their space to live. Whereas in fact, the 
animal’s freedom to live its own life should be preserved. 
 
 “Animals have to be able to be whatever they want to, regardless the 
 acts of  others.” 
 
 “Many animals in this country live in captivity. Whereas actually, they 
 should be able  to live their lives in freedom.”  
 
According to the Source framework, the animal’s own needs should be taken 
into account in every way that we as humans make use of animals.  
 
 “Humans should not neglect the needs of animals. This is humiliating  
 to them.”   
 
The normative sense of the Source framework is implicitly present in many 
of the aspects of the animal that are appreciated. Appreciation of the animal’s 
freedom for example immediately restricts the range of human action that is 
considered acceptable in the framing of the Source framework.
8.6 The intrinsic value of animals
The concept of intrinsic value has acquired a central position in the Dutch 
ethical regulation of animal biotechnology. Paula’s evaluation (2001) of the 
Dutch policy approach demonstrated that both within the Committee for 
Animal Biotechnology (CAB) as well as in the broader policy community 
there was no consensus about the interpretation and relative weight of 
intrinsic value. The majority of respondents regarded the concept as too 
difficult and ill defined to play a meaningful role in the public debate. 
Apparently, the philosophical debate of the intrinsic value of animals has 
left the public discussion behind. This does not mean, however, that citizens 
do not recognize the value of animals as ends-in-themselves or do not act 
accordingly in their daily lives. It merely demonstrates that the concept of 
‘intrinsic value’ is insufficiently meaningful to represent the Dutch citizen’s 
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intuitive conceptions of the independent value of animals. Because of the 
persistent ambiguities surrounding the concept of intrinsic value, it has 
played a problematic role in the practice of animal biotechnology policy. 
The discrepancy between the academic notion of intrinsic value and the 
perceptions of the independent value of animals in the Dutch society is 
also demonstrated by our empirical data. In one of the workshop rounds 
of the value lab sessions, we explicitly asked the participants to indicate 
which of the collected and articulated values were (in their view) related to 
the animal’s value of its own. We purposely did not ask for intrinsic value 
directly because of the explicit, but ambiguous, role of this concept in the 
debate. Each of the reconstructed value frameworks constitutes a different 
interpretation of the animal’s intrinsic value. Of course, aspects of the 
different interpretations also overlap. However, even when two frameworks 
refer to the same aspect, differences remain in how this aspect is precisely 
understood. In addition, the frame-specific perspectives on the animal and 
the human-animal relationship colour the understanding of each aspect of a 
particular intrinsic value interpretation.
Table 8.3 Differences in interpretation of ’intrinsic value’. The legal definition  
  does not match any of the framework interpretations. 
Frameworks of animal value
The animal’s Law Use Relation Balance Source
health
welfare
ability of species-specific behavior
capacity of self-sustenance in a 
species-specific environment
physiological wholeness and 
intactness
uniqueness
taking part in a greater whole
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We compared the different interpretations of intrinsic value with the legal 
definition used by the Dutch government as a central tenet for all animal 
use policies (see Table 8.3). The framework used in Dutch ethical regulation 
involves a definition of intrinsic value based on three criteria: ‘health’, 
‘welfare’ and ‘integrity’. The concept of integrity is again subdivided into three 
different aspects: ‘the ability of species-specific behavior’, ‘the capacity of self-
sustenance in a species-specific environment’ and ‘physiological wholeness 
and intactness’. This definition is used by the CAB in their assessment of 
biotechnological research proposals (Paula & van den Belt, 2008).
 The Use framework interprets the intrinsic value of animals 
particularly as the recognition of the animal as a sentient being, with the 
capacity to experience and suffer. The concepts of health and welfare are 
therefore valued as the most important (and relevant) interests of the 
animal itself. The capacity for species-specific behavior is valued in so far 
as it contributes to the animal’s welfare. The Relation framework shares the 
recognition of the animal’s health and welfare as important elements of the 
animal’s intrinsic value. Additionally, the animal’s individual quality is seen as 
a part of the animal’s intrinsic value, expressed in the value ‘uniqueness’. The 
animal is appreciated as an independent companion in the human-animal 
relationship. This idea contributes to the quality of this relationship. Due to 
the human-centeredness of the perspectives of both the Use and Relation 
frameworks, some elements of the animal’s intrinsic value are simultaneously 
appreciated for their instrumental value. The Use framework, for example, 
perceives the animal’s species-specific character and behavior as something 
that belongs to the animal, but also gives humans the opportunity to Use 
animals in order to fulfill human needs. The Relation framework also 
appreciates this character and behavior in an aesthetic sense, referring to the 
joy it grants the human spectator.  
 The Balance framework interpretation of intrinsic value primarily 
emphasizes the animal’s independent role and position as a co-inhabitant 
of ‘system earth’. Further constituents of the animal’s intrinsic value are the 
appreciation of the animal as a subject of life, with its own subsequent needs 
and interests, and the animal’s naturalness, grounded in the concepts of 
species-specific character and behavior, but particularly in the recognition 
of the animal as a part of a natural environment, expressed in the value 
‘capacity for self-sustenance’. A similar ‘system’ perspective can be observed 
in the language and concepts of the Source framework. However, there 
is a more spiritual dimension to it. The greater whole of which man and 
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animal are part is conceived as incomprehensible to us human beings. The 
interconnectedness of animals with all other things is perceived as one of 
two evenly important elements of the animal’s intrinsic value. It is expressed 
in Table 8.2 as the animal’s taking part in a greater whole. The other 
element is the animal’s individuality, expressed as ‘uniqueness’ in Table 8.2. 
Interconnectedness and individuality are together viewed as a manifestation 
of the animal’s purpose. 
 None of the four constructed value frameworks completely matches 
the framing of intrinsic value applied by the Ministry of Agriculture in the 
operationalization of animal biotechnology policy in the Netherlands. The 
concepts of ‘wholeness and intactness’ and ‘self-sustenance’ do not play a role 
in the frameworks of ‘Use’ and ‘Relation’. If a participant of the public debate 
would make sense of animal biotechnology using these frameworks, at least a 
part of the concept of intrinsic value would not be meaningful to her. At the 
same time, the ‘Relation’ framework expresses a valuation of the uniqueness 
of animals, which is not reflected in the operational definition. The notion 
that animals are taking part in a greater whole, an important concept in 
the ‘Balance’ and ‘Source’ framework, is also not reflected in the definition 
used by the government. Although the legislative definition comprises the 
majority of values, its  differences with the interpretations of the animal’s 
intrinsic value of the four reconstructed frameworks indicate that in further 
public deliberations, the legislative definition will remain subject to critique. 
Part D of this thesis addresses the ways in which the Dutch government can 
take these results into account in the making and communication of animal 
biotechnology policy.
Chapter 9
Reflections, implications
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This explorative study has shown that the interactive methodology of the 
value lab is able to produce in-depth structured value frameworks underlying 
the reflection on animals. Furthermore, participants described the group 
wise self-exploration as a rewarding experience, both interesting and fun to 
do. A central aspect of this study was the bottom-up reconstruction of the 
language and concepts citizens themselves use when they think and talk 
about animals. Development and application of the value lab method had the 
objective to explore both the width and depth of this reflection. Chapter 7 
presented the series of methodological steps required to warrant the quality 
of this exploration of value diversity. Homogeneity and the use of structured 
exercises enabled us to adequately manage the deliberative processes in 
discussion groups, facilitating constructive interaction. The utilized selection 
criteria produced rich in-depth discussions covering a noticeably wide 
range of ideas about animals in the Netherlands. Finally, the value lab spiral 
enabled participants to act as co-researchers in the exploration of value 
frameworks. Together with the subsequent grounded theory analysis these 
steps provided an in-depth construction of generic, contextual and specific 
ways of thinking and talking about animals. The resulting value frameworks 
were presented in chapter 8. This chapter presents an evaluation of the value 
lab methodology. In addition, it reviews the implications of the reconstructed 
value frameworks for animal ethics.
9.1	 Evaluation	of	the	value	lab	methodology
 
A first step in the assessment of the quality of a participation mechanism 
is a definition of its effectiveness (Rowe & Frewer, 2004). We consider the 
value lab effective, when its objective has been reached, i.e. exploration of 
the width and depth of different ways in which citizens in the Netherlands 
frame the value of animals. In this section, the methodological steps taken to 
attain this objective are evaluated against the criteria presented in literature 
(Burgess & Chilvers, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Webler, 1995). Because the 
value lab methodology does not focus on involving the public(s) in making 
actual decisions, but rather slows down and zooms in on the values that 
shape those decisions, not all of the reported process and outcome criteria to 
evaluate participation mechanisms were applicable. The following sections 
report on three clusters of criteria: deliberative process management, the 
co-construction of ideas and the issue of representation. The data used to 
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evaluate the fulfillment of these criteria were obtained through observation 
of the group discussions, content analysis and the analysis of short evaluation 
forms distributed directly after the value lab group discussions. Observation 
and analysis were performed independently by two of our researchers and 
subsequently compared and discussed. 
 
Management of the deliberative process 
 
A first element of the evaluation of deliberative processes is the structure of 
the process and procedures. We will focus on process criteria that evaluate 
the deliberative process itself. The overall purpose of deliberative process 
management is the facilitation of constructive interaction and knowledge 
sharing between participants. We have formulated three criteria to assess 
the management of process in the application of the value lab method: 
process facilitation, mutual respect and openness, and equal opportunity 
(Abelson et al., 2003; Caron-Flinterman, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Webler 
& Tuler, 2000). Generally, participants evaluated the structure of process and 
procedures as adequate. They furthermore indicated to have perceived the 
discussion group sessions as enjoyable, interesting and rich of learning. The 
general atmosphere in the groups was considered friendly and fruitful. 
 
Process facilitation  
The facilitation of deliberative processes should be in the hands of 
independent professionals, without a direct interest in the outcome of the 
discussion (Caron-Flinterman, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). The value lab 
discussions were facilitated by experienced staff members of the Athena 
Institute of VU University Amsterdam, all of them not directly involved in 
or affected by animal biotechnology policy making. Rowe and Frewer (2000) 
argued that whether facilitators are seen as independent is also important. 
Indeed, we experienced that the fact that our facilitators were university 
employees instead of government officials, had a positive effect on the 
willingness to participate. 
Mutual respect and openness  
Effective and productive deliberation requires a safe and relaxed environment 
in which participants feel free to express and explain themselves and ask 
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each other questions of clarification, i.e. characterized by mutual respect 
and openness (Webler & Tuler, 2000). Our strategy to form homogeneous 
discussion groups indeed showed a positive effect on the group process, 
creating group adhesion and a strong sense of solidarity. Generally, 
participants indicated to have felt free to express their thoughts. A woman 
from one of the groups remarked, “it felt like every opinion about animals 
was welcomed.” Also, it was mentioned that it felt good to discuss these 
matters among people with similar minds. For example one participant 
stated “it was nice to recognize myself in the views of others.” The mixed 
groups showed less of this sense of solidarity, although the workshop setting 
in itself also in these groups contributed to a friendly atmosphere. Still, in 
these groups more time was spent at ‘convincing’ instead of ‘clarifying’, which 
had a negative impact on the time schedule. 
 A second strategy to warrant the safe and non-threatening 
environment was a mutual agreement on conversation rules at the 
introduction of the group meeting. Altogether, the atmospheres at the group 
discussions were open and respectful. Participants indicated to have felt free 
to talk. 
 
Equal opportunity 
The deliberative process should be fair, in the sense that it provides every 
participant the opportunity to put forward her position and to reflect on the 
position of others (Abelson et al., 2003; Ryfe, 2005; Webler & Tuler, 2000). 
The conversation rules as well as the use of structured exercises contributed 
to an equal distribution of attention during the discussion. One of the 
participants: “I appreciated the idea that the exercises granted everybody’s 
opinion equal attention.” Another one: “There was a fair division of attention.” 
Finally, working with homogeneous groups supported the equality of 
participants in the group discussions. In two of the homogeneous groups, a 
small minority was on hindsight misplaced. These participants indicated they 
felt different and that these differences obstructed the process of discussing 
the important animal values. Another aspect of equal opportunity concerns 
the level of professionalization with respect to the animal biotechnology 
debate. Earlier we indicated to have excluded individuals that professionally 
represent interests, because they could interfere with the equal opportunity 
of other non-professionalized participants. On hindsight, a few of the 109 
participants would still be classified as ‘professionalized’. Indeed, group 
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dynamics showed that this gave them a dominant and influential role in the 
group due to their pre-knowledge of the subject and sometimes also personal 
behavior. 
Co-construction of ideas 
 
The idea of co-construction intended exploration of the depth of different 
ways in which citizens frame the value of animals. Empirical research in 
psychology has shown that people normally do not reason by taking in, and 
evaluating, all relevant information, but rather use cognitive heuristics by 
taking information shortcuts and making snap judgments (Lau & Redlawsk, 
2001; Ryfe, 2005). This suggests that deliberation is in fact a disturbance 
of everyday reasoning. Moreover, cognitive heuristics potentially threaten 
the Habermasian concepts of ideal speech and communicative action 
(J. Habermas, 1984). We counteracted this pitfall by delegating part of 
the analytical steps to the structured exercises of the step-by-step spiral. 
The structured approach stimulated real in-depth exploration of a wide 
range of issues. In the words of one of the participants: “some of these 
values come from really deep inside. I just don’t use them every day. This 
approach worked for me as a way to make things concrete.” Furthermore, the 
participant-centered structure of the workshop and subsequent reflection 
stimulated participants to structure their own thoughts using their own 
associations and categorizations, acting as co-researchers in the construction 
of value frameworks.  
 The value lab spiral added more deep-seated levels of understanding. 
This is illustrated by the following quotes, taken from various short 
evaluation forms distributed directly after the workshops. “This evening 
in fact taught me to think out on these values and the place of animals and 
humans in this world”; “It was intriguing to think about the matter in this 
structured way”; “The way this evening was structured really provided 
insight.” At the same time, the discussion groups enhanced individual 
learning. A significant part of the participants mentioned in the evaluation 
forms that they had experienced the workshop evening as rich in learning. 
One participant stated: “This workshop has shed a different light on the 
matter, which was certainly valuable to me.” Another one: “This workshop 
really widened my view.” 
 In addition to the structured exercises, homogeneity contributed 
to the co-construction of ideas. However, homogeneity also tends to 
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suppress the expression of possibly conflicting ideas, while confrontation 
with a greater diversity of ideas might in fact encourage the challenging 
of arguments, learning and deeper consideration of issues (Ryfe, 2005). In 
our experience however, homogeneity is a necessary precondition for the 
exploration of deeper, unarticulated values. The participants that were on 
hindsight misplaced in this study indicated that - as a consequence of the 
misplacement- the discussion of the values that théy considered important, 
remained more superficial and abstract. Furthermore, we observed that in 
homogeneous groups a larger part of the expressed values were shared or 
taken up by other participants. In the heterogeneous groups, we observed 
a greater tendency towards extra careful exploration and conflict avoiding 
behavior. 
 One notable observation of this study was that Christian and 
Islamic groups appeared not to be homogeneous with respected to animals. 
Discussions in those groups produced a set of value categories resembling 
the value images produced by the mixed groups. Also the group process 
resembled that of the mixed groups. Apparently, religion is a less strong 
determinant in the way people think about animals. Our findings show 
that although heterogeneous groups would resemble the practice of public 
debates more closely, the deliberation of values benefits from homogeneity. 
In the second phase of our project, the experimental dialogues connected the 
exploration of values to the encounter of other perspectives.   
 
Representation	of	the	diversity	of	views 
 
Representativeness is considered one of the most important criteria for 
evaluating the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms (Abelson et al., 
2003; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). It refers to the legitimacy and fairness of the 
selection process. Many projects of public participation seek some kind 
of statistical representativeness, i.e. the balanced representation of socio-
demographic categories or stakeholder interests. In our study, we were 
interested in cognitive representation, inclusion of the qualitative diversity 
of views on animals and the human-animal relationship. Using a cognitive 
representation sampling strategy probably entails missing out on some socio-
demographic categories. In line with Fishkin (1995), this is only a problem 
when these groups would provide new or not yet described ideas about 
animals. Fishkin has argued that, if not every person, at least every view must 
be represented. So, the question is whether our selection strategy covered the 
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width of views on animals in the Netherlands. Qualitative research literature 
recommends to conduct a series of discussion groups, while simultaneously 
monitoring the development of the range of issues to see whether new issues 
come up or the development of themes and categories becomes ‘saturated’ 
(Krueger, 1994; Sim, 1998). We started out with the two groups we expected 
to construct the two outer extremes of value patterns (see Table 7.1: fg1 and 
fg10). The homogeneous groups we conducted subsequently showed no 
transgressions of these extremes. Also the mixed group discussions, which 
were cross-sections of society, did not show additional value patterns. The 
range of value categories observed in the homogeneous groups has been 
produced in the mixed group discussions as well. 
 
What	the	value	frameworks	do	and	what	they	do	not 
 
Based on our qualitative research design, we can argue to have encompassed 
the diversity of views on the value of animals in the Netherlands. Systematic 
analysis of the value lab data produced frameworks that were distinctively 
different at a conceptual level. Because of the limitations of qualitative data 
obtained from small group discussions, empirical generalization of the 
four constructed frameworks to wider populations, events or situations 
is not possible (Sim, 1998). Although we do observe a relation between a 
particular individual and a particular framework, this relation is not fixed 
and changes under different circumstances. Generalization at a conceptual 
level is more feasible. The significance of the produced frameworks for 
the Dutch public debate therefore lies in generalization of the conceptual 
diversity to the public domain. Following Frouws (1998), we regard the value 
frameworks as social representations. In a public debate they are continually 
produced and reproduced. The meaning of value frameworks produced in 
the value lab should be regarded as instrumental. Here, we follow the line of 
Deweyan pragmatists, considering the ethics of technology as a process of 
invention and reconstruction (Keulartz et al., 2004). The frameworks are a 
way of understanding the pluralistic reality of the public debates on animal 
biotechnology in the Netherlands. The implications of the value frameworks 
for the practices of ethics and policy-making will be addressed in the next 
section.
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9.2 Animal ethics in the face of pluralism
 
Chapter 3 discussed the tendency of animal ethics towards ethical monism: 
the desire for a single and comprehensive animal ethic that will guide all 
our actions regarding animals and the human-animal relationship. The 
pragmatist critique of this tendency, presented in chapter 3, explored the 
problematic aspects of ethical monism and offered an alternative, pluralistic 
conception of the value of animals. The four value frameworks that we have 
reconstructed through the value lab sessions render a rich understanding 
of the range of animal values present in the reflection on animals in the 
Netherlands. Each of the reconstructed frameworks produces specific and 
contextual meanings of the value of animals, providing a strong validation of 
value pluralism in the reflection on animal issues in the Netherlands. In this 
section, the consequences of the observed value pluralism for animal ethics 
will be discussed. 
 
Recognizing	value	pluralism 
 
Smith (2003) indicated that value pluralism, as it is commonly understood in 
contemporary philosophy, rests on two ideas: the incompatibility of values 
and the incommensurability of values (see for example Nagel, 1979; Williams, 
1981). The incompatibility of values occurs when two (or more) possible 
ideals cannot be fulfilled at the same time. Smith refers to it as the human 
condition. Conflicts between incompatible values are numerously present in 
our moral experience, also with regard to animal issues. Such conflicts may 
occur not only between persons, but also within a single person. We indeed 
observed participants of the value lab sessions simultaneously appreciating 
different values of the animal that are difficult to reconcile and which pull 
them in contradictory directions. An example of incompatibility within a 
particular framing is the Relation framework’s simultaneous expression of 
the desire to build emotional relationships with animals and the appreciation 
of the role of laboratory animals in drug development. An example of 
incompatibility between framings is the use of animals for the fulfillment of 
human needs, mainly appreciated in the Use and Relation frameworks and 
the celebration of the animal’s autonomy expressed in the Source framework.  
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The second element of value pluralism, the incommensurability of values, 
turns directly to ethical monism. Incommensurability refers to the absence 
of an overarching value against which competing values can be weighed 
and evaluated (Smith, 2003). It occurs when communication across 
theories, vocabularies or perspectives is disturbed and rational assessment 
difficult or impossible (Furrow, 1995). Also Williams (1981) has argued 
that the incommensurability of values entails that not every conflict of 
values can be rationally resolved. He goes on to say that this does not yet 
imply a commitment to a radical incomparability of values. It means that 
conflicting values can not necessarily be reduced to each other or to an 
external standard. If we look at the different framings of the value of animals 
reconstructed in this study, the incommensurability of those framings is 
apparent. What universal standard could justify a choice between the I-it 
perspective of the Use framework, the I-you perspective of the Relation 
framework, the i-WE perspective of the Balance framework or the i-THOU 
perspective of the Source framework? All these frameworks will produce a 
different judgment of a particular case of the use of animals, for example the 
use of animals for laboratory experiments. In all frameworks, ‘knowledge 
benefit’, ‘health benefit’, ‘animal suffering’ or ‘the intrusion of animal life’ 
acquires a different meaning and relative weight; the situation will be judged 
by appealing to different criteria. The frameworks appear to exhibit their 
own rationality. As Schön and Rein (1994) argued, there is no frame-neutral 
standard to evaluate the ‘appropriateness’ of a particular frame. The presence 
of multiple, conflicting frames has to be taken into account in ethics and 
governance if a socially robust resolution of the animal biotechnology 
controversy is to be constructed. The pragmatist reflective learning 
approach developed in this thesis is an example of a strategy that aims at the 
recognition of the variety of legitimate perspectives. Part D of this thesis will 
further elaborate on the strategies for ethics and governance.   
 The observations of the value lab inquiries indicate that ethical 
monism, which was proposed to expel uncertainty and settle conflicts, 
needlessly limits the broad range of interactions between humans and 
animals and thereby misrepresent the diversity of moral experiences and 
values. Furthermore, seeing that others share the same struggles and conflicts 
of values, be it that they arrive at a different judgment, might improve mutual 
understanding. 
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Beyond	the	dichotomy	of	value	dilemmas 
 
The observed incommensurability and incompatibility of the diversity of 
values identified by the value lab investigations demonstrate the flaws of 
ethical monism in animal biotechnology ethics. A second problematic aspect 
of the traditional approach to animal biotechnology ethics is that value 
conflicts regarding the human treatment of animals are often conceptualized 
as a conflict between values that represent the needs, interests or rights of 
humans and values that represent the needs, interests or rights of animals 
(see Armstrong & Botzler, 2003; Garner, 2005). The dichotomous framing 
construes participants in the moral debate as adversaries on either side 
of the dilemma. The value pluralism observed in this study demonstrates 
that this dichotomy oversimplifies our response to the morally problematic 
dimensions of the situation we are confronted with. First of all, it is important 
to note that within each of the reconstructed frameworks, a mixture of 
values is expressed (see Figure 8.1). Furthermore, the role of a certain value 
in moral judgment will eventually be determined by the meaning that value 
acquires in its contextual relation to other values. All four frameworks, for 
example, acknowledge the concept of naturalness as an important aspect of 
the animal’s life. The frameworks however differ in the contextual meaning of 
that concept for the human-animal relationship. In the Use framework, the 
value category ‘naturalness’ is related to the categories of ‘functionality’ and 
‘use’, constructing ‘naturalness’ as a necessary condition for the fulfillment 
of human needs. In the Balance framework the naturalness of the animal 
is primarily related to the value category of ‘life’ and ‘system’ perceived as a 
necessary condition for a good life of the animal itself, whereas the Relation 
framework emphasizes the human experience of an animal’s naturalness. The 
Source framework recognizes a final purpose in the animal’s naturalness, as 
it is connected to the categories of ‘spirituality’ and ‘being’. As a result, all 
four frameworks differ in the normative implications that are attributed to 
the concept of naturalness, some are instrumental towards the fulfillment 
of human needs, others are not. Ultimately, the way in which a certain 
concept is guiding moral inquiry depends on the configuration of the entire 
framework it is positioned in. As a result of the dichotomous framing of 
moral debates about the treatment of animals, different moral positions 
become fixed positions and the associated values perceived and treated as 
ends-in-themselves, i.e. the dichotomy between an animal rights position and 
a human rights position. The different interpretations of ‘naturalness’ indicate 
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however that a value concept can play a different meaningful part in different 
framings of the value of animals. For example, the concept of ‘naturalness’ 
is meaningful, whether it is appreciated as a condition for the fulfillment of 
human needs or a condition for the fulfillment of animal life. 
Frame	reflection
 
In his examination of value pluralism in environmental ethics, Smith (2003) 
concludes that “value conflicts and dilemmas are not pathological”. Smith 
means to say that value conflicts are an integral part of the moral life of both 
individuals and groups. They are inevitable constituents of the practices of 
ethics and democracy. The question remains how moral judgments should 
be made in the context of value pluralism. Dewey’s (1932) reconstruction 
of ethics views moral life as an explicit process of cooperative conflict 
resolution. In the context of relationships between humans and animals, 
most public conflicts involve multiple stakeholders, each of them framing the 
value of animals, and therefore the moral problem at hand, in a different way. 
The value frameworks reconstructed in this study exemplify these different 
ways of framing. They imply entrenched disagreements about values, 
interests and ideals. To understand how cooperative conflict resolution can 
be practiced in the context of those deeply entrenched public conflicts, we 
return to the concept of framing as developed by another pragmatist, Donald 
Schön. The discursive materials of the value lab empirically demonstrate 
that the plurality of perspectives present in the reflection on animals in the 
Netherlands indeed results in various “problem-setting stories”, grounded 
in different, in some ways conflicting, frames. According to Schön, these 
different, conflicting frames are the reason that such public conflicts seem 
intractable controversies (Schön, 1979). As discussed in chapter 4, those 
kind of problems are in need of frame restructuring: the process by which 
we “respond to frame conflict by constructing a new problem-setting 
story, one in which we attempt to integrate conflicting frames by including 
features and relations drawn from earlier stories” (Schön, 1979; p. 270).  A 
crucial condition for frame restructuring is frame reflection, achieving 
understanding of one’s own framing of a problem and (possible) differences 
with the framings of others (Schön & Rein, 1994). The concept of frame 
reflection revives the Deweyan theme of the creative and constructive 
resolution of conflicts in public life. According to Keulartz et al. (2002a) this 
reflexive attitude is precisely what is needed to sustain a pragmatist ideal of 
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equal coexistence of plural perspectives. They argue that “conflicting parties 
have to appreciate the facts that they are competing for primacy within the 
same universe of discourse with others that cannot beforehand be branded 
as unreasonable. Such reflexive awareness rejects the naivety of dogmatic 
beliefs, recognizes its own fallibility and leaves room for ‘reasonable 
dissensus’” (Keulartz, et al. , 2002a, p. 262).
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Part three
Value conflict
Chapter 10
The context of animal biotechnology
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The approach to reflective learning about the animal biotechnology 
controversy, developed in this thesis, explicitly focuses on the inquiry and 
deliberation of values. The deliberative design of our social experiments 
therefore had a stepwise character. The first round of interaction, the value 
lab discussions, focused on the exploration of value diversity in the reflection 
on animals. The process of participatory inquiry started out with the ways in 
which people experience and reflect upon animals in their daily lives. These 
experiences and reflections, embodied in social practices, form the initial 
context in which the value of animal becomes meaningful. As presented in 
Part B, application of the value lab tool yielded the reconstruction of four 
distinctive frames of reference, constituting the diversity of values in the 
reflection on animals in the Netherlands. However, the general context 
in which the frames were produced, begs the question of relevance for 
the governance of animal biotechnology. Do these frames have the same 
meaning and use in the context of animal biotechnology? Or does the genetic 
modification of animals invoke a different use of language and concepts? 
Furthermore, the social controversy of animal biotechnology is characterized 
by the presence of different perspectives and problem definitions (see 
chapter 4). Two contextual aspects are of a vital importance in the 
interpretation of these conflicts. First, there are the potential differences 
between the analytical reconstruction of value pluralism in the reflection 
on animals in general and the expressed patterns of value in the context 
of animal biotechnology. Second, there is the inevitable social character 
of the value conflicts. They are discursively constructed in the interaction 
between different individuals and groups. Value conflicts should therefore 
be addressed as practical disputes. Moreover, deliberation should focus on 
tangible problematic situations of developments in animal biotechnology 
(see chapter 3). Concluding, from the perspective of reflective learning about 
the animal biotechnology controversy, it would be the most interesting to 
monitor the meaning and use of frames in the heterogeneous deliberation of 
animal biotechnology cases.
 The second round of interaction indeed focused on the articulation 
of (possible) value conflicts in the active discussion of concrete animal 
biotechnology cases. In order to articulate conflicts and explore the 
possibilities for reframing, we developed a second deliberative instrument, 
the experimental dialogues tool. Roughly the same group of citizens that 
had participated in the value lab sessions was six months later brought 
together to discuss and evaluate concrete cases of animal biotechnology in 
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combinations representing different frames. Chapter 11 reveals how the 
experimental dialogues tool created a safe and non-threatening conversation 
environment in order to facilitate equal and respectful deliberation of 
concrete cases of animal biotechnology. The objective of the dialogues 
tool was to contribute to the systematic articulation of value conflicts. We 
used two different principles to investigate possible value conflicts between 
representatives of different frames: first we looked at the extent to which 
participants were capable of achieving understanding. Second, we looked 
at the extent to which they were able to reach a consensus, or to maneuver 
between conflict and consensus, both in the context of concrete case 
evaluation. Chapter 12 reviews the performance on both principles for every 
frame combination. The chapter shows that the various frame combinations 
each achieve a different extent of understanding and consensus. Ultimately, 
the experimental dialogues have provided a rich understanding of the (im)
possibilities of consensus and conflict when the different perspectives present 
in the Dutch society meet in dialogue. The extent to which the experimental 
dialogues provided insight into the opportunities for reframing of the animal 
biotechnology controversy will be discussed in the final part of this thesis 
(part D). Although the meaning and use of frame-specific expressions is 
of course relative to the context of each particular ‘meeting of frames’, the 
dialogues did provide some more general insights into the differences and 
similarities between the responses of the various frames to the context of 
animal biotechnology. These insights will be discussed in chapter 13.

Chapter 11
The experimental dialogues methodology
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The concept of dialogue is related to different levels of social organization. It 
may refer to communication between individuals, but also to communication 
within society as a whole. In our study, we considered a dialogue session to 
be a deliberative meeting of two small groups of persons that do not share 
each other’s ideas on a specific issue. The same group of citizens that had 
participated in the reconstruction of value frames was now invited to discuss 
and evaluate concrete cases of animal biotechnology in carefully arranged 
heterogeneous discussion groups. This chapter discusses the methodological 
choices made to achieve these objectives.
 The citizen dialogues were supposed to contribute to the articulation 
of value conflicts and the exploration of reframing possibilities with respect 
to the social controversy of animal biotechnology. Citizen participation 
was therefore again indispensable for the discursive exploration of conflict 
and agreement. The citizens were brought together to discuss and evaluate 
concrete cases of animal biotechnology in combinations representing 
different frames. The participants invited for the dialogue sessions were the 
same citizens that had also participated in the value lab discussions in order 
to establish continuity in the process of frame analysis. In addition, using 
the same participant sample created the optimal benefit of the stepwise 
design of our social experiments. We expected the participants to have 
already increased their awareness of their own frames of reference in the 
value lab sessions. The value frames that were articulated in the value lab 
discussions and, subsequently, in the reconstructive analysis, were now 
used as instruments to arrange and structure the experimental dialogue 
deliberations. We organized a series of dialogue sessions in which each 
session contained the representatives of two different frames. In this way, 
we were able to monitor the meaning and use of each particular frame in the 
presence of any other frame. Furthermore, this design enabled us to more 
carefully investigate frame conflicts and reframing possibilities for each 
combination of frames. In section 11.1, a more detailed description of the 
selection and grouping of participants is provided.
 We asked the participants of one dialogue session to make a decision 
together about two different animal biotechnology cases. The purpose of 
this assignment was to investigate whether the differences between the 
frames would interfere with the process of decision-making about concrete 
examples of animal biotechnology. Furthermore, we expected the request to 
make a decision to increase the participants’ feeling of responsibility as well 
as their feeling of urgency to deliberate the cases. We expected an increased 
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sense of responsibility and urgency to improve the deliberative effort made 
by the participants. Furthermore, the formulation of a decision at the end of 
the experiment enabled us to investigate whether the deliberation of values, 
conflicts and reframing possibilities had actually occurred. Section 11.3 will 
describe the virtual decision-making environment that we have created to 
both increase the sense of responsibility and urgency and establish a non-
threatening conversation environment.
11.1 Participant selection and grouping
We invited the same participants that participated in the reconstruction 
of frames in the first phase of this project (see part B). As chapter 7 has 
described, the selection of participants in our social experiments explicitly 
aimed at the qualitative variation - not the statistical representativeness 
of ideas about animals. We were interested in the so-called cognitive 
representation of the diversity of viewpoints. Participants were selected 
through a wide range of social organizations associated with certain 
viewpoints on the animal issue. We did not select official representatives 
of those groups or movements for reasons of process management. We 
expected professionalized citizens to take (or be granted by others) a 
too dominant role in the construction of value frameworks. Also in the 
experimental dialogues, the participants were explicitly addressed as 
individual citizens with their own sets of values and concerns. 
 The empirical investigation of the different ways of thinking and 
talking about animals in the Netherlands in the first phase of the project 
led to the reconstruction of four distinctive frames (see Table 11.1 for a 
short description). These frames were used instrumentally to arrange the 
experimental dialogues into sessions comprising representatives of two 
different frames. Therefore, we first had to classify each participant as a 
representative of one of the four frames. The discursive material of the value 
lab discussions was used to assess every participant’s preferred frame. Of 
course, frames are not some kind of mental entities existing in the minds 
of individuals. As chapter 8 indicated, they should be regarded as social 
representations that people use to express their thoughts and concerns. 
However, for the majority of participants, we did observe a tendency to use 
the language and concepts typical of a particular frame. 
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Table 11.1 Short descriptions of the four different frameworks of the   
  value of animals in the Netherlands. These frameworks have been  
  reconstructed in earlier empirical research (see Part B).
Frame The animal as a
Use respected biological entity, that can be used instrumentally for food con-
sumption and to further human knowledge, be it in a responsible way
Relation individual character, functional in the human-animal relationship. The 
hierarchy of the relation is set: humans benefit whereas the animal 
remains unaffected or benefits too
Balance individual being that is part of the system of life. Like humans, they have 
their own needs and interests that should be granted some space in a 
fair balance
Source distinctive being, vitally interconnected with the whole of existence. 
Humans should treat them as equals for both are participating in the 
progression of the whole
Our assessment of a participant’s use of language and concepts was tested 
by means of a vignette questionnaire at the same day the dialogues were 
organized. Vignettes are described as short, hypothetical stories about a 
specified situation to which research participants are asked to respond 
(Finch, 1987; Hughes & Huby, 2002). Prior to the dialogues, we confronted 
the participants with a description of three animal biotechnology cases. 
For each case, participants were asked to indicate - by distributing credit 
points- the relative weight of seven different animal value concepts in their 
evaluation of the case. These value concepts had been generated from our 
analysis of the discursive material of the value lab discussions. Based on the 
concepts they prioritized, participants were labelled as a representative of a 
particular frame. The results of the vignette questionnaire overall indicated 
that we accurately assessed the participants’ frames. We concluded that the 
division of participants over the dialogues had therefore been accurate.
 Eventually, almost every combination of two frames occurred twice; 
in total there were 10 dialogue sessions. Only the dialogues between the Use 
and Source participants and the Relation and Balance participants occurred 
once, because of unexpected low attendance rates at one of the dialogue days. 
This did however not affect our analysis of these frame combinations. The 
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sessions were organized at a central, neutral location in the Netherlands. In 
every dialogue session, 4 to 6 persons participated. Representation of both 
frames was balanced to avoid power differences. Altogether, 53 persons 
participated, of which 30 were male. The age of the participants varied from 
22 to 80 years, whereas the average age of the participants was 44 years. The 
sessions were taped on video and audio for further analysis, with permission 
of the participants involved.
11.2 Dialogue settings and design
A dialogue is essentially different from a debate, which is primarily aimed 
at convincing the other parties of one’s point of view. A dialogue aims at 
a reciprocal conversation, in which both parties aim at understanding the 
other’s point of view. Whether the various frame combinations would 
actually achieve mutual understanding was of course part of the interaction. 
In order to enable dialogical interaction, it was necessary to create a 
trustworthy and non-threatening environment in which participants 
would feel at ease and open to freely express their personal thoughts and 
beliefs (Greenbaum, 2000). Effective and productive deliberation requires 
a conversation environment characterized by mutual respect and openness 
(Webler & Tuler, 2000). The safe environment was created by several process 
conditions. First, we invoked three ground rules at the start of each session. 
These rules were derived from the concept of ‘power-free dialogue’ developed 
by Habermas (1984). At the start of the dialogues, we asked every participant 
to agree to the following rules:
- A dialogue should be power-free. What is said in this experimental 
setting, may not be used to their advantage by others in future 
situations outside this room.
- Respect the other as equal. Start with the assumption that everyone 
has something valuable to contribute. 
- Be willing to revise your own views. Accept the potential of other 
views.
A second process condition was that participants were explicitly addressed 
as individual citizens, not as representatives, or symphatizer, of some kind 
of organization or movement. We wanted the participants to share their 
126
Chapter 11
personal beliefs and concerns from their own unique experience. When 
people speak as representatives of groups they tend to be less prone to 
listening and understanding. 
 Third, we developed the imaginative setting of the ‘island council’ 
in order to create a power-free space where the animal biotechnology 
cases could be deliberated. The group conversation took place in a role-
play setting. Participants were told that they had been personally elected 
into the council of an island with the same demographic characteristics as 
the Netherlands. The introduction of the ‘island council’ was expected to 
preclude the influence of the strategic context of existing power structures or 
vested interests. Of course, the public concern about animal biotechnology in 
practice is concerned with cognitive and institutional aspects as well (Marris, 
2001). In that sense, it might be argued that the imaginative setting of the 
‘island council’ abstracted the experimental dialogues discussions from the 
actual context of the animal biotechnology controversy. However, precisely 
because of the focus on interests, moral debates are often narrowed down 
to strategic negotiations (see for example Keulartz et al., 2004). Differences 
in value frames and problem definitions are no longer deliberated. Whereas 
these frames also influence how interests, cognitive or institutional aspects 
are appreciated. With the introduction of the ‘island council’ role-play 
setting, we aimed to focus the participants on a substantice discussion of 
moral aspects rather than interest negotiations, in order to contribute to the 
equal and fair deliberation of values.
 Finally, the group facilitators played a vital role in nurturing the 
dialogical context. They adopted a hermeneutical approach aimed at 
understanding the participants’ point of view (Freeman, 2006; Thompson 
et al., 1994). Furthermore, the fact that the experimental dialogues were 
facilitated by independent professionals of the Athena Institute of the 
VU University Amsterdam, contributed to the participants’ perception 
of the experimental dialogues as a fair exercise (see also Rowe & Frewer, 
2000). Importantly, because we were interested in the unassisted ability of 
representatives of different frames to make shared decicions, the facilitators 
did not interfere in the ‘island council’ role play.
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Session design
In all sessions, each comprising the representatives of two different frames, 
two concrete animal biotechnology cases were discussed. Each case 
discussion followed the same semi-structured design, consisting of several 
rounds with individual or group tasks. In Box 11.1, the sequential steps 
of the dialogue session design are explained further. The dialogues were 
designed as a step-by-step process. The group conversation gradually moved 
from the articulation of arguments to making a mutual decision. A session 
started out with a name game, to avoid the demonstration of expertise or 
power and simultaneously break the ice. The next step was to let participants 
individually reflect on the presented animal biotechnology case by filling in 
a weighing scale of arguments. Then, the individual arguments were shared 
with each other. The next step was to make a decision as a group, based on 
the arguments that were articulated. In the final decision-making process, 
facilitators hardly intervened in order to obtain a clear view of the likelihood 
of consensus or conflict for every frame combination. As Box 11.1 indicates, 
each discussion round uses different interventions to preserve the process-
conditions mentioned above.
Box 11.1. The sequential steps of the dialogue program.
Round Activity
name game Every participant is asked to introduce him/ herself with a 
personal anecdote about their name.
The game acts to address participants as individuals. Talk of personal background, 
profession or membership of social organizations is carefully avoided in order to 
preclude prejudgments. Furthermore, this exercise serves to loosen up and break 
the ice.
weighing scales The participants are asked to list their arguments in favor and 
against the case on a distributed paper weighing scale.
This individual exercise makes participants reflect on the case and articulate argu-
mentations before getting influenced by other participants. The facilitators urge 
them to suspend their judgment until the end of the case discussion.
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share arguments Every participant gets the opportunity to share his/ her argu-
ments with the group.
The group is asked only to listen to each other and not to start discussing the mat-
ter. The facilitators structure the go-round and invite the participants to explain 
and clarify their arguments.
island council The group conversation takes place in the imaginative set-
ting of the ‘Island council’. The participants are told they have 
personally been elected into the council of an island with the 
same demographic characteristics as the Netherlands. The 
council is asked to decide whether to allow or prohibit a speci-
fic case of the biotechnological use of animals on the island.
Introducing the virtual setting of the ‘Island council’ serves to create a power-free 
space, precludes the influence of existing power structures or vested interests. 
Additionally, being members of the council serves the equality of participants and 
also the responsibility for making decisions that affect more people than the parti-
cipants themselves. Facilitators explicitly withdraw themselves from the conversa-
tion. The group gets 40 minutes to come to a mutual decision.   
group reflection The final decision is formulated, together with possible terms 
and conditions and points of consent and dissent. Next, the 
decision-making process is evaluated within the group.
The facilitators invite the participants to reflect on the quality of the dialogue 
process. 
11.3	 Cases	of	animal	biotechnology
The case discussions in the dialogue sessions served as a further exploration 
of ethical aspects of the biotechnological use of animals. They constituted 
the next step in contextualizing the relation between animal biotechnology 
and the frames of animal value in the Netherlands. In each dialogue two 
cases were discussed. As is illustrated in table 3, the cases consisted of (small 
variations of ) existing examples of the biotechnological use of animals 
and provided a range of applications of animal biotechnology, comprising 
different animals, objectives and techniques.
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Table 11.2 Cases discussed in the different dialogue sessions.
Case Description
colon cancer mouse Transgenic mice are used to study the development and 
proliferation of human colon cancer to develop new thera-
pies. 
sparerib pig Genetic modification extends the spinal column of pigs to 
increase the volume and efficiency of meat production. 
double-muscle goat Genetic modification stimulates muscle growth of the 
goat’s rear to increase the volume and efficiency of meat 
production. 
clone panda Cloning of the giant panda in order to save it from extinc-
tion.
environment pig Transgenic pigs produce less phosphates in their manure 
to reduce environmental phosphate pollution due to inten-
sive farming.
All frame combinations discussed the case of the ‘colon cancer mouse’, which 
concerned the transgenic modification of a widely used laboratory animal 
in the context of scientific laboratory research with the purpose of human 
health benefits. All combinations of the Use frame with another frame also 
discussed a case with an economic purpose, the case of the ‘sparerib pig’. 
Only in the dialogue between Use and Balance representatives, we changed 
the pig for the ‘double muscle goat’ because of the presence of participants 
that do not eat pig meat out of religious conviction. As a result, all different 
frame representatives discussed one case with a human health purpose and 
one case with an agricultural purpose. These are the two major fields of 
application of animal biotechnology: the field of animal research for human 
health and the field of agriculture and food production. 
  Another motivation of the distribution of cases was the requirement 
that case evaluations were supposed to necessitate active exploration 
and deliberation in order to reach a decision. If the two groups of frame 
representatives would not need to deliberate before they could agree on a 
decision, we would not be able to investigate their potential frame conflicts 
and reframing possibilities. Because we were primarily interested in the 
dynamics of framing and reframing when representatives of different frames 
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would meet for discussion, the use of different cases did in our view not 
interfere with our research design. We therefore assigned cases in yet other 
fields of application to the combinations between Relation and Balance 
/ Source representatives and Balance and Source representatives. We 
expected those representatives to agree too easily on the objection to genetic 
modification for economic purposes, as in the case of the sparerib pig, which 
would diminish the extent of exploration and deliberation in those dialogues. 
Instead, we selected cases of animal biotechnology that would potentially 
appeal to ideas that were valued in these frames, such as ‘biodiversity’ and 
‘animal protection’ in the case of the ‘clone panda’ and ‘environmental 
protection’ in the case discussion of the ‘environment pig’. Eventually, the 
selection and assignment of cases to different frame combinations was to 
make sure that in each dialogue session, representatives of both frames 
would at the start be willing to explore and deliberate the cases they were 
confronted with.
11.4	 Dialogue	analysis
The experimental dialogues have been analyzed with respect to both process 
and content. The analytical framework of analysis has been derived from the 
dialogues’ specific purpose of articulating possible value conflicts between 
the representatives of different frames. Table 11.4 shows the analytical 
framework that has been used. The process-criteria concerned the extent to 
which the participants were able to achieve understanding and the extent 
to which they were able to reach a consensus. The degree of consensus was 
classified into one of two categories: either the convergence of arguments 
into a shared decision or the divergence of arguments in the absence of a 
shared decision. The degree of understanding was also classified into one 
of two categories: either the presence or absence of the deliberation of 
arguments. The presence or absence of deliberation was established by means 
of a facilitated group reflection (round 5) following the decision-making 
process (round 4) and a comparison of the formed decision with the initially 
stated arguments (round 3). The process analysis will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 12. With respect to the content of the sessions, we evaluated the 
dialogues on the frame-specific attitudes towards animal biotechnology, 
comprising both the initial attitude towards genetic modification and the 
influence of the context of application. Furthermore, we examined the 
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frame-specific style of reasoning and the frame-specific appeal to a source 
of moral guidelines in the regulation of animal biotechnology. The meaning 
and implications of these criteria and the content analysis will be further 
discussed in chapter 13.  
Table 11.3 The framework used to analyze the dialogue process and   
  content
Criterion Dimension
process
achieving understanding values are deliberated, values are not 
deliberated
achieving consensus convergence, divergence
content
attitude towards 
animal biotechnology
initial attitude towards genetic 
modification
context of application
style of reasoning categorical reasoning, contextual 
reasoning
moral appeal individualism, external regulation, 
universalism
The definitions of all used analytical categories were derived from literature. 
The different dimensions of the criteria were constructed in an interactive 
process of interaction between theoretical notions known from literature 
and the raw empirical data of the dialogue transcripts. In line with standard 
qualitative analysis procedures (see Strauss & Corbin, 1998), we pursued 
investigator triangulation. Observation and analysis were performed 
independently by two of our researchers and subsequently compared and 
discussed. These cycles of independent analysis and joint interpretation have 
warranted the shared interpretative validity of research process and products 
(see Maxwell, 1992). 
 There are two further aspects that might limit the implications of 
our findings. First, the value frames that we have reconstructed should be 
perceived as social representations that can selectively be used to express 
what is thought to be important in a particular context. This implies that the 
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specific context of animal biotechnology may invoke a different pattern of 
frame use in the same person, compared to the discussion of animal issues 
in general. However, because we observed similar patterns of expression and 
behavior amongst the representatives of a particular frame, we considered 
the frame-specificity of these patterns to be warranted. 
 Second, the patterns of expression and behavior have only been 
monitored in the presence of representatives of another frame. The 
meaning of expressions and behavior should therefore be interpreted in the 
context of a particular ‘meeting of frames’. However, almost all frames have 
been combined twice. Furthermore, we compared the observed patterns 
of expression and behavior of a particular frame representative to the 
expressions and behavior of fellow representatives in the same and other 
meetings. Moreover, we compared the patterns of expressions and behavior 
of frame representatives to those of representatives of other frames, in 
the same and other meetings. It has therefore been possible to draw some 
more general conclusions about the frame-specific responses to animal 
biotechnology (see chapter 13).
Chapter 12
When frames meet for dialogue
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The experimental dialogues aimed to contribute to the articulation of value 
conflicts in the animal biotechnology controversy in the Netherlands. In 
order to obtain an in-depth understanding of potential value conflicts 
between the different frames that had been articulated in the value lab 
discussions, we organized dialogue sessions between representatives of only 
two different frames at a time. It is important to note here that conflicts 
of value have an inevitable social character because they are discursively 
constructed in the interaction between different individuals and groups. 
Therefore, the following sections will discuss the conflicts of value in the 
context of different frame combinations. For each of the six combinations, 
both the extent to which a consensus was reached and the extent to which 
understanding was achieved, will be discussed.
12.1 Achieving understanding, achieving consensus
This section will first elaborate a bit more on the two criteria of ‘achieving 
understanding’ and ‘achieving consensus’ that have been used to evaluate the 
process of the dialogue sessions. It was the aim of the dialogue experiments 
to contribute to the development of a reflective learning process towards 
the animal biotechnology controversy that would include the diversity of 
value frames. The experimental dialogues therefore explored the conditions 
of a constructive dialogue. Two aspects should be discerned here. First, the 
extent to which the representatives of different frames are able to understand 
each other’s point of view, values and interests. Second, the extent to which 
these representatives are able (and willing) to reach consensus. In the 
hermeneutical tradition, both aspects, understanding and consensus, are 
seen as necessary and interdependent components of a constructive dialogue 
(Karlsson, 2001).
 Buber (1961) and Gadamer (1960) have argued that a focus on 
listening and understanding is the most important element of a constructive 
dialogue, for consensus can only follow from understanding. What kind of 
understanding are we talking about? In dialogical ethics, participants express 
what is important to them with respect to a certain morally problematic 
context. In doing so, they discover the existence of other perspectives than 
their own. According to the hermeneutic philosopher Gadamer (1960) 
this experience is the foundation of a process of understanding. Gadamer 
discerns three types of understanding. The first is the explanation of the 
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other’s viewpoint with the help of general concepts and associations. 
According to Gadamer this is objectifying the other’s perspective. The second 
concerns explanation of the other’s viewpoint in relation to one’s own unique 
identity. Reference to a unique life history however tends to relativize the 
other’s perspective. The third type is dialogical understanding. Participants 
open up to what the other has to say and are willing to revise their own 
views. From a hermeneutic perspective, as argued by Widdershoven (2001), 
dialogical understanding essentially is a process of extending one’s own 
horizon by the appropriation of new perspectives. A process described 
by Gadamer as the fusion of horizons. This does not mean that one has 
to move over to the other’s position. It refers to the co-creation of a new, 
encompassing perspective. 
 So, dialogical understanding ultimately involves some kind of 
consensus, the emergence of a new perspective. However, the orientation 
on consensus is also criticized. Abma (2001) has argued that a focus on 
consensus may hinder the creation of new meaning and exclude marginalized 
voices that do not recognize the constructed dominant ideas. Hosking and 
Bass (2002) even asserted that consensus is not necessary for communication 
or action. Authors in the public participation literature have argued that an 
emphasis on consensus often leads to a focus on the most tractable problems 
and merely reaches agreement on imprecise and general statements, while 
other important issues are ignored and important differences of value 
suppressed (Coglianese, 1997; Kerkhof, 2006). These critics all contend that 
an orientation on consensus rather tampers with real understanding because 
it obstructs deliberation. This concept, the concept of deliberation, originates 
from the work of Gadamer (1960) and Habermas (1984) on dialogues. 
It refers to a process of argumentation and communication in which 
participants collectively engage in the consideration of viewpoints, critical 
inquiry of arguments and reflection on perspectives and understandings 
(Dryzek, 2000; Webler, 1995). A focus on deliberation itself is seen as an 
alternative to the consensus-approach in the field of public participation in 
science and technology policy (see for example Kerkhof, 2006).
 This thesis has analyzed animal biotechnology as an unstructured 
policy problem. As chapter 4 has argued, this particular kind of problems 
would benefit more from a policy strategy focused on problem finding 
than a strategy focused on problem solving. The aim of a reflective 
learning approach would indeed be to learn about the problem of animal 
biotechnology. However, it would also recognize the need for decision-
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making. Therefore, we applied a stepwise approach in the design of our social 
experiments. The first phase, the articulation of value diversity, solely focused 
on deliberation. In the second phase, next to deliberation also the making 
of decisions on the acceptability of animal biotechnology cases played an 
important role. The purpose of the experimental dialogues was to investigate 
whether the differences between the frames would interfere with the process 
of decision-making about concrete examples of animal biotechnology. 
The dynamics of the group decision-making process in the experimental 
dialogues were supposed to provide insight into the unassisted opportunity 
for reframing when different frames meet in dialogue. Furthermore, the 
formation of a consensus would allow us to assess the occurrence of 
deliberation and the achievement of understanding by reflecting on the 
formed decision collectively and comparing the content of the decision to the 
initially stated individual arguments (see chapter 11).  
 Table 12.1 shows the typology of four different shapes of a dialogue 
about animal biotechnology, constructed based upon the combination of 
theoretical insights from the literature and the empirical observations of 
the experimental dialogues. The table distinguishes between ‘achieving 
understanding’, the extent to which perspectives are truly deliberated, and 
‘achieving consensus’, the extent to which the perspectives converge into a 
new perspective. 
Table 12.1 Four distinctive possibilities of the eventual shape of a social  
  dialogue, distinguishing between achieving understanding and  
  achieving consensus. 
Achieving consensus
convergence divergence
ac
hi
ev
in
g 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g deliberation substantive consensus procedural consensus
agree to disagree
no deliberation artificial consensus
avoid disagreement
dissensus
trench warfare
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Consensus can be reached on different aspects, leading to a substantive 
or procedural consensus (Moreno, 1995). Substantive consensus, on the 
content of the decision, can take two forms: consensus on the principles 
underlying the decision or consensus on the consequences of it. For this 
type of consensus it is required that the diversity of values and interests is 
deliberated. Procedural consensus is understood as a consensus on the rules 
or methods that should be employed to resolve existing disagreements. 
Examples of procedural consensus are majority decision by voting, the 
installation of an expert committee and the decision to first do further 
research. A procedural consensus occurs when values and interests are 
deliberated but a shared decision cannot be formed. It is important to note 
here that a procedural consensus can also be used to mask conflicts, in 
order to avoid the actual deliberation of certain values or interests. In our 
analysis of the experimental dialogues, this form of procedural consensus was 
classified as an artificial consensus (see Table 12.1). Ultimately, we discerned 
between three types of consensus: a true substantive consensus, a true 
procedural consensus and an artificial consensus. Table 12.1 furthermore 
shows that we distinguished between two types of divergence, in the absence 
of a consensus. In a dialogue session where the multiple viewpoints and 
values are thoughtfully deliberated, but differences remain, participants 
can merely agree to disagree. When the differences are so large that even 
the deliberation of values and interests is impossible, this is classified as a 
dissensus.
 In addition, we predicted two types of conflict that would interfere 
with either achieving understanding and/ or consensus. The first type 
concerned substantive differences. The four frames differ considerably in 
their appreciation of diverse aspects of the animal’s life and its relationship 
to human beings. The varied appreciation relates to differences in the 
underlying value framework and perspective. The second type of conflict 
concerns jargon: differences in the used vocabulary and terminology. Each 
of the frames contains expressions that are typical for that specific frame. 
Some of these expressions make no sense to representatives of other frames 
or might even irritate them. Incomprehension and irritation are likely to 
obstruct the achievement of understanding and consensus as well.
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12.2	 Consensus	and	conflict
In every session of the experimental dialogues, two cases were discussed 
(see chapter 11). This section summarizes the case discussions for each 
of the dialogues. It reflects on the type of decision that is formed and the 
levels of understanding and consensus that were reached. Altogether, a true 
substantive consensus was only reached in the dialogue between Balance and 
Source representatives. The Use and Relation representatives and, in one of 
the cases, also the Relation and Balance representatives, were able to reach a 
procedural consensus. The combination of Use and Balance representatives, 
as well as the combination of Relation and Source representatives, only 
reached an artificial consensus, avoiding the deliberation of differences. In 
one dialogue, the meeting of Use and Source representatives, the substantive 
conflicts were large and no procedural solutions could be found. This 
dialogue ended in a dissensus. 
Use vs. Relation
The Use and Relation frames share a relatively large amount of values and 
ideas. The frame analysis, reported in part B, has shown that both frames 
have a human-centered perspective. The human-animal relationship is 
perceived to be a hierarchical relationship, in which human needs and 
interests are in principle more important than animal needs and interests. 
The difference between the two frames lies in the image of the animal itself. 
The Use frame perceives the animal primarily as a member of its species, 
whereas the Relation frame sees the animal as a personal, individual being. 
These similarities and differences are also present in the expressions of the 
frame representatives, observed in the experimental dialogue sessions. In the 
discussion of the ‘colon cancer mouse’ for example, the Use representatives 
strongly emphasize the human benefits.  
 U: “It is in the interest of human health, science and eventually  
  the entire world.”   
Also the Relation representatives attribute great value to human benefits, 
although they appear to have more difficulties with the individual animals 
that are involved in the realization of these benefits, as was expected based 
on the frame analysis.
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 R: “...it is so important that this information is obtained... ...to a  
  certain limit... ...I think it is terrible that such a little animal  
  has to suffer because of the research...”
Despite these differences in emphasis, we observed little to no substantive 
conflicts. Both the Use and Relation representatives think that colon 
cancer mouse research should be allowed, because of the importance of the 
accumulation of knowledge to possibly cure a human disease. Also, both Use 
and Relation representatives recognize the trade-off between the suffering of 
the mice and the suffering of human beings. However, as the abovementioned 
quotes suggest, most frequently Relation representatives brought up the 
needs and interests of the mouse, and the topic of animal suffering. 
 R:  “...but I think that such a mouse at a certain point in time will 
  be in pain...”
 U1: “...so that means that one will monitor whether the mouse  
  can still cope...” 
 U2: “Exactly, although the scientific results should have priority... 
  ...than that mouse just has to...” 
 R: “Yes, but...”
 U2: “It is for everyone...” 
Although the Use representatives do acknowledge the problem of animal 
suffering, their general position is that it is inescapable. After discussing 
the topic at length, all participants agree that human suffering essentially 
outweighs animal suffering. This has been observed in both meetings of Use 
and Relation representatives. Eventually, Relation and Use participants find 
each other in the establishment of conditions that constrain the amount of 
animal suffering. In one of the meetings, for instance, the group decides to 
call in a laboratory animal expert to monitor mouse behavior during the 
experiments in order to check for the wellbeing of the mice. This strategy is 
an example of a procedural consensus. However, it was not aimed at avoiding 
substantive or jargon conflicts. The similarities and differences of value 
among the different frame representatives had been carefully deliberated. As 
one of the participants of that meeting indicated during the group reflection 
round:
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 U: “It struck me that we found each other quite soon. We did  
  spend some time talking about where to draw the line.   
  However, I think this was caused by individual inclarities  
  rather than that we differed so much as a group.”
Also in the discussion of the second case, the ‘sparerib pig’, consensus 
between Use and Relation representatives was easily reached. In the view 
of both representatives, the lack of economic necessity makes the genetic 
modification of the animals unjustified.   
 As was expected, the representatives of Use and Relation frames 
hardly come into deep-seated substantive conflicts with each other. Both 
parties recognize potential harms and benefits of animal biotechnology. They 
differ, to some extent, in the relative weight assigned to these aspects, animal 
suffering in particular. The Use representatives first and foremost value the 
human benefits and the progress of science, the Relation representatives 
tend to have more compassion with the animal involved. The differences in 
the relative weight of animal suffering do introduce some divergence in the 
eventual decisions that are made. The decision to monitor animal welfare 
during the experiments should be understood as a procedural solution in 
order to accommodate these differences. As mentioned above, the differences 
between the Use and Relation representatives have however been deliberated. 
This means that the dialogues between Use and Relation representatives have 
led to the formation of a procedural rather than a true substantive consensus.
Use vs. Balance
The Use and Balance frames have similarities but also some profound 
differences, as the reconstruction of frames in the value lab discussions has 
shown. In both frames, a certain functionality of animals is emphasized, 
although it is interpreted differently. Whereas the Use frame employs a 
human-centered perspective, perceives the human-animal relationship as a 
hierarchical relationship, the Balance frame focuses on the system of life. The 
Balance frame appreciates a principal equality in the relationship between 
humans and animals, striving for a balance between human and animal 
needs. 
 Both similarities and differences played a role in the discussions of 
the experimental dialogues. The representatives of both frames did not have 
much difficulty in reaching consensus about a final judgment. However, 
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significant differences in the argumentation provided for this judgment, do 
lead to strong disagreements with respect to terms and conditions. In order 
to mask these substantive differences, the participants have sought and found 
procedural ways out of the conflict. As a result however, the underlying 
values and interests have not been deliberated.
 The representatives of the Use and Balance frames were asked to 
make a decision about the ‘colon cancer mouse’ and the ‘double-muscle 
goat’. A first example of the decision-making process typical for this dialogue 
encounter is observed in the discussion of the terms and conditions 
necessary for Balance representatives to accept the proposal for colon 
cancer mouse research. In one of the sessions, Balance representatives 
attempted to consider the suffering of the mice and the potential negative 
effects on the environment. All values that they thought were important. 
Use representatives however disarmed the argument by packing it into a 
procedure.
 B: “The only thing you can not turn back is the spread of genes  
  outside the laboratory.”    
 U: “Yeah, but that is why we have good protocols.”
Although all participants subsequently took over the importance of ‘good 
protocols’, no agreement was reached on what was actually considered to 
be a good protocol. Another example of such a decision-making process 
was found in the precondition, proposed by the Balance representatives, to 
simultaneously start research into the development of alternatives. 
 B: “Wait a minute.. now I might get difficult. I say, research into  
  alternatives!”
 U: “All those things we just take along. You see, first we will  
  investigate colon cancer, the alternatives we just take along.”   
Although considered important at first, the subject of alternatives was 
not thoroughly discussed in the remainder of the session. This group did 
eventually decide that research into alternatives should take place. However, 
the precise meaning of this statement, or its relative weight, was not 
deliberated and true consensus therefore not reached.
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Also in the discussion of the second case, Use and Balance representatives 
reached a consensus about the final judgment. Both meetings decided not to 
allow production of the ‘double-muscle goat’. Whereas Use representatives 
did not have principal objections to transgenic modification of the goat 
for economic purposes, the Balance representatives did. In the absence of 
economic urgency however, all participants agreed they could afford not to 
do it.
 U: “I do not have the big picture right now... that is why I do not 
  say no right away... ...if we have enough options, I agree, but  
  if we have to see how to solve the world food shortage, I do  
  want to leave it open as an option.” 
This too is an example of a decision-making process in which the underlying 
arguments, values and interests are not deliberated. Now, it is the absence of 
urgency that makes it unnecessary to deliberate differences.
 The discussions of both cases indicate that Use and Balance 
representatives were capable of making decisions together, even though many 
substantive differences were present. The deliberation of these differences 
was avoided, and conflicts were masked, by introducing procedural 
solutions. More precisely, the participants reached a consensus on the 
need for ‘good protocols’ and ‘alternatives’, but what a ‘good protocol’ is, or 
what ‘alternatives’ are, remained undeliberated. The sometimes profound 
value differences between the Use and Balance frames, which would have 
presumably led to a distinctively different construction of meaning, have 
thus been suppressed. We concluded that in the meetings between Use and 
Balance participants, a mere artificial consensus has been reached. In the 
literature about public participation mechanisms, a consensus orientation in 
dialogues is argued to lead to a focus on the most tractable problems, which 
are not necessarily the most important problems. Furthermore, it would 
result in agreement over imprecise and general statements (Coglianese, 
1999; Kerkhof, 2006). Our observations of the dialogue sessions between 
Use and Balance representatives indeed substantiate these arguments. Also 
in the individual evaluations by telephone participants indicated that they 
sometimes avoided going deeper into perceived value differences in the light 
of the decision they were asked to make. Having to make a shared decision 
within the constraints of space and time in some cases hurried participants to 
a decision, leaving problematic aspects and value differences undeliberated.
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Use vs. Source
There are significant and deep-seated differences between the Use and 
Source frames, as the frame analysis of the value lab discussions pointed out. 
Whereas the Use frame strongly emphasizes the human perspective, the 
Source frame takes a plainly modest position towards the greater whole of 
existence. These almost diametrical perspectives influence to a large extent 
how both frames appreciate the arguments of the other frame. The discussion 
of the ‘colon cancer mouse’ is illustrative of the profound differences between 
the views of Use and Source representatives. Even though the participants 
found some agreement in the perception of colon cancer as a very serious 
disease, the differences were too large to reach a substantive consensus. 
Also a procedural consensus, or an artificial consensus, was not found. One 
of the most deep cutting differences between the two frames appeared to 
reside in the holism of the Source frame and the human-centeredness of 
the Use frame, as was demonstrated by the discussion of the ‘real causes’ of 
colon cancer. Use representatives sought the ‘real causes’ of colon cancer in 
biological mechanisms and were therefore inclined to accept colon cancer 
mouse research. Source representatives however came to the opposite 
conclusion. They sought the ‘real causes’ of colon cancer in our way of life 
and also in the current state of the greater whole.
 S1: “I presume it (the causes of colon cancer) has a lot to do  
  with the conditions of life, the way we live... ...that is what  
  we should look at... ...in stead of using mice to study the  
  development of the disease... which is...” 
 S2: “Fighting symptoms.” 
 U: “Of course... ...but there is a colon cancer gene, apparently,  
  and there is a certain group of people carrying that gene...  
  ...that has nothing to do with their way of life... ...it is their  
  genetic fate, so to speak...” 
The difference between the perspectives of Source and Use representatives 
results in a different appreciation of the scientific approach in itself. Whereas 
Use representatives reduces the disease of cancer to genetic factors and 
malfunctioning biological processes, Source representatives in fact question 
whether scientific research deals with the actual causes of disease. 
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Another example of the large differences between Use and Source 
representatives, was the difference in their expressed attitude towards the use 
of the genetic modification of animals.
 S: “...just because you damage an animal in its being...   
  ...something is introduced into the mouse that does not  
  belong there.” 
 U: “...genetic modification in itself is not a boundary for me. The  
  reason, or the purpose of it, is a boundary....”
In the second case that was discussed, the case of the ‘sparerib pig’, similar 
differences play an important role. However, the participants do seem to 
reach a decision on this case. Initially, both Use and Source representatives 
rejected the ‘sparerib pig’ case, be it for different reasons. The discussion of 
this case is again illustrative of the different attitudes towards biotechnology, 
constructed by the Use and Source frames. Use representatives judge 
biotechnological action on the evaluation of its purpose and consequences. 
Source representatives judge it on the moral character of the action in 
itself. Despite efforts of the participants to understand each other and work 
towards a converging decision, substantive differences, also in the case of 
the ‘sparerib pig’, prove to be too large to find consensus on what should 
be done in the future. Source representatives want to prohibit the use of 
biotechnology entirely, whereas the Use representatives want to keep the 
option open.
U: “I do not think one should accept or reject it by definition.”
S: “I am concerned here with how you see the animal.   
  Respecting its own identity, that is a motive for me.”    
The meeting of the Use and Source representatives is classified into the 
final category depicted in Table 12.1, dissensus, because there is no room 
for deliberation nor convergence on a mutual decision. As one of the 
participants commented during an evaluation of the dialogue session by 
telephone:
 U: “Eventually something did happen, but it was not really  
  constructive. It rather came down to the ventilation of   
  opinions than that something really was constructed.” 
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The course of the Use vs. Source dialogue reflects another constraint of a 
consensus-orientation. In problematic situations where the participants 
involved have different axioms, assumptions and concepts with regard to 
that situation, a consensus-approach will not work (Smith, 1995). The result 
is characterized as trench warfare; different parties retreat to their own 
positions in an attempt to defend their own perspective. In the discussions 
between Use and Source representatives, we even observed the participants 
sometimes could not deliberate each other’s values, because of a lack of 
shared concepts and language. Still, presumably because of the safe and 
friendly setting of the experimental dialogues environment, the atmosphere 
never became hostile and no participants dropped out of the conversation.
Relation vs. Balance
The frame analysis of the value lab discussions demonstrated that the 
Relation and Balance frames have both similarities and differences. The two 
frames recognize both human needs and interests as well as animal needs 
and interests. An important difference is the systems view of the Balance 
frame compared to the human-centered view of the Relation frame. Also 
the image of the human-animal relationship is different for both frames. The 
Relation frame perceives it as a hierarchical relationship whereas the Balance 
frame sees humans and animals as principally equal. 
 Nevertheless, in the experimental dialogue discussions, 
representatives of the two frames easily found consensus on a number 
of issues. On issues of diverging opinions, procedural solutions were 
constructed after careful deliberation. In the case of the ‘colon cancer mouse’ 
for example, both groups of representatives recognized the importance of 
the suffering of humans as well as the importance of the suffering of mice. In 
each of the two dialogue meetings, a majority of representatives, of both the 
Relation and Balance frame, indicated that the suffering of mice because of 
the experiments was acceptable to prevent human suffering because of the 
disease. The discussions of the ‘colon cancer mouse’ case,  between Relation 
and Balance representatives, were characterized by the careful exploration of 
conditions under which the experiments were allowed to take place.
 B: “In that case, I think we can only reach a decision if we look  
  into these conditions a bit more.”  
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Eventually, the group agreed on a list of conditions to reduce the number of 
experiments as well as the suffering of the mice in the experiments as much 
as possible.
 Also in the discussion of the second case, the cloning of the giant 
panda, a decision was reached quite easily. Both Relation and Balance 
participants appeared to agree that the disruption of the natural equilibrium, 
causing the animal’s extinction, was the responsibility of human beings. We 
should take up this responsibility by expanding the panda’s life territory in 
stead of cloning the animal. The participants believe cloning is unnatural and 
too invasive to allow it.
 Both case discussions led to the conclusion that Relation and Balance 
representatives have little substantive differences that obstruct reaching a 
consensus. When such differences do appear, it is possible for both groups 
of participants to move towards the other’s position in order to come to 
a mutual decision. Eventually, the dialogue between Relation and Balance 
representatives reached a well-argumented procedural consensus in both 
cases. In the group reflection round however, representatives of both frames 
pointed out that they would have discovered more differences between them 
when they would have talked about the case in more depth. The task to 
make a decision, the participants indicated, had suppressed the deliberation 
of differences to some extent. Still, the participants expected to have 
eventually made the same decision. The exploration of points of agreement 
and disagreement in these dialogue sessions signifies that Relation and 
Balance representatives are capable of achieving understanding of the other 
representatives’ views. This understanding is reflected in the list of terms and 
conditions that comes with the group decision.
Relation vs. Source
The substantive differences between these two frames are large, presumably 
because Relation representatives use a human-centered perspective, whereas 
Source representatives approach the cases with a holistic perspective. The 
frame analysis of the value lab discussions furthermore showed that the two 
frames are similar in their appreciation of the animal’s individual identity, 
be it that the Relation frame constructs a more personalized and the Source 
frame a more mystified image of the animal’s individuality. 
 The difference between the Relation frame’s focus on the human-
animal relationship and the Source frame’s emphasis on the greater whole 
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of existence is also expressed in the experimental dialogue discussion of the 
‘colon cancer mouse’.
R1: “The situation is of course that there is human colon cancer  
  We have to find a solution for that... ...one of the possibilities 
  is to use a genetically modified  mouse... ...can we all agree  
  that we will use this mouse?”  
 S: “Then you take the suffering of humans as the measure. I 
  think the measure should be the equilibrium, for on the long 
  term it is all about... how do you say...  living together in a 
  sustainable way. If you keep the focus on humans, our   
  development will eventually diminish...”
 R2: “I don’t know if I would... ...the case is about that this (human  
  colon cancer) happens. Apart from the case, all kind of other  
  things may happen... ...I believe we now have to decide, as an  
  island council, whether we allow this research or not...” 
As in the dialogues between Use and Source representatives, the diametrical 
perspectives of Relation and Source representatives make it hard for these 
participants to actually deliberate their values and interests. The mere 
differences in the use of language and concepts makes it difficult to achieve 
understanding of the other’s point of view.
 The insurmountable divide centers on the judgment of the 
biotechnological action itself. Like the Use representatives did, Relation 
representatives judge genetic modification on its purpose and consequences; 
Source representatives fundamentally object to the action itself. There 
are a few points that both groups of participants agreed on. These 
points however, concern the use of ambiguous language that conceal the 
profound substantive differences. One example is the alleged importance 
of ‘controllability’. Relation participants refer to the potential consequences 
for human beings, whereas the Source participants fear a disruption 
of the greater whole. Another example is the proposition of research 
into alternatives. Although the participants agree on the importance of 
alternatives, Relation representatives aim at the development of alternatives 
within the approach of regular biomedical science, whereas the Source 
participants aim at non-medical, non-technological approaches.
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S: “We totally forget to look at the greater perspective... ...it is  
  not only the mouse and the lab... ... they are part of a greater  
  whole that should be taken into account.”
Also in the discussion of the cloning of the giant panda, substantive 
differences obstruct the achievement of understanding. Eventually, the 
Relation and Source representatives do reach a final judgment to reject 
the proposal. Although the Relation and Source representatives agree that 
the near distinction of the giant panda is caused by human expansion and 
therefore a human problem, they think differently about the acceptability of 
cloning in the resolution of the problem. In the evaluation of the dialogue 
session by telephone, the Relation representatives indicated they refrained 
from talking about cloning because they felt that this would be nonnegotiable 
for the other participants.
 In sum, the substantive differences between Relation and Source 
participants are too large to reach a shared decision. The ambiguous 
concepts the participants did agree on, have a different meaning in their 
respective frames of reference. Participants thus converge on concepts 
like ‘controllability’ and ‘alternatives’ while important value differences are 
not deliberated. The strategy to find consensus using these concepts was 
therefore in the end unsuccessful. The search for a (artificial) consensus 
indeed obstructs the process of dialogical understanding. Participants 
engage in strategic listening in order to achieve their individual goals. But, as 
Widdershoven (2001) has put it, a true consensus in the hermeneutic sense 
cannot be strategically produced. We concluded that Relation and Source 
representatives have only reached an artificial consensus. 
Balance vs. Source
The Balance and Source frames have many similarities, as the frame analysis 
of the value lab discussions pointed out. The representatives of Balance and 
Source frames shared much of their beliefs, values and ideals. Both use a 
perspective that focuses on the level of the system. These similarities were 
expressed in the experimental dialogue discussions as well. 
 With respect to the ‘colon cancer mouse’, the representatives of both 
frames reached a consensus easily. They mutually decided not to accept the 
investigation of colon cancer using transgenic mice. Their first argument 
was that this research would be an example of fighting the symptoms instead 
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of the actual causes. The participants agreed that the focus should be on 
lifestyle and prevention. A second reason referred to the unforeseeable 
consequences for the ecosystem. The preclusion of negative consequences 
was regarded to be a fundamental criterion. Thirdly, both Balance and Source 
participants felt that suffering and death are in some way a part of human 
life. Finally, the participants rather choose alternative forms of research, like 
for example experimental research on human cancer patients, research into 
herbal medication and prevention. 
 The second discussion, concerning the ‘environment pig’, illustrates 
that the Balance and Source representatives also share their attitude towards 
genetic modification. They agreed that it is not right to intervene in the being 
of the animal like this. Also intervening in a system that is not precisely 
understood is considered not to be right. Thus, both the Balance and Source 
representatives object to the technique of genetic modification out of 
principle (see also the next chapter). Furthermore, the genetic engineering 
of the ‘environment pig’ was considered a so-called ‘end-of-pipe’ solution. 
According to both groups of representatives, the real problem was not in the 
pig’s manure but in the scale of intensive farming. 
 We concluded that the arguments, on which the Balance and Source 
representatives based their decisions, have been carefully exchanged and 
deliberated. When there is convergence and deliberation, a ‘substantive 
consensus’ is reached. The participants find a new perspective that they 
all value more than their own individual perspective (Gregory, McDaniels, 
& Fields, 2001). Such a perspective can only be found if the participants 
engage in a blend of empathic and analytical listening. This is what happened 
in the dialogue session between Balance and Source representatives. 
During the consideration of the ‘colon cancer mouse’ case, for example, the 
participants together “discovered” the new options of ‘accepting death and 
disease as a part of life’ and ‘prevention by a change of lifestyle’. One might 
interpret the decision to focus on these aspects, rather than on colon cancer 
mouse research, as a fusion of horizons. However, we did observe that the 
Balance participants were more inclined to adjust their position than the 
representatives of the Source frame were.
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Reaching consensus or ending up in conflict
Table 12.2 shows the (im)possibilities of consensus and conflict for the six 
frame combinations. With respect to reaching substantive consensus, we 
only observed a true consensus in the dialogue between Balance and Source 
representatives. Although Use and Relation representatives did agree on 
many issues, they also differed in the relative weight they attributed to certain 
aspects. Use and Relation representatives accommodated these differences 
in the formation of a procedural consensus. Also in the dialogues between 
Relation and Balance representatives, a procedural consensus was found. 
The points of agreement and disagreement were carefully deliberated, 
and accumulated in a list of terms and conditions. Also the Use and 
Balance representatives and the Relation and Source representatives found 
consensus on a list of terms and conditions. However, in those cases these 
conditions were strategically used to avoid the deliberation of differences. We 
interpreted these decisions as examples of an artificial consensus.   
Table 12.2. Consensus and conflict in the different frame combinations. Also  
  is indicated whether representatives of the respective frames suffer  
  from jargon conflicts caused by different use of language and  
  concepts.
Use Relation Balance Source
Use
Relation procedural 
consensus
no jargon
conflicts
Balance artificial 
consensus
procedural 
consensus
minor jargon 
conflicts
no jargon 
conflicts
Source dissensus artificial 
consensus
substantive 
consensus
jargon conflicts jargon 
conflicts
no jargon 
conflicts
Chapter 13
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Analysis of the value lab discussions yielded the articulation of four 
distinctive frames of reference in the Dutch citizens’ reflection on animals 
and the human-animal relationship. The articulation of value diversity 
started with the ways in which people experience and reflect upon animals 
in their daily lives. It is these experiences and reflections, embodied in social 
practices, which encompass the values and ideals that matter to them with 
respect to animal issues in general. Biotechnology presents a rather particular 
context in which these values and ideals might acquire a different meaning 
and use. It is therefore interesting to reconstruct the frame-specific responses 
to the context of animal biotechnology. This would also support our claim 
that the reconstructed frames can be used as heuristic instruments in order 
to acquire a better understanding of the different values and viewpoints of 
the animal biotechnology controversy. The experimental dialogues have 
indeed provided some insights into the responses of various frames to 
the context of animal biotechnology. The content of the dialogue sessions 
demonstrated that each of the frames produces a specific understanding of 
the concrete animal biotechnology contexts that were discussed. 
 In the discussion of practical cases of animal biotechnology, such 
as the ‘colon cancer mouse’ and the ‘sparerib pig’, we observed that the 
representatives of distinctive frames used different lines of argumentation 
to express their values and concerns. The differences in argumentation 
depended on a different interpretation of the value of animals within 
every frame (see part B). As chapter 12 pointed out, the different frames 
emphasized specific value concepts to express their concerns. The Use 
and Relation frames primarily focused on the dilemma between human 
benefits and animal suffering, whereas the Balance and Source frames also 
emphasized values like the naturalness and interconnectedness of life. These 
different value orientations constructed different attitudes towards animal 
biotechnology. In this study, as was pointed out in chapter 11, we discerned 
four different aspects of these attitudes. First of all, the frames construct a 
different attitude towards the technique of genetic modification itself. In the 
experimental dialogue sessions, some of the frames produced a rejection of 
the technique of genetic modification in itself, whereas other frames mainly 
highlighted the potential effects of the technique on humans, animals or the 
environment. The second aspect is the context of application. The purpose 
of animal biotechnology had a large influence on the frame-specific attitude 
towards it. Animal biotechnology for human health is, across all frames, 
far more positively evaluated than animal biotechnology for economy 
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or environmental purposes. The third aspect, in which the frames are 
distinctive, is their style of reasoning. Whereas some frames may incorporate 
many contextual considerations, others give rise to a more categorical point 
of view. Finally, the four frames significantly differ in the envisioned way 
towards a resolution of the moral problem of animal biotechnology. Whereas 
some frames make an appeal to external regulation, others seem to rely on 
the individual conscience of the involved actors. This chapter will compare 
the four frames along these lines.
13.1	 Attitudes	towards	the	genetic	modification	of	animals
This section starts with a review of the different attitudes towards genetic 
modification, relating each attitude to the specific features of the frame 
through which it is constructed. It is important to note here that these 
attitudes towards the genetic modification of animals are initial attitudes, 
expressing an evaluation of the technique itself. The ultimate moral judgment 
of a certain application of animal biotechnology of course depends on other 
factors as well, such as the context of application (see later in this section), 
social or institutional aspects. 
 Looking at the various responses to genetic modification, uttered 
in the dialogue sessions, we immediately recognized a great divide between 
the frames of Balance and Source on the one side and Use and Relation 
on the other side. The vast majority of Balance and Source representatives 
showed principal objections to the technique of genetic modification 
itself. The majority of Use and Relation representatives, on the other hand, 
did not have many objections to genetic modification itself. This was not 
unexpected, given the structure of the reconstructed frames. The Use and 
Relation frames share a relatively large amount of values and ideas. Both 
frames have a human-centered perspective. The human-animal relationship 
is perceived to be a hierarchical relationship, in which human needs and 
interests are in principle more important than animal needs and interests. 
Both frames do stress the responsibility of humans in this relationship, for 
the animal’s health and welfare. The difference between the two frames lies in 
the image of the animal itself. The Use frame perceives the animal primarily 
as a member of its species, whereas the Relation frame sees the animal as a 
personal, individual being. Therefore, the Use frame puts an emphasis on 
human benefits, whereas the welfare of the animal is emphasized more in the 
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Relation frame. The observed attitudes towards the genetic modification of 
animals showed a similar pattern. 
Both Use and Relation representatives do not have many objections to the 
intrinsic characteristics of the technique of genetic modification in itself. 
 U: “it (genetic modification) is just a matter of getting used to.”
 
 R: “your own species comes first... ...I am not against it (genetic  
  modification), you know... ...as soon as you are involved  
  yourself, you start to rethink the situation...” 
Use representatives argued that the genetic modification of animals is merely 
problematic because of the potential negative consequences for the animal’s 
wellbeing.
U: “The aspect of well-being is important to me. I do not care  
  whether the animals are genetically modified or not... ...as  
  long as there is no suffering.”
Also the line of argument of the Relation representatives was primarily 
grounded in the importance of maintaining a responsible relationship to the 
individual animal.
 R1: “I think -for example- of the animal itself. Why would you 
  harm an animal for this?”
 R2: “I am not sure where to draw the line... ...can people deal with 
  it responsibly...  ...I think that is frightening...”   
 
Furthermore, Relation representatives indicated that they were 
concerned about the potential consequences of animal biotechnology 
for the environment and for human health. The main arguments for this 
concern were provided by the unforeseeability and unpredictability of the 
consequences of biotechnological interventions. Relation representatives 
therefore stressed that all biotechnological procedures should be performed 
in the closed environments of specialized laboratories, monitored by experts, 
to prevent the spread of transgenic material. 
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Balance representatives have also recognized this argument, the potential 
spread of transgenic materials into the environment. The difference between 
the Relation representatives and Balance representatives however, is that 
Balance representatives object to disturbing the natural equilibrium itself, 
whereas Relation representatives rather fear this disturbance may lead to loss 
of control and human health risks. In this respect, the Balance frame shows 
more similarities to the Source frame, as has been pointed out by the frame 
analysis of the value lab discussions. Both utilize a perspective that focuses 
on the system of life. Values like interconnectedness, naturalness and respect 
for life are important concepts in both frames. The recognition that both 
humans and animals are part of the same whole gives rise to an image of the 
human-animal relationship that is significantly different compared to the 
image of the Use and Relation frames. Both the Balance and Source frame 
appreciate a principal equality in the relationship of humans and animals. 
The frames differ in the implication of this principle. Whereas the Balance 
frame seeks to find a fair balance between human and animal needs, the 
Source frame appeals to a plainly modest position towards the greater whole 
of existence. According to the Source frame, humans should do nothing to 
interfere with the course of nature. 
 The Source representatives also demonstrated the strongest objection 
to the intrinsic characteristics of the genetic modification of animals. In their 
perception, genetic modification interferes with the essence of the animal’s 
reality.
S: “Within certain limits, an animal should get the opportunity  
  and space to retain its own identity... ...it has to be able to  
  show it is a chicken or cow or whatever...”
Also a majority of Balance representatives objects to the technique of genetic 
modification in itself. They argue it is unnatural and therefore problematic.
 B: “I think natural animals should be treated in a natural way.”
The value of ‘naturalness’ occupies an important position in the Balance 
frame. The experimental dialogue discussions of the animal biotechnology 
cases showed that it not only played a role in the appreciation of the 
technique of genetic modification in itself, but also in the assessment of its 
unpredictability and uncertainty. 
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 B: “For millions of years, we survived all sorts of situations. Now 
  we should not – let us just say it- screw that up in 50-100  
  years. Because that is what we are doing when we allow this  
  to happen in an uncontrolled way and for this purpose.” 
 
Our findings showed that the four frameworks resulted in different 
constructions of the moral problem of animal biotechnology. Source 
representatives and the majority of Balance representatives recognize 
the principlist argument that the technique of genetic modification is in 
itself morally problematic, because it tampers with the animal‘s ‘being’ or 
‘naturalness’. Whereas the Source perspective chiefly rests on the principal 
argument against genetic modification, the argumentation of Balance 
representatives also concerns its potential consequences. The Relation 
and Use perspectives primarily constructed the moral problem of the 
genetic modification of animals in terms of its, potentially problematic, 
consequences.
13.2 The context of application
The cases of animal biotechnology discussed in the experimental dialogue 
sessions, all consisted of (small variations) of existing examples of the 
biotechnological use of animals. All frame representatives have discussed 
one case of animal research for a human health purpose and one case of 
agricultural biotechnology: the two major fields of application of animal 
biotechnology. Depending on the combination of frames, the case of 
agricultural biotechnology either had a economic or environmental purpose 
(see chapter 11). Thus, the cases covered three different purposes of animal 
biotechnology. The content of the dialogue sessions showed that these 
different purposes are quite differently evaluated, both within and between 
frames.
Animal	biotechnology	for	an	economic	purpose
In the case of the ‘sparerib pig’, participants were invited to make a decision 
together whether or not to accept the production of genetically modified 
pigs, of which the spinal columns is extended with five vertebra. The 
modified gene is a species-own gene. Farmers that change to keeping the 
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modified pigs are able to produce more pig meat in a more efficient way. The 
case of the ‘double muscle goat’ has a similar structure. A species-own gene 
is modified to increase muscle growth. The goat meat production process 
becomes more efficient and yields more meat. For both cases, the economic 
purpose is defined as follows: the biotechnological action yields an economic 
benefit for the meat producer and possible other actors involved.
 The case discussions showed that the majority of representatives (of 
all four frames) rejects the genetic modification of the pig for the economic 
purpose of increasing volume and efficiency of meat production. Despite 
their different initial attitudes towards the genetic modification of animals, 
the representatives of different frames appear to agree in their evaluation of 
animal biotechnology for an economic purpose. The majority of participants, 
whatever frame they represented, argued that there is a lack of economic 
necessity in this case.
 S: “Genetic modification is already a problem for me... ...the  
  pure economic  purpose only makes it worse.”
U: “If genetic modification purely serves an economic purpose  
  that can be reached in other ways as well, the end does not
 justify the means. The mere fact that someone wants to pay
 4.95 in stead of 5 Euros is not a ground for the risks genetic  
  modification brings about...” 
Only a part of the Use representatives is inclined to postpone a final 
judgment of this case to see whether genetic modification of the ‘sparerib pig’ 
can lead to other benefits than the mentioned economic purpose.
    U: “but... ...suppose it is a solution for the world food shortage.  
  In that case I’d say ‘yes’. Then it is not that strange anymore.”
 
 
 U: “I admit that if you can increase the benefits... and you have  
  other arguments as well, there are scenarios in which it  
  (genetic modification) is acceptable in animals as well.”  
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Animal	biotechnology	for	a	human	health	purpose
In the case of the ‘colon cancer mouse’, the participants were asked to make a 
decision together whether it is acceptable that transgenic mice are created to 
gain more insight into the mechanisms of human colon cancer development 
and proliferation. The mouse intestinal system is structurally similar to that 
of humans. The gene inserted is a human gene. Insight into the mechanisms 
of colon cancer may lead to new therapies in the future, i.e. human health 
benefits.  
 The combinations of dialogue sessions produced a mixed image 
of the acceptability of colon cancer mouse research. Representatives of 
different frames provided different argumentations for their judgments. Use 
representatives for example clearly put the interest of humans (the potential 
health benefits) above the interest of the animals involved (no suffering). 
This is combined with a firm belief in the fruits of science and technology for 
human kind.
 U: “You want to save people from their genetic problems.   
  Despite the fact that they have that gene, you want to give  
  them a life...”
Although they are explicitly aware of the tension between the suffering of 
humans and the suffering of animals, Relation representatives in the end too 
make a hierarchical distinction. Mice and other animals are important and 
worthy creatures, however not equal to human beings.
 R: “After all, you still put humans at the top of the food chain,  
  whether it is consciously or unconsciously. Your own kind is  
  first... ...and then you take every opportunity to get better...  
  ...but try to respect the animal as much as possible.”
Relation representatives accept the colon cancer mouse research under 
conditions, such as minimizing suffering and reducing the necessary number 
of experiments. The mouse has to be respected as much as possible. Also 
Balance representatives take an ambivalent position towards this case. In 
general, they recognize the need for an equal balance between the needs 
and interests of humans and animals. Depending on the context of the 
conversation, i.e. the specific meeting of frames, the one or the other may 
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be emphasized. Another element that was important in the contributions of 
Balance representatives was the importance of finding alternatives.
 B: “So do not only fixate on the mouse and the use of the mouse, 
  but first see whether you can find an alternative.”   
The Source representatives fundamentally reject the genetic modification of 
mice; it interferes with the integrity of the animal as a being.
 S: “A transgenic mouse is not a mouse anymore.”
The Source frame is characterized by a holistic frame of reference. Thus, the 
causes of a disease like colon cancer are not so much sought at a biological 
level but at the level of the whole. Looking for disease-related biological 
phenomena in order to develop medical interventions is understood as 
fighting the symptoms, whereas the problem of colon cancer in the eyes 
of the Source representatives rather concerns the way we live, our attitude 
towards life and the way we cope with things that happen to us.
 All these aspects have an influence on the existence and course of 
colon cancer. Source representatives rather fight cancer with prevention by 
changing the way we live than with the aid of medication.
 S: “...then you give the person itself the power over his own life  
  in stead of giving it away to the medication or the money.”
The majority of Source participants feels we have to accept that disease and 
death are a part of life. The technical interventions of contemporary medicine 
refrain us from being ourselves. 
 S: “Life is not romantic... it is not painless... ...because of all  
  those interventions, we can not adapt ourselves anymore. We  
  drift away from our identity.”   
Animal	biotechnology	for	an	environmental	purpose
Finally, two cases have been discussed that concern the application of animal 
biotechnology for two distinct environmental purposes. The case of the 
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‘clone panda’ involves the cloning of the giant panda in order to save it from 
extinction. The case of the ‘environment pig’ involves the genetic engineering 
of pigs in order to reduce the level of phosphate in their manure. The pig’s 
genome is modified with a trans-species gene. The lowering of phosphate 
levels reduces environmental phosphate pollution due to intensive farming. 
These two cases have not been discussed by representatives of every frame.  
We only used these cases instead of the case of the ‘sparerib pig’ in those 
frame combinations that we expected to agree on a (negative) decision about 
the ‘sparerib pig’ without having to deliberate it. The dialogues between 
Relation and Balance and Relation and Source discussed the case of the ‘clone 
panda’. The dialogues between Balance and Source discussed the case of the 
‘environment pig’.
 In the Relation vs. Balance discussion of the cloning of the giant 
panda, it is hard to distinguish between the expressions of representatives 
of different frames. Relation and Balance representatives both agree that the 
probable extinction of the giant panda is the responsibility of human beings. 
Moreover, they strongly feel that humans should take up this responsibility 
and do something to prevent the panda from extinction. However, the 
attempt to save the panda by cloning it however, is not accepted, mainly 
because the intervention of cloning is thought to be unnatural.
 R: “I think you should not do this… …that we are going to  
  determine nature… …decide who lives and who dies…”
 B: “Indeed, the whole aspect that it is  not natural, and that we  
  act as if it is, repels me...”
 R: “I am also against it. I think it is not a normal way of  
  reproduction, of preserving the species. You make it artificial.  
  It is questionable whether we want that… …in that case, you  
  better improve its biotope.”
The alternative course of action, to save the giant panda from extinction by 
enlarging its natural life environment, is agreed by all participants to be a 
more viable solution.
Also in the meetings of Relation and Source representatives, the case of 
the giant panda has been discussed. Both groups of representatives did 
not accept this application of animal biotechnology. Relation and Source 
representatives agree that the intervention of cloning is not the right 
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solution. Instead of cloning animals, it is argued that we should enlarge the 
panda’s life environment.
 R: “In principle, you are protecting an animal species. It is my  
  opinion however, that you should better do that in a natural  
  environment.”
The Relation representatives have little fundamental objections to the act of 
cloning itself, although they have many concerns about this particular case. 
The Source representatives did demonstrate a strong fundamental objection 
to the act of cloning itself. They argued that the cloning is unnatural. 
Furthermore, in the view of the Source perspective, the cloning of animals 
turns against the unity of existence.
S: “Humanity should learn to be modest, to be a part of the 
whole rather than striving to rise above it.”
The combination of Balance and Source representatives has discussed the 
case of the ‘environment pig’. With respect to this particular case, there 
were hardly any differences between the evaluation of Balance and Source 
representatives. As could be expected, based on the frames’ similar initial 
attitudes towards the technique of genetic modification, this application of 
animal biotechnology was rather quickly rejected. All representatives, in 
both dialogue sessions, agreed that the modification of the pig to reduce the 
level of phosphate in their manure is an example of ‘fighting the symptoms’. 
They argued that the real problem of the surplus of phosphate-rich manure 
is intensive farming. The problem should therefore be addressed by making 
pig farming more extensive, rather than by modifying the genome of animals. 
Moreover, the representatives have fundamental objections to the technique 
of genetic modification itself.
 In conclusion, only the context of animal research for the purpose 
of human health benefits acquires a generally positive evaluation. Even the 
Source representatives, strongly objecting to the act of genetic modification, 
also had difficulties rejecting the proposal of the colon cancer mouse. 
With respect to the purpose of increasing economic benefits however, the 
picture is completely reversed. There is hardly any support for this field of 
application. Also in the case of animal biotechnology for an environmental 
purpose, there is no support among the participants that have discussed 
162
Chapter 13
this case. Although the dialogue participants do recognize the problem 
presented by the cases, genetic engineering is regarded the wrong solution 
to this problem. Due to our dialogue design, the Use participants did not 
discuss the case of agricultural biotechnology for an environmental purpose. 
Whether this kind of agricultural biotechnology would be acceptable for Use 
representatives therefore remains a matter of further research.
13.3	 Styles	of	reasoning
Section 13.1 described the frame-specific responses to the technique 
of genetic modification itself, either aiming at the evaluation of genetic 
modification’s intrinsic characteristics or the evaluation of its potential 
effects. We have also observed differences between the frames in the style 
of reasoning. The criterion of ‘style of reasoning’ has been derived from 
previous public debates about genetic modification in the Netherlands. Wilde 
et al. (2003) have argued that the different responses to genetic engineering 
in the Dutch society may be classified into two different types of reasoning: 
categorical reasoning and contextual reasoning. Categorical reasoning is 
taking place when a particular category is always attributed with the same 
inherent qualities. Contextual reasoning, on the other hand, implies that the 
qualities of a particular category are perceived as dependent on the context 
of application. Wilde et al. have used this distinction to categorize the actors 
involved in the public debate about genetically modified food. Also in the 
experimental dialogues about animal biotechnology, we observed indications 
of these two different styles of reasoning. 
 Interestingly, the distinction between categorical and contextual 
reasoning is not the same as the distinction between having fundamental 
objections to genetic modification or not. The Balance representatives, for 
example, demonstrated to have strong objections to the technique of genetic 
modification itself, mainly because it was deemed unnatural. However, the 
patterns of expression and behavior of these representatives in the dialogue 
sessions is also characterized by a careful exploration of different aspects. 
It appeared that the fundamental objection to genetic modification merely 
constitutes one of a range of different arguments for these representatives. 
This was not unexpected, based on the structure of the Balance frame, 
which is characterized by a balance between values that represent the 
needs and interests of humans, animals and the natural environment. 
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The patterns of expression and behavior of Balance representatives thus 
was characterized by the style of contextual reasoning. This furthermore 
enabled Balance participants to maneuver in the confrontation with 
representatives of different frames. In the encounter between Balance and 
Source representatives, for example, concepts like ‘the acceptance of life and 
death’ and the assessment of medicalization as a form of ‘fighting symptoms’ 
were recognized as fairly relevant to the ‘colon cancer mouse’ case. In the 
confrontation with Use representatives however, these subjects were touched 
upon considerably less. Here, the Balance representatives demonstrated 
their awareness of the potential benefits for human health. Of course, these 
differences might be produced by personal differences as well. Because 
these observations occurred systematically however, and correlated to the 
structure of the Balance frame as reconstructed in the frame analysis of the 
value lab discussions, we interpreted these observations as examples of the 
contextual style of reasoning that is characteristic for the Balance frame. 
 Also the Relation representatives showed a pattern of expression 
and behavior that was characterized by contextual reasoning, be it to a lesser 
extent than the Balance representatives did. In many of the case discussions, 
the tension between human benefits and the suffering of individual animals 
was what Relation representatives considered morally problematic. Their 
attitude in the discussions was often characterized by a careful exploration of 
the different sides of this moral problem. Indicative of this attitude was the 
frequent comment of Relation representatives that more information was 
needed to make a decision.
  The Use and Source representatives utilized a more categorical 
style of reasoning. Interestingly, these frames constructed a diametrical 
position in the dialogue sessions, with respect to the technique of genetic 
modification itself. For Use representatives, human needs were always more 
important than the suffering of animals. Although Use representatives were 
prepared to discuss terms and conditions, as in the case discussion of the 
‘colon cancer mouse’ with Relation representatives, the final outcome of the 
discussions were nonnegotiable. A similar pattern is seen in combination 
with the Balance representatives, when attention to alternatives is vowed, but 
acceptance of the proposal itself never really questioned. In the case of the 
‘sparerib pig’, the proposal was rejected not so much because of the suffering 
of the animals, or the use of genetic modification, but out of a disbelief in the 
necessity of the project. 
 Also the Source representatives showed a pattern of expression 
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and behavior characteristic of the style of categorical reasoning. In the 
perspective of the Source frame, the natural order of the greater whole of 
existence as well as the unique individuality of every living being are that 
important that a technological intervention in the course of life is always 
rejected. 
 These dynamics show that although the participants predominantly 
use a specific frame to express their ideals and concerns, there is also some 
room to maneuver. When the frames are characterized by the style of 
contextual reasoning, as is the case for the Relation and Balance frames, the 
room to maneuver is however considerably larger. The patterns of expression 
and behavior of Relation and Balance representatives show that a specific 
context of discussion can invoke participants to stress other aspects of the 
case at hand. The Use and Source representatives however show that the 
structure of the value frames can also be deeply rooted.
13.4 Differences in moral appeal
There is a final criterion that distinguishes between the relations of the 
different frames to animal biotechnology, that we want to mention here. It 
concerns the envisioned way towards a resolution of the moral problem of 
animal biotechnology. The various frames made an appeal to a distinctive 
source of moral guidelines. Interestingly, also with respect to this criterion, 
the Relation and Balance frames and the Use and Source frames are 
paired. The Relation and Balance frames both frequently made an appeal 
to external regulatory bodies to provide moral guidelines. Recognizing the 
need for further investigation of the contextual aspects, the Relation and 
Balance representatives were inclined to call in the help of external experts 
or advisory committees. The Use and Source frames on the other hand 
seemed both to rely on the moral conscience of the actors involved. The Use 
representatives demonstrated a fair level of trust in the ability of the scientific 
community to do what is right with respect to the application of animal 
biotechnology. The discussion about ‘good protocols’ is an example of that. 
Use representatives dis not feel the need to go further into the question of 
what is a good protocol, because they did not find it morally problematic that 
the community of professionals would decide that for itself. This position 
might be called ‘ethical individualism’, because of the reliance on the ethical 
expertise of the scienstists themselves. The Source representatives also made 
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an appeal to the moral conscience of the actors involved, be it rather from 
a position that might be called ‘ethical universalism’. They perceived every 
involved actor, a scientist, policy-maker or an ordinary citizen, as a moral 
being that should be able to recognize the, in their view, inevitable equality 
of all forms of life. In the perspective of the Source frame, individuals also 
should act according to this recognition. It is an interesting question whether 
the fact that both the Use and Source representatives make an appeal to the 
individual involved in the biotechnological action, is an important factor 
in the difficulties representatives of these frames experience in engaging 
in a conversation about their values and concerns, and reaching a shared 
decision.     
Part four
Reflections
Chapter 14
Democratizing animal biotechnology
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Four typical features characterize the animal biotechnology controversy in 
the Netherlands. First of all, the development of animal biotechnology has 
an inevitable moral dimension, since the use of animals is involved. Second, 
the development of the technology is characterized by contingency and 
change, producing inherent scientific uncertainty. Third, the Dutch society, 
as all contemporary democratic societies, is characterized by a pluralism 
of values. Finally, the changing relations between technology, politics and 
society impair the democratic legitimacy of the development of animal 
biotechnology. Together, these features have turned the development of 
animal biotechnology into an intractable social controversy. As part A 
revealed, it makes animal biotechnology a particularly intricate problem for 
ethical governance.
The practice of ethics  
How can normative guidelines be developed without disregarding the 
dynamic character of animal biotechnology and the value pluralism of the 
Dutch society? The traditional approaches in ethics fall short. Their rational 
foundationalism insufficiently recognizes the co-evolution of technology 
and society that is characteristic of the technological culture we live in. 
Their monistic tendencies shape the debate about animal biotechnology 
ethics in either deontological or utilitarian concerns, excluding the moral 
consideration of other potentially relevant values and ideals. Pragmatist 
ethics, inspired by the philosophical pragmatism of John Dewey, offers a 
viable alternative. It recognizes the technological culture and embraces 
pluralism. Its experimental, open and flexible approach is better suited to 
accommodate the contingency and change of animal biotechnology. In a 
Deweyan account of pragmatist ethics, values and principles emerge through 
the method of experimental inquiry and deliberation. Moral conflicts 
are addressed as practical disputes that demand for cooperative inquiry 
and deliberation rather than the abstract philosophical debates that for a 
long time predominated animal biotechnology ethics. A pragmatist ethics 
approach shifts its focus from the justification of moral truths to the design 
and facilitation of deliberative processes and the invention of new moral 
concepts. It aims at the creative management of the multiple perspectives 
within the democratic community.   
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The practice of governance
Also from the perspective of governance, this thesis has taken a pragmatic 
turn in the analysis of the animal biotechnology policy problem and the 
formulation of an appropriate policy strategy. Although the pioneers of 
the policy sciences shared the democratic aspirations of the pragmatist 
movement, the field has for a long time been dominated by the technocratic 
tradition of the modernity project. Postpositivists however pointed towards 
the potential flaws of its instrumental rationality and objectivism in the 
resolution of contemporary policy problems. Some of these problems are 
too ambiguous and multi-dimensional to solve them with straightforward, 
technical solutions. Argumentative policy analysis provides a more 
promising approach to these problems. It starts from the recognition that 
multiple perspectives are involved in the interpretation and understanding 
of social reality and the construction of policy problems. Argumentative 
policy analysis assumes a fallibilist, pragmatist rationality, emphasizing the 
importance of democratic deliberation in the process of policy analysis. From 
this perspective, animal biotechnology is analyzed as an unstructured policy 
problem, characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about the relevant 
facts in combination with a high degree of disagreement about which values 
are at stake. Various policy actors have different, legitimate constructions of 
the policy problem of animal biotechnology. The appropriate policy strategy 
would therefore be aimed at problem structuring, gathering information 
about the problem, ultimately leading to a new and shared vision on what the 
problem actually is. It requires the participation of a broad range of citizens 
to examine the ways in which their framings of the problem are discursively 
constructed.
The	research	project
In order to deal effectively with the deep-seated value conflicts of the animal 
biotechnology controversy, a more open and democratic approach to ethical 
governance was required. Our research project integrated the perspectives 
of pragmatist ethics and argumentative policy analysis in its primary 
objective to contribute to a conceptual and methodological framework 
for the democratic deliberation of animal biotechnology controversy. We 
developed and applied a number of social experiments to acquire a better 
understanding of the way in which this process of democratic deliberation 
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should be designed. In the fourth and final part of the thesis, we reflect 
on the results of these experiments and the extent to which the primary 
objective, to contribute to a framework for democratic deliberation, has been 
achieved. The perspectives of pragmatist ethics and argumentative policy 
analysis showed us that the main concept of a methodological framework for 
democratic deliberation about animal biotechnology is reflective learning by 
the actors involved. One of the two main research questions of this thesis has 
been:
How should an appropriate reflective learning process be designed in order 
to structure the social problem of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands?
We distinguished two different aspects of reflective learning. In the first 
phase of the project, we focused on the articulation of value diversity in the 
reflection on animals and the human-animal relationship. Two subquestions 
were formulated. The first subquestion concerned the design of a deliberative 
instrument for participatory value inquiry. The second subquestion 
concerned the articulated value diversity itself. In the second phase of the 
project, we focused on the articulation of value conflicts in the context of 
animal biotechnology dialogues. Again, two subquestions were formulated, 
respectively concerning the design of a deliberative instrument and the 
articulation of the conflicts themselves. Chapter 15 reflects on the findings 
and conclusions with respect to these four subquestions.
 The social experiments we conducted, provided a deeper 
understanding of the societal context of the animal biotechnology 
controversy. We used these insights to explore the opportunities for a 
resolution of the social controversy. If a reflective learning approach is to 
contribute to the resolution of the animal biotechnology controversy, it 
has to generate problem structuring. The extent to which the application 
of value labs and experimental dialogues has indeed given rise to problem 
structuring, is examined in chapter 16. It provides an answer to the second 
main research question of this thesis:
What are the possibilities for problem structuring and reframing of the 
animal biotechnology controversy in the Netherlands?
On the basis of the findings and conclusions presented in chapters 15 and 16, 
chapter 17 revisits the design of the research project itself. The chapter closes 
with some recommendations for future research in pragmatist ethics.
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Chapter 18, finally, discusses the theoretical implications of the research 
project for the ethics and governance of animal biotechnology. It reflects 
on the potential role of the developed deliberative instruments in future 
pragmatist ethics activities in the creative management of value perspectives 
in the animal biotechnology controversy. Furthermore, the chapter sketches 
two different scenarios for the governance of animal biotechnology in the 
Netherlands. Both scenarios aim to reconcile the recognition of uncertainty 
and pluralism in democratic practices of ethics and governance.

Chapter 15
Learning about value diversity and conflict
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How should an appropriate reflective learning process be designed in order 
to structure the animal biotechnology controversy? Chapter 3 has argued that 
it requires a shift to contextualism. Therefore the context of specific variables 
had to be explored in relation to the different framings. This implies that the 
practical translation of the reflective learning approach towards the animal 
biotechnology controversy should be directed towards the facilitation of 
processes of inquiry and deliberation. The central element of these processes 
is ‘frame reflection’, in which a wide variety of citizens should be involved. 
As was mentioned in chapter 14, the first step of a reflective learning process 
should be the articulation of value diversity; the second step should be the 
articulation and deliberation of value conflict. We have formulated a number 
of research questions that structured the social experiments that were 
conducted in order to articulate the value diversity and conflict of the animal 
biotechnology controversy in the Netherlands. This chapter summarizes the 
findings and conclusions of these social experiments.
15.1	 The	participatory	inquiry	of	values
The first step in the pragmatic contextualization of animal biotechnology 
ethics was the articulation of the existing value diversity in the moral 
reflection on human-animal relationships in the Netherlands. For that reason 
we developed the value lab, a deliberative tool that was designed as a policy 
instrument for learning about the diversity of value frameworks in social 
conflicts (see chapter 7). The interactive explorations of the value lab yielded 
four different moral value frameworks, each consisting of a distinctive, 
interrelated structure of animal values (see chapter 8). This section will 
reflect on the methods and results of the participatory value inquiry in 
relation to the initially posed research questions. 
How can the frame-reflective participatory inquiry of the value diversity in 
the reflection on animals and the human-animal relationship be realized?
The value lab tool has been thoroughly evaluated in chapter 9, based on three 
evaluation criteria: the ‘management of the deliberative process’, the ‘co-
construction of ideas’ and the ’representation of diversity’. The criterion of 
‘deliberative process management’ was subdivided into ‘process facilitation’, 
’mutual respect and openness’ and ‘equal opportunity’. With respect to the 
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first criterion, ‘deliberative process management’, chapter 9 concluded that 
the application of the value lab tool performed properly. The homogeneity 
of the discussion groups, combined with the use of structured exercises 
and independent facilitation offered participants a safe, non-threatening 
environment to freely express their thoughts and concerns. The evaluation 
forms furthermore indicated an atmosphere of openness and respect and 
the opportunity for every participant to have a say. Regarding the second 
criterion, the ‘co-construction of ideas’, the value lab methodology was 
also positively evaluated. The semi-structured approach of the value lab 
spiral stimulated participants to act as co-researchers in the process of 
philosophical self-inquiry into their frames of reference. 
 With respect to the third criterion of the representation of the 
diversity of views, the value lab tool was considered to have functioned 
properly. Of course, this kind of public participation exercises is always 
restricted by a selection bias, because only the generally interested citizens 
show up. However, based on the qualitative analysis procedures that were 
applied, we consider it justified to state that the value lab discussions have 
encompassed the widest variety of views. The value lab did not provide 
knowledge of the statistical representativeness of the frameworks that were 
reconstructed. Our qualitative design merely yielded insight into what the 
diverse frames are and how they are structured. The reconstructed frames 
should be regarded as social representations that people use to express 
their thoughts and concerns. The value lab research has shown that all 
different value categories are recognized in all four frames. The patterns of 
expression and behavior, observed in the value lab and experimental dialogue 
sessions, indicated that the role and relative weight of a certain value in a 
particular frame might shift due to the influence of the context. If one aims 
to understand the social controversy of animal issues, knowledge about 
the diversity and structure of frames in dynamic contexts is therefore more 
interesting than the statistical representation of frames in a certain point in 
time.
What are the different ways in which Dutch citizens frame the value of 
animals in the discussion of animals and the human-animal relationship?
Application of the value lab reconstructed four distinct value frames that 
were labeled after their central value concept: Use, Relation, Balance and 
Source. The four value frames constituted empirical knowledge of the 
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different ways in which a broad range of Dutch citizens thinks about the 
value of animals. Each of the frameworks produces specific and contextual 
meanings of the animal values expressed. The diversity of animal values 
observed in this study provides a strong validation of moral pluralism 
in the reflection on animal issues in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the 
reconstruction of the four value frameworks provided an improved insight 
into the problematic aspects of the role of the intrinsic value concept in the 
current (ethical) regulation. Paula’s (2001) evaluation of the Dutch approach 
to animal biotechnology policy had already indicated that the use of the 
intrinsic value concept frustrated the public debate because of the lack of 
clarity about its meaning. Our results demonstrated that this concept indeed 
acquires various meanings in the moral reflection on animal issues. Together 
with Paula’s observations, our findings provide empirical evidence for the 
pragmatist claim that the conceptualization of the intrinsic value concept as 
a fixed end, indeed neglects moral diversity and impedes constructive moral 
inquiry and deliberation.
 What is the relation of the frames reconstructed in this study to 
the scientific literature about the human-animal relationship? Historically, 
the sociology of relationships between humans and animals has not been 
regarded as a legitimate subject of research, presumably due to a common 
anthropocentric orientation in social science. Only recently, the nature of 
the human-animal relationship gained increased attention (Arluke, 2003). 
Research in this area has however predominantly focused on quantitative 
surveys of the relation between participant characteristics and the attitude 
towards animals. Examples of such factors are gender, race or religious 
orientation. There has however been little qualitative research into the views 
and attitudes towards animals. The few examples of qualitative research 
often involve people’s view towards a specific, single issue, such as the use of 
animals in research (Knight & Barnett, 2008). To our knowledge, there have 
not been systematic qualitative inquiries into the diversity and structure of 
perspectives on the animal and the human-animal relationship in general.
 With respect to the situation in the Netherlands, our empirically 
reconstructed frames of the human-animal relationship could be compared 
to the theoretical images of the human-nature relationship, described in 
literature. Dutch environmental philosophers have constructed these images 
in an attempt to better understand the value and significance of nature (De 
Groot, 1992; Kockelkoren, 1993; Zweers, 1995). Different philosophers 
have provided slightly different classifications, broadly ranging from an 
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anthropocentric to an eco-centric orientation. Overall, however, four distinct 
categories emerge: the Master, who stands above nature and may use nature 
do fulfill his needs; the Steward, who’s task it is to manage nature responsibly 
under the authority of someone or something else; the Partner, who grants 
nature a status of its own in a mutually dependent relationship between man 
and nature; the Participant, who is a part of the whole of nature as part of his 
identity (Van den Born, 2007). 
 If we contrast the frames reconstructed in our empirical study to the 
images of the human-nature relationship, similarities and discrepancies are 
recognized. The Use frame and the Master image both assume a hierarchical 
attitude towards the human-nonhuman relationship and have a preference 
for technological innovation. An important difference is that the Use frame 
does emphasize the responsibility of humans towards animals, whereas the 
Master image does not recognize a specific human responsibility towards 
nature itself. The Relation frame exhibits an emphasis on care taking that is 
similar to the Steward image. In the Relation image it is however grounded 
in the (emotional) human experience of the animal, whereas the emphasis 
on care and responsibility in the Steward image is related to the authority of 
his superior (e.g. god, or nature). The Balance frame and the Partner image 
both strive for equality in the human-nonhuman relationship and recognize 
the independent value of nonhuman nature. The Source frame and the 
Participant image both share a spiritual dimension and a value of the greater 
whole in which man, animals and the rest of nature participate. 
 The differences between the images of the human-nature relationship 
and the frames reconstructed in this study presumably lie in the different 
character and meaning of nature and animals in our culture. The similarities 
between the two classifications of views are probably due to the fact that they 
are both grounded in the same culture. The advantage of our qualitative study 
is that the observed diversity of frames is empirically grounded. In addition, 
the value lab research enabled a deeper understanding of the structure of 
the frames and the values that construct them. Also the theoretical images 
of the human-nature relationship have been empirically tested, using a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative methods. Van den Born (2007) found that, 
although all images were recognized, respondents, rather than adopting 
an image as a whole, endorsed specific elements out of various images. 
This is comparable to our finding with respect to the contextual expression 
of animal value frames. Overall, we considered the congruence between 
the reconstructed frames and the theoretical images as an indication of 
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interpretative validity. The acquired in-depth understanding of the character 
of the frames, as well as their contextual dimensions, constitutes the added 
value of empirical philosophy.
15.2	 The	participatory	deliberation	of	animal	biotechnology
The next step in the pragmatic contextualization of animal biotechnology 
ethics in the Netherlands was the articulation of (possible) value conflicts 
in the deliberation of the practical context of animal biotechnology. For 
that reason we have developed a second deliberative tool, the experimental 
dialogues, in which representatives of different framings of the value of 
animals discussed concrete cases of animal biotechnology together in a 
structured way (see chapter 11). Application of the experimental dialogues 
tool provided a deeper insight into the specific dynamics of discussing animal 
biotechnology cases for a range of frame combinations. The results offered 
a differentiated picture of the possibilities and impossibilities of achieving 
understanding and consensus when different frames meet in dialogue. 
Furthermore, the experimental dialogues yielded some insights into the 
reciprocal relationships between the value frames and the appreciation of 
animal biotechnology. This section reflects on the method and results of 
the participatory deliberation of animal biotechnology along the lines of the 
formulated research questions.
How can the frame-reflective public deliberation of animal biotechnology be 
realized?
Even though consensus or compromise was not always a viable option due 
to fundamental value differences, the setting of the experimental dialogues 
did succeed to facilitate a respectful attitude of its participants. This can be 
concluded based on our observations during the sessions, but also based 
on specific remarks of the participants in the individual evaluations by 
telephone, within two weeks after the session. The atmosphere of mutual 
respect may be attributed to the specific design elements of the experimental 
dialogues, such as the conversation rules and the imaginative setting of 
the ‘island council’. An important factor, as the individual evaluations put 
forward, has also been the moderation by skilled facilitators that were 
(perceived as) independent with respect to the subject of discussion. 
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The facilitators did not actively contribute to the management of the 
deliberative process of the ‘island council’, because we were interested in the 
dynamics of the meeting of different frames and the potential to achieve 
understanding and consensus in an unassisted process of decision making. 
As the next chapters will elaborately discuss, we believe that an increased 
use of facilitator interventions would surely increase both the quality of the 
process, in terms of openness to other views and equal opportunity, as well 
as the quality of the outcome, in terms of the achieved understanding. A 
similar comment has to be made with respect to the consensus orientation 
of the dialogue sessions. As chapter 11 explained, this consensus orientation 
was used instrumentally to focus the participants and increase their sense 
of urgency and responsibility. Chapter 12 however demonstrated that 
the consensus orientation also obstructed the deliberation of values and 
therefore the achievement of understanding. As such, the experimental 
dialogues provided empirical evidence for the claim that this kind of 
public participation exercises should be oriented at deliberation and not at 
consensus (Kerkhof, 2006; Paula, 2001). The next chapters will reflect on the 
orientation of future problem structuring exercises in more detail.
What are the different conflicts of value when Dutch citizens meet to discuss 
cases of animal biotechnology?
The experimental dialogues provided a differentiated account of the 
possibilities and impossibilities of achieving understanding and consensus. A 
true substantive consensus, characterized by deliberation of similarities and 
differences as well as the convergence to a shared decision, was only observed 
in the Balance and Source dialogue. Use and Relation representatives 
agreed on many values and ideals, but sometimes differed significantly 
in the relative weight they attributed to certain aspects, especially the 
importance of ‘individual animal suffering’. Use and Relation representatives 
accommodated these differences in the formation of a procedural consensus. 
Also in dialogues between Relation and Balance representatives, a procedural 
consensus was achieved. The points of agreement and disagreement were 
carefully deliberated, and accumulated in a list of terms and conditions. 
Whereas the Use and Balance dialogues and the Relation and Source 
dialogues also achieved convergence on terms and conditions, we concluded 
that these were examples of an artificial consensus. The terms and conditions 
were merely strategically used to avoid the deliberation of differences.
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Apparently, three of the frame combinations (Use-Relation; Relation-Balance; 
Balance-Source) are capable of reaching a decision while having achieved 
understanding of each other’s views. Depending on the depth of value 
differences, this decision either was a convergent or divergent decision. The 
other three frame combinations (Use-Balance; Use-Source; Relation-Source) 
were not capable of achieving understanding. Depending on their differences, 
they either reach an artificial decision or no decision at all.
 Each framing of the value of the animal also produced a specific 
framing of animal biotechnology as well. Note however that the responses 
to animal biotechnology have only been observed in the context of meeting 
with representatives of another frame (see chapter 13 for a discussion). We 
discerned four aspects. First of all, the Balance and Source frames construct 
a fundamental objection towards the technique of genetic modification, 
whereas the Use and Relation frames evaluate the technique merely on its 
potential consequences. This difference reflects a common distinction in 
(animal) ethics between deontological and consequentialistic arguments 
(Armstrong & Botzler, 2003; Garner, 2005). We want to stress here that this 
distinction merely concerns the evaluation of the technique itself. The final 
judgment of the cases of animal biotechnology depended on many other 
aspects. With respect to these aspects, all frames were observed to use a 
mix of deontological and consequentialistic arguments. Another important 
aspect was for instance the influence of the context of application on the 
final decision. Across all frames, animal biotechnology for human health is 
far more positively evaluated than animal biotechnology for economic or 
environmental purposes. This finding corresponds to the literature on public 
attitudes towards animal biotechnology (Eurobarometer, 2002). A third 
aspect is the style of reasoning. Whereas the Relation and Balance frames are 
inclined to incorporate many contextual considerations, the Use and Source 
frames give rise to a more categorical point of view. Finally, the four frames 
significantly differ in the envisioned way towards a resolution of the moral 
problem of animal biotechnology. The Relation and Balance frames make an 
appeal to external regulation by centers of expertise or advisory bodies. The 
Use and Source frame on the other hand seem to rely on, or make an appeal 
to, the individual conscience of the involved actors. If we now look at the 
results of the experimental dialogue again, it appears that the differentiated 
abilities to achieve understanding and consensus not only depend on 
differences in the appreciation of values, but also on differences in the style of 
reasoning and the moral appeal. 
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Each frame yields a distinct attitude towards animal biotechnology. 
Moreover, the similarities between the various frames provide a possible 
explanation of their performance in the attempt to reach a shared decision 
in the experimental dialogue sessions. These findings support our suggestion 
that the reconstructed frames can be used as heuristic instruments in order 
to acquire a better understanding of the different viewpoints in the animal 
biotechnology controversy.

Chapter 16
Problem structuring
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The entanglement of uncertainty and pluralism is what characterizes the 
policy problem of animal biotechnology. In this context, various actors define 
what they think is the problem of animal biotechnology in different ways. 
Hisschemöller (1993) has argued that these kind of unstructured problems 
are in need of problem structuring, the activity of generating, integrating and 
sharing as much as possible conflicting information about both normative 
and empirical aspects. The aim of problem structuring is to produce new 
insights about the problem and its possible solutions. This chapter reflects 
on the contribution that the sequential application of value labs and 
experimental dialogues has made to the activity of problem structuring with 
respect to the animal biotechnology controversy. 
 Problem structuring required the active participation of a wide 
range of actors in order to take the different views of the problem into 
account. These actors of course had to be willing to participate and adopt a 
communicative rationality aimed at mutual understanding. As chapter 4 has 
outlined, a crucial aspect of problem structuring is what Schön & Rein (1994) 
have called frame reflection, achieving understanding of one’s own framing 
of the problem and (possible) differences with the framings of others. Years 
before 1994, Schön (1979) already recognized that the intractability of public 
conflicts, such as the animal biotechnology controversy, is related to the 
active presence of conflicting frames. He argued that this kind of problems is 
in need of frame restructuring, the process of constructing a new integrative 
frame of the problem. Schön & Rein (1994) later referred to this process 
as reframing. They argued that the relationships between frame reflection, 
reframing and the resolution of social conflicts are not that straightforward. 
Sometimes a policy problem is reframed without frame reflection. Other 
times, the act of frame reflection itself does not lead to reframing of the 
problem at hand. As the chapters 7 and 11 have demonstrated, the value lab 
and experimental dialogues tools have been specifically designed to nurture 
a safe and friendly conversation environment in which participants could 
focus on listening and mutual understanding. The question to be answered 
in this chapter is whether these conversations have indeed produced frame 
reflection and reframing of the problem of animal biotechnology.
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16.1	 Constructing	animal	value:	different	roles	of	frame	reflection
The value lab is a deliberative instrument designed specifically for frame-
reflective inquiry. The process design facilitated respect, openness and equal 
opportunity and the co-construction of ideas. The participants acted as co-
researchers in the reconstruction of their own frames of reference. Evaluation 
of the value lab methodology in chapter 9 has shown that this deliberative 
tool indeed provides a constructive communicative space for reflective 
learning about frames. However, our design of interactive exploration of 
value diversity in separate groups of ordinary citizens limited the scope of 
individual frame reflection to the discussion groups themselves. The worth of 
the value lab application with regard to frame reflection was that its results 
– the four reconstructed value frames – provided ample opportunity for the 
government and other policy actors to increase their reflexive awareness 
of the variety of existing frames. Each of the frameworks discussed in 
chapter 8 consists of a differentiated structure of animal values, providing 
the constructs and patterns to make the animal and the human-animal 
relationship meaningful to others and to ourselves. The same ‘object’, in our 
case the animal and the human-animal relationship, is defined in a different 
way, using different concepts. Chapter 8 additionally showed that none of 
these frameworks matches the framing of the intrinsic value of animals as 
it is operationalized in Dutch legislation and animal biotechnology policy 
making. This insight is an example of one of the potential roles of frame 
reflection in the improvement of policy making in social controversies: 
frame-critical analysis (Rein, 1983). Frame-critical analysis can reveal the 
implicit assumptions and exclusion effects of current habits, patterns and 
structures of policy and politics.
 According to Swaffield (1998), there are two other potential roles of 
frame reflection in policy making concerning complex issues. The first is the 
instrumental role in the pragmatic resolution of controversy by the process 
of reframing. The second role does not directly focus on resolution of public 
conflicts, but on the thorough interpretation of these conflicts. Because the 
value labs and experimental dialogues concerned reflective deliberations 
amongst ordinary citizens, and not amongst institutionalized policy actors, 
the interpretive role of frame reflection seems more appropriate. Its first 
aim is to acquire a deeper understanding of public conflicts in order to 
provide the preconditions for processes such as education, negotiation and 
mediation, which do aim at resolution of the conflict. The interpretive role 
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of the frameworks reconstructed in the value lab sessions exists in their 
ability to identify the key areas of conflict and misunderstanding. Also 
in the second phase of the project, the application of the experimental 
dialogues, the multi-perspectival problem construction was clearly observed. 
Different social actors each constructed the problem in their own way (see 
chapter 13). Insight into the structure of meaning of the different problem 
perceptions has pointed towards the major differences and similarities of 
the various frames and the potentially problematic roles of these differences 
and similarities in the deliberation of animal biotechnology in the policy 
arena. Furthermore, this frame-reflective knowledge indicates options for the 
direction of future inquiries and deliberations.
16.2	 Deliberating	animal	biotechnology:	
 opportunities for reframing
The experimental dialogues explored the possibilities for the creative 
management of social conflicts related to animal biotechnology. One of these 
possibilities is reframing, the creation of an integrative frame that constitutes 
a shared perception of the problem. The degree to which reframing of the 
Dutch animal biotechnology policy problem can occur is evidently related to 
the levels of understanding and consensus that can be reached in the practice 
of the Dutch policy arena. As was discussed in chapter 12, the experimental 
dialogues, organized as the confrontation between representatives of 
different frames, examined the extent to which the frame combinations 
achieved understanding and consensus. It is our assumption that the frames 
reconstructed in the value lab sessions also play a role in the actual societal 
debate. Therefore we expected the experimental dialogues to provide 
insight into the possibilities for achieving understanding and consensus and 
therefore for reframing in the policy practice as well. 
 We observed that the frames of Use and Source participants were so 
different that frame restructuring was not possible in their dialogue sessions. 
In stead, one might say that the participants retreated in their own frames. 
In chapter 12, this phenomenon was characterized as trench warfare, the 
participants retreat to their own positions in the attempt to defend their 
own perspective. In addition to the unwillingness to reflect on the other 
participants’ frame, we observed that the Use and Source participants 
sometimes also could not deliberate these frames, because of a lack of shared 
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concepts and language. We concluded that the discursive confrontations 
of Use and Source views might have contributed to the reflective learning 
about the participants’ own views, but barely to reflective learning about 
the views of the ‘other’. Also Schön and Rein (1994) recognized that frame 
reflection may sometimes merely serve to reinforce the existing stalemate or 
antagonism. 
 Another observation of these authors is that sometimes frame 
restructuring takes place in the absence of thorough frame reflection. 
A similar situation arose in the dialogues that achieved what chapter 12 
denoted as an artificial consensus. This type of consensus is an agreement 
on a particular outcome or course of action while the values, beliefs and 
ideals motivating the outcome have not been deliberated. In these situations, 
frame reflection actually does not take place. Although an artificial consensus 
can be sufficient to disarm a policy controversy, it can also hide conflicts 
of value that may heat the controversy at later stages of the policy process. 
The latter was observed in the dialogue between Relation and Source 
representatives and to a lesser extent in the Use and Balance dialogue. We 
observed that in these dialogues the, sometimes profound, value differences 
were not deliberated. In the Relation versus Source dialogue for example, 
the participants agreed on the shared importance of ‘controllability’. 
However, for Relation representatives, the concept of ‘controllability’ 
referred to the potential consequences for human beings, whereas Source 
participants feared a misbalance of the greater whole. In this case, the use of 
ambiguous language enabled the participants to find an artificial consensus, 
but concealed substantive value differences. Another example in which 
reframing obscures a conflict of value, is the shared decision for research 
into alternatives in the Use and Balance dialogue. The initial problem 
constructions of both frames entailed a significantly different meaning of 
‘alternatives’. In the Balance frame, the perceived unnaturalness of genetic 
modification (gm) was the reason for the desire of non-gm alternatives. The 
Use frame on the other hand firstly interpreted ‘alternatives’ as activities 
within the field of gm research in order to refine the procedures and 
techniques.
 The encounters between the Relation and Balance frames and the 
encounters between the Use and Relation frames constituted examples of a 
situation in which frame reflection contributes to the resolution of a problem 
without the occurrence of frame restructuring. The participants carefully 
explored each other’s problem-setting stories, demonstrating awareness 
188
Chapter 16
of their frame differences. We concluded that learning about the frames 
of oneself and others to a large extent occurred. However, not in all cases 
these participants actually reframed the case problem into an integrative 
story that was mutually shared. Instead, a procedural consensus was 
formulated in terms of conditions. The representatives of different frames 
managed to accommodate their value differences in a heterogeneous list of 
conditions. In the Relation versus Balance dialogue for example, one of the 
underlying value differences concerned a different definition of the human-
animal relationship. The Relation representatives primarily interpreted 
this relationship as a form of ‘hierarchical responsibility’ whereas Balance 
representatives also emphasized the ‘principal equality’ of this relationship. 
In the course of the conversation, the participants together decided to 
respect the value of ’equality’ in the specification of conditions. A similar 
phenomenon was observed in the Use versus Relation dialogue. Here, the 
concept of animal suffering was primarily valued by Relation representatives. 
In order to show consideration for their point of view, the group as a 
whole decided to accommodate the concern for animal suffering in a list of 
conditions.      
 We did observe frame restructuring in the case of the Balance and 
Source dialogue. Here, the participants together constructed a new problem-
setting story, which was different from that of the case discussed, and 
grounded in the value concepts they shared. During the consideration of the 
‘colon cancer mouse’ case, for example, the participants together “discovered” 
the new options of ’accepting death and disease as a part of life’ and 
‘prevention by a change of lifestyle’. One might interpret the decision to focus 
on these aspects, rather than on colon cancer mouse research, as a fusion of 
horizons. 
 The observed frame reflection in the experimental dialogues 
indeed showed a capacity for mutual learning. Still, in cases when frame 
conflicts were large, the participants adhered to their own problem-setting 
stories, resulting in trench warfare and at best artificial consensus. The 
experience of the animal biotechnology dialogues nevertheless showed 
that deliberative tools, such as the experimental dialogues, do aid reflexive 
inquiry and deliberation. The exploration of opportunities for reframing in 
the experimental dialogues is an example of the instrumental role of frame 
reflection in the management of intractable policy controversies. Swaffield 
(1998) discerned two options for the instrumental role of frames. The first is 
to treat the frames as given elements that can subsequently be used in further 
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stages of problem solving. The role of the value frameworks in guiding the 
selection and grouping of participants in the experimental dialogue sessions 
is an example of this instrumental use of frames. The second option is to 
regard frames as dynamic elements that form a part of the conflict resolution 
process. In the experimental dialogue sessions, four of the six different 
frame confrontations indeed showed the dynamic character of those frames. 
These frame combinations were able to find room to maneuver in order to 
find solutions. Nonetheless, the accommodation of value differences did 
not always lead to a stable resolution of the problem at hand. In some cases, 
the formulation of an artificial consensus masked the deliberation of values, 
which would be needed to find a socially robust solution.
 A final remark has to be made about the nature of frame reflection 
itself. The problems of animal biotechnology are constructed and 
reconstructed endlessly. In this strongly dynamic context, frame-reflective 
inquiry and deliberation should not be seen as fixed ends that can finally 
be reached. They should be integrated characteristics of an on-going 
process of policy making. The reflexive awareness that is needed to engage 
meaningfully in a collective process of inquiry and deliberation is much 
more of an attitude than an outcome. It concerns the rejection of dogmatic 
beliefs, the recognition of pluralism and the embrace of the provisionality 
of all judgment. Perhaps, Dewey’s view of moral theory can be of help here. 
Dewey did not reject moral principles altogether, but insisted that they 
were produced through the human, cultural experience of concrete moral 
situations and should always be tested against new situations (B. A. Minteer, 
Corley, E. A., Manning, R. E., 2004). The invention and reconstruction of 
moral concepts and rules always are an integral part of this process. The 
question is not whether we have reached the endpoint of frame-reflective 
inquiry and deliberation but how the frame-reflective attitude can be 
incorporated into the practice of ethics policy with regard to animal 
biotechnology. This question will be further addressed in chapter 18.

Chapter 17
Lessons for future experiments
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The chapters 15 and 16 have reflected on the results of the social experiments 
that we have conducted in order to contribute to the development of a 
reflective learning approach. Both experiments, the articulation of diversity, 
by means of the value lab, and the articulation of conflict, by means of 
the experimental dialogues, have achieved their objectives. The value labs 
yielded new insights into the diversity of frames in the reflection on animals 
and the human-animal relationship in the Netherlands. The experimental 
dialogues enabled us to understand what kind of conflicts may arise when 
different frames meet for dialogue in the discussion of animal biotechnology. 
This chapter revisits the research design of these two social experiments we 
conducted. The chapter closes with some lessons for future research into the 
intractable moral controversy of animal biotechnology.
17.1	 Key	issues	in	design	and	implementation
This thesis did not implement a reflective learning process itself. Rather, it 
described the development and application of two social experiments that 
were conducted in order to contribute to the development of a conceptual 
and methodological framework for democratic deliberation. This section 
reviews a number of relevant aspects of this framework for democratic 
deliberation. As part A of this thesis specified, literature study into the 
theoretical perspectives of pragmatist ethics and argumentative policy 
analysis indicated that the central concept of democratic deliberation in 
the animal biotechnology controversy should be reflective learning. Given 
the unstructuredness of the animal biotechnology controversy, the process 
of reflective learning should consist of two important characteristics: 
frame reflection and citizen participation. The two social experiments 
were conducted to find out how a reflective learning process could be 
appropriately designed, in order to incorporate the participation of citizens 
and the process of frame reflection. These experiments were designed in a 
stepwise fashion. The first step of the learning process was the articulation of 
diversity; the second step was the articulation of conflict. 
Towards	reflective	learning
The conclusions of chapter 15 indicate that the first characteristic, citizen 
participation, has been adequately realized in both experiments. The 
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value lab discussions as well as the experimental dialogues generated a fair 
representation of the diversity of ideas about animals and the human-animal 
relationship. With respect to the second characteristic, frame reflection, 
some more critical remarks can be made. The value lab methodology, for 
example, facilitated frame reflection to a large extent. However, due to 
the utilized design principle of ‘homogeneity within the groups’, frame 
reflection only occurred with respect to the participants’ own frame. This 
did not constitute a problem for our research design, because the citizens 
participating in the value labs were merely consulted in order to reconstruct 
the diversity of frames. If the value lab methodology will be used to facilitate 
reflective learning in future interactive policy-making practices, this might 
become a problem. In such situations, it is important that the involved policy 
actors not only learn about their own frame. These actors should also become 
aware of possible differences between their frame and the frame of others, 
a process called cross-frame learning (Klijn, 2000). This would imply that 
the value lab session should be succeeded by another homogeneous session 
in which the participants engage in facilitated reflection on the value lab 
products of other groups.
Deliberation-oriented dialogues
With respect to frame reflection in the experimental dialogues a similar 
remark can be made. The experimental dialogues have shown that an 
orientation towards consensus can in fact limit the degree of frame 
reflection. In several dialogues, the consensus orientation hindered the 
development of mutual understanding because it obstructed deliberation. 
This was observed during the sessions, but also indicated by participants in 
the individual evaluations of the dialogues by telephone (see chapter 12). 
Also in the literature on public participation, the emphasis on consensus is 
argued to lead to a focus on the most tractable problems and merely reaches 
agreement on imprecise and general statements, while other important 
issues are ignored and important differences of value suppressed (Coglianese, 
1999; Kerkhof, 2006). As chapter 18 will argue from a more theoretical 
perspective, a consensus orientation in deliberative exercises is indeed prone 
to the suppression of differences, whereas these differences might in fact be 
constitutive to the meaning of a particular problematic situation. A focus on 
deliberation itself might therefore be a more promising alternative for the 
engagement of citizens in the discussion of animal biotechnology. 
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The	facilitation	of	inquiry	and	deliberation
The experimental dialogues confronted different frame representatives 
in a situation in which they had to make a decision together. We were 
initially interested in conversation dynamics and the unassisted ability 
to reach a decision together. Therefore, cross-frame learning was hardly 
facilitated by the moderators that were present. During the ‘island council’ 
deliberation, the facilitators refrained from intervention. However, many 
of the strategic elements that were observed in the dialogue conversations, 
such as the suppression of other voices, or the use of ambiguous concepts 
like ‘alternatives’, could often have been repaired by creative interventions 
of facilitators. Our experiments have demonstrated that the deliberative 
attitude of reflexive awareness has to be explicitly facilitated if inquiry 
and deliberation is to take place in-depth. The application of the value lab 
methodology showed that reflective inquiry and deliberation are not only 
obtained through skilled facilitation. The facilitation of frame reflection can 
also, at least partly, be delegated to creative exercises. The use of creative 
exercises, in combination with skilled facilitation, mobilizes participants as 
co-researchers in the inquiry and deliberation of the diverse relationships 
between their own frames of reference and the context of animal 
biotechnology.
17.2 Recommendations for pragmatist ethics research
This research has been an example of the empirical philosophy that in our 
view characterizes pragmatist ethics. Our role as ethicists transformed 
into the role of a designer/ facilitator of social experiments. Intractable 
controversies are characterized by deeply entrenched disagreements about 
underlying values and concerns. Furthermore, these deeper, and often 
poorly articulated values and concerns are discursively constructed in 
the course of social interaction. Thus, pragmatist ethics research into the 
morally problematic aspects of technology controversies largely relies on 
the development and application of interactive qualitative methodologies in 
order to understand and evaluate the character and deliberation of public 
views.
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The value lab and experimental dialogues, developed in this project, form 
useful tools for the facilitation of inquiry and deliberation. However, in 
order to optimize these tools and expand the repertoire of pragmatist ethics, 
more research into the development and implementation of interactive 
qualitative methodologies is needed. Several questions seem worthwhile to 
explore. How can deliberation be explicitly facilitated, even in the presence 
of profound value differences? How can the concept of extended rationality 
be incorporated into the process of democratic deliberation? How can a 
deliberation of the diversity of views be realized in a constructive way? Of 
course, also questions related to the products of inquiry are relevant for 
the program of pragmatist ethics. For example, the frame-specific attitudes 
towards animal biotechnology have in our project only been monitored in 
the presence of other frames. It would therefore be interesting to perform 
more research into the specific relationships between the value frames and 
the differentiated appreciation of animal biotechnology in the Dutch society. 
In addition, research is needed to investigate the further role of the frames in 
the process of policy analysis and policy making.
 These and more questions illuminate the path towards future 
social experiments for dealing with social controverses surrounding animal 
biotechnology or other life science innovations. The development of a rich 
variety of tools and methodologies to facilitate inquiry and deliberation, in 
combination with an improved in-depth understanding of the products of 
moral inquiry, would enable pragmatist ethics to deal more effectively with 
the morally problematic aspects of technology controversies. 

Chapter 18
Implications for ethics and governance
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The reflective learning approach that is advocated, and experimented with, 
in this thesis, integrates the theoretical perspectives of pragmatist ethics and 
argumentative policy analysis. This thesis has argued that moral conflicts of 
the animal biotechnology were better addressed as practical disputes demand 
for cooperative inquiry and deliberation rather than abstract philosophical 
debates. Pragmatist ethicists should shift the focus from the justification of 
moral truths to the design and facilitation of deliberative processes and the 
creative management of the multiple perspectives within the democratic 
community. Indeed, as chapter 15 and 16 showed, application of the value 
labs and experimental dialogues has facilitated the inquiry and deliberation 
of a plurality of values and concerns with respect to the development of 
animal biotechnology. Also the perspective of argumentative policy analysis 
emphasizes the importance of democratic deliberation in the process of 
policy analysis and decision making. An appropriate policy strategy for 
intractable controversies, such as the animal biotechnology controversy, 
should be directed towards problem structuring, aiming at a new and shared 
vision on what the problem actually is. The social experiments of the value 
labs and experimental dialogues indeed contributed to problem structuring, 
although they have also demonstrated that the diversity of value frames 
and problem constructions is an inevitable characteristic of the animal 
biotechnology controversy.
 The first two sections of this chapter reflect on the different ways in 
which the problem structuring results of the value labs and experimental 
dialogues can be used in order to reconstruct the practice of animal 
biotechnology governance. In Deweyan pragmatism, it is recognized that in 
order to deal with the complexity of public conflicts in moral life, not only 
our ethical language and concepts should be reconstructed, but also our 
habits, institutions and practices. Two scenarios for such a reconstruction 
are presented. One concerns a reconstruction of the role and activities of 
the responsible policy makers. It aims to seek and demonstrate the reflexive 
awareness of other legitimate perspectives in the policy arena. The other 
scenario involves taking up the management of an on-going process of 
public deliberation and education. It entails a more radical reconstruction 
of the policy practice as a whole. The final section of this chapter interprets 
the application of the value labs and experimental dialogues tools in terms 
of the contribution they make to the repertoire of the pragmatist ethics 
for a technological culture that was sketched out by Keulartz et al. (2004). 
Furthermore, this section looks forward to the future of pragmatist ethics. It 
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conceptualizes ethics as the Deweyan ideal of creative democracy. It argues 
that in response to social controversies surrounding life science innovations 
like animal biotechnology, the ethicist should primarily operate as a designer 
and facilitator of cooperative processes of inquiry and deliberation.
18.1 Double vision
The previous section turned primarily towards the roles and activities of 
pragmatist ethicists. Ethics however does not merely take place in the habits 
and practices of ethicists. The practice of animal biotechnology governance 
is the place where ethical activities and products become reality. A pragmatic 
reconstruction of the animal biotechnology controversy should therefore 
also focus on the habits and practices of policy makers. This section reflects 
on the implications of our experiments in the inquiry and deliberation of 
values for the role and activities of the policy makers responsible for animal 
biotechnology governance in the Netherlands. It suggests how policy makers 
can utilize the products of problem structuring in their practice. 
 Chapter 16 finished with the claim that problem structuring is 
a constant need when dealing with persistently unstructured problems. 
The contingent and changing practice of animal biotechnology requires 
the continuation of inquiry and deliberation in order to structure and 
restructure our collective moral experience of the problems of animal 
biotechnology. However, policy-making also needs decisions in order to 
deal with the practical reality of animal biotechnology. The choice for a 
particular set of moral guidelines is a choice that is to be made by politics. In 
parliamentary democracies, representatives are elected to make the political 
choices in name of their electorate. The course of the political process will 
therefore always set the limits of the potential role of problem structuring. 
Hisschemöller & Hoppe (2001) have indicated problem structuring can 
serve as the foundation for a reasoned political choice of a problem frame. 
In this sense, the elected representatives making these decisions complete 
the process of structuring and participation, even if the unstructuring of the 
problem by the changing dynamics of the socio-technical context continues. 
What is the role of policy makers in this process? They are the public officials 
concerned with the preparation and implementation of decisions. Fischer 
(2003) has pointed out that an increasing part of the actual making of policy 
decisions takes place within the public agencies. From a democratic point 
200
Chapter 18
of view, the important issue is how unelected public servants can justify 
their role in the policy process. According to Fischer, the answer rather is 
more than less political engagement. Mobilizing the writings of Reich (1990) 
and Moore (1995), he argued that in order to find (or perhaps restore) the 
confidence of citizens, policy makers have to assume responsibility for their 
actions and products by participating in a political dialogue about their 
purposes and methods. How do they do that? According to Fischer (2003), 
Reich’s answer is to build a deliberative relationship with the public. One 
way of doing that is, as Reich advocated, taking up the management of an 
on-going process of public deliberation and education. This option will be 
elaborated in the next section. Another way is to seek and demonstrate the 
reflexive awareness of other legitimate perspectives in the policy arena. 
 Problem structuring can lead to representative thinking. This 
concept, developed by Hannah Arendt, addresses the ability to keep other 
people’s standpoints present in your mind while reflecting on a certain issue. 
The stronger one’s capacity for representative thinking, the more valid will 
the final conclusions of political judgment be (Arendt, 1968). Schön and 
Rein (1994) have called this understanding double vision: “the ability to act 
from a frame while cultivating awareness of alternative frames.” Double 
vision is a manifestation of the abovementioned deliberative relationship 
with the public and its political representatives through which policy makers 
may assume responsibility. Given the changing relations between science, 
government and society, discussed in part A, double vision is a skill that 
policy makers increasingly need in order to function properly. Since society 
started to speak back to science, as Nowotny et al. (2001)  have put it, also 
policy makers increasingly have to justify their actions in the public sphere as 
well.
 The value lab-based critique of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ in the 
Dutch regulatory practice is one example of how double vision can be put 
into practice. As chapter 4 explained, the current context of legislation and 
policy practice in the Netherlands imposes a juridical-technical framework 
on the public discussion of the problematic aspects of animal biotechnology. 
The evaluation study of Paula (2001) indicated that there has been too 
little space for the moral reflection on wider issues such as values and 
ideals with regard to the relationship between humans and animals or the 
role of technology in this relationship. Whereas these wider issues in fact 
make up a great deal of the public’s concern. Chapter 8 and 9 showed that 
application of the value lab method produced in-depth understandings of 
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the various ways in which Dutch citizens might frame the value of animals 
and the intrinsic value in particular. All of these framings are different 
from the legislative framing of intrinsic value used by the government. As 
long as the government regards their definition as normative, it will invoke 
critique. However, adopting a different definition will not be likely to change 
this. Double vision is a possible solution to the policy maker’s problem of 
taking responsibility here. Based upon our frame analysis of the value lab 
inquiries, we advised the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture to put double vision 
into practice. In all communicative action regarding animal biotechnology, 
the government should first of all demonstrate a reflexive awareness of the 
different interpretations of intrinsic value in society. Second, the government 
should explain her argumentation of why certain policy choices are made, 
whilst reflecting on alternative lines of argumentation. Double vision put 
into practice allows policy makers to better respond to the inevitable frame 
conflicts in the public discussion of animal biotechnology.
 How do policy makers acquire this skill? The answer of Schön and 
Rein (1994) is frame-reflective policy analysis in combination with the 
training and education of policy makers. Next to the prevailing models 
of policy rationality, choice, politics and negotiation, they argued that 
policy makers should also be educated in a different, more reflective kind 
of policy rationality in order to be able to cope with the intractable policy 
controversies of today. Schön and Rein have called this rationality the design 
rationality. It encompasses a focus on practical problems; the ability of 
frame reflection and double vision; an appreciation of the necessary political 
character of policy design and the skill of creative invention of new policy 
instruments and practices. They argued for a reflective policy practicum, an 
authentic learning environment in which problematic policy situations are 
resituated in order to enable policy makers to develop the skills required 
to reshape those situations. The situatedness of such an environment 
generates the experience of ambiguity and conflict, different constructions 
of meaning, controversy and the need for new, creative solutions. The role 
of policy makers will thus be reconstructed from a provider of solutions to a 
reflective, design-rational inquirer. However, they need help to learn how to 
accomplish the task of frame reflection, especially in situations of intractable 
controversy such as the animal biotechnology policy problem. Because of 
the interwovenness of facts and values and the multiple legitimate problem 
constructions that are there, frame reflection will have to be an interactive, 
situated process, engaging a wide range of citizens. This immediately requires 
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the development of mutual trust, which is particularly necessary to sustain 
frame-reflective inquiry into these situations of controversy (Schön & Rein, 
1994). These two tasks, frame reflection and the development of mutual 
trust, correspond to the pragmatist ethics activities envisaged by Keulartz et 
al. (2004). The reconstruction of the attitude and habits of policy makers in 
order to acquire double vision thus requires the pragmatist role of ethicists as 
the designers and facilitators of processes of moral inquiry and deliberation.
18.2	 Interactive	policy-making
The second scenario I want to discuss here is the scenario of interactive 
policy-making. Ultimately, interactive policy-making is aimed at the 
democratization of policy deliberation. This thesis has already argued that 
frame-reflective inquiry and public deliberation aimed at problem structuring 
are indispensable elements of the democratic deliberation of a new emerging 
technology such as animal biotechnology. The scenario of interactive policy 
making goes one step further. It involves the reconstruction of the current 
habits, practices and institutions of animal biotechnology policy-making. It 
not only changes the roles and activities of policy makers but also the roles 
and activities of other actors involved in the animal biotechnology policy 
arena. It is active at different levels of institutional and societal organization 
in order to transform that policy arena into a democratic, communicative 
space. 
 Interactive policy-making increasingly attracted the attention of 
policy makers, politicians, policy scientists and political scientists (Hajer, 
2003; Klijn, 2000). The recent interest is related to a growing concern about 
the democratic legitimacy of public policy, also in the field of science and 
technology development. As mentioned in part A, the place of science in 
society has become more and more problematic. The initial trust in the 
benefits of science and technology gradually changed into a concern about 
its consequences. Contemporary publics no longer completely rely on the 
judgment of experts, but are more and more expecting to be consulted about 
its preferences. In the 21st century, scientific knowledge and technological 
artifacts will increasingly be contested in the public arena. At the same 
time, current political institutions, such as political parties are thought to 
have lost the ability of connecting to the needs and desires of the citizenry. 
Hence, there is a growing need for the reconstruction of these institutions. 
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New communicative spaces are required to mediate the communication 
between science, the government and society. These communicative spaces 
have to take the changing relations between science and society into account. 
The erosion of the traditional institutions of political organization, such 
as political parties, changes the meaning of policy-making. Mutual trust 
and adherence between different groups have to be actively organized 
(Hajer, 2003). Furthermore, the unstructuredness of contemporary public 
problems, like the animal biotechnology controversy, indicates that simply 
providing more knowledge does not solve the problem. Interactive policy-
making has the potential to create a communicative space that answers to 
these developments. It represents a new orientation to the use of processes 
to solve contemporary public problems (Hajer, 2003). Interactive policy 
making organizes a variety of social actors in a collaborative process aimed 
at the resolution of public conflict through dialogue, partnership and co-
management (Driessen, 2001). A central element of this approach is the 
participation of citizens in the decisions that concern them.
Citizen	participation
The reconstruction of the policy practice into a communicative space in 
which new policies are interactively formulated, primarily concentrates 
on the arrangement and facilitation of deliberative processes between 
citizens and experts. Citizen participation undoubtedly is the touchstone 
of the democratic political process. In a democracy citizens have the right 
to express themselves about the matters that concern them. Moreover, 
they should be able to participate meaningfully in the making of decisions 
that concern them. Also in the field of science and technology policy, 
the significance of the participation of citizens is increasingly recognized 
(Feenberg, 1999; Hagendijk, 2006; Jasanoff, 2003; Wynne, 2002 ). The 
participation of citizens is argued to enhance the legitimacy of policy 
development and implementation. In addition, it might increase public 
support of political decisions by decreasing conflict and increasing 
acceptance and trust. Next to its normative and instrumental role, citizen 
participation can have a substantive role in decision-making about 
developments in science and technology (Fischer, 2003). It might increase 
the quality of decisions by offering relevant local knowledge or normative 
interpretations or by raising questions that were not yet addressed. 
Especially in the context of intractable public controversies, citizens 
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have an indispensable contribution to make in the process of problem 
characterization and the consideration of potential solutions.
Democratizing	policy	deliberation?
Interactive policy making aims at democratizing policy deliberation. 
However, does the participation of citizens necessarily contribute to a more 
democratic and open form of decision-making? The answer is – of course 
– that it depends. Meaningful cooperation between parties with diverse 
interests, values and ideals is far from unproblematic. The major challenge of 
the democratic aspirations of citizen participation is forcefully demonstrated 
by Paula’s (2001) evaluation study of the current Dutch practice of animal 
biotechnology policy. It has been one the official aims of the Dutch policy 
approach to engage the public in the discussion of moral issues surrounding 
the development of animal biotechnology. Another aim was to clarify the 
moral position of the animal in biotechnological practices. Together, these 
aims were to contribute to the development of a societal consensus on the 
acceptability of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands. Paula (2001) 
however indicated that the way in which citizens could participate satisfied 
none of the three reasons for participation mentioned above. Next to the 
abovementioned aims, the Committee for Animal Biotechnology (CAB), the 
central actor in the Dutch policy approach, was assigned to assess concrete 
animal biotechnology cases. The CAB evaluated the proposals for animal 
biotechnology research in a case-by-case review process, followed by public 
hearings that would give the opportunity for citizens to contest the intended 
decisions. The advisory practice of the CAB contained many problematic 
aspects. The actual space for public deliberation was more or less confined 
to the arena of the public hearings. The legal context of this arena obscured 
the communication between citizens and experts because it did not provide 
a setting to deliberate the moral issues that were experienced as problematic 
by the public. The lack of clarity about the meaning of the ethical concepts 
that were used, such as the intrinsic value concept (see chapter 4), further 
complicated the substantive deliberation of moral issues. Finally, the CAB 
itself responded to the public concern by framing problematic questions in a 
mere technical way, thus avoiding the deliberation of wider issues of concern 
associated with the development of animal biotechnology. As a result, the 
public discussions hardly had any effect on the judgments and licensing 
decisions that were made. Due to the limited attention to public concerns, 
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the public discussion of animal biotechnology merely heated the controversy.
 Paula’s (2001) analysis showed that the democratic quality of an 
interactive process is influenced by a number of elements and conditions. 
In recent times, a growing number of experiments with diverse forms of 
participatory exercises have been initiated in various Western societies 
(Hagendijk, 2006). The literature on public participation has built up many 
criteria proposed to harness the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of 
participatory exercises (Abelson et al., 2003; Broerse, forthcoming; Rowe & 
Frewer, 2000; Webler & Tuler, 2000). Paula’s (2001) evaluation study as well 
as the research project reported in this thesis indicate that for successful 
deliberation of the widest range of moral values and ideals, criteria such as 
the (frame-reflective) rationality and inclusivity of the interactive process 
are important. For the participatory exercises to achieve a serious impact on 
actual public policy making, other criteria, such as the transparency of the 
process and the shared authority to make decisions amongst citizens and 
experts are essential features (Akkerman, 2001). Despite the many promising 
initiatives, the effectiveness of participatory exercises has often been labelled 
as poor or at least uncertain (Hagendijk, 2006; Irwin, 2006). Different 
authors in the field have therefore called for more insight into the contextual 
conditions that determine the effectiveness of participatory approaches and 
may provide opportunities for the development of methods and instruments 
in order to improve the democratic quality of interactive processes in policy 
making (Broerse, forthcoming; Hagendijk, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2004). 
 The deliberative instruments presented in this thesis, the value lab 
and experimental dialogues tools, have demonstrated their potential to 
contribute to the reflective inquiry and deliberation of moral values in the 
public discussion of new emerging technologies. However, our research 
project merely concerned the consultation of citizens to increase the 
frame-reflective rationality of governmental policy and action. A practice 
of interactive policy making would imply that citizens, the government and 
a range of other actors become engaged in a mutual learning process. This 
requires the development of new arrangements and political spaces where a 
wide range of actors can meet for the democratic deliberation and appraisal 
of their views. Hajer (2003) however has indicated that these arrangements 
and political spaces should also be recognized as a stage for the articulation 
of political conflict. But what does that mean for their democratic quality? 
The subject of concern here is the relationship between two necessary 
aspects of interactive policy-making processes. A pragmatic reconstruction 
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of habits, institutions and practices of policy and politics should incorporate 
both aspects: first, the cultivation of an extended concept of rationality, 
aimed at mutual understanding; second, the inherently political character of 
public deliberation. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the challenges 
for interactive policy making posed by the interaction between these two 
aspects. 
 
Extended	rationality 
 
One of the habits of current practices of policy making that needs to be 
reconstructed is the prevalence of a technocratic rationality. Technocratic 
decision making strategies are unlikely to contribute to a long-term 
resolution of the social controversies of unstructured policy problems. The 
analytical-reductionist epistemological foundations and categorizations 
of technocratic rationality frame the solution to the social problem of 
animal biotechnology as a matter of reaching scientific certainty about its 
consequences. The analysis of animal biotechnology as an unstructured 
problem however showed that the animal biotechnology controversy is just 
as much constituted by scientific uncertainty as by a disagreement about the 
values at stake. The scientific-technical framing of the animal biotechnology 
debate merely excludes the consideration of potentially relevant values and 
ideals. This thesis has indicated that in the animal biotechnology controversy, 
multiple viewpoints amongst the public result in a range of different 
constructions of the social problem. The provisional and constructed 
nature of knowledge and values suggests a more practical conception of 
rationality as an alternative for the narrowly defined technocratic rationality. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, a practical rationality focuses on processes of 
argumentation and deliberation rather than scientific justification in order 
to find ‘good’ reasons for action (Fischer, 2003). Habermas (1984) argued to 
extend the concept of scientific rationality to a communicative rationality. 
In addition to achieving knowledge about the world, communicative 
rationality aims to achieve mutual understanding in the interaction between 
the members of democratic communities. It recognizes the pragmatist view 
of human agents embedded in a social context of dialogue and transaction. 
As Hoppe (1999) indicated, the combined act of social experimentation 
and deliberation creates an openness to learning in order to improve the 
human condition of associated living. He stated communicative rationality is 
necessarily social, interactive and dialogical. 
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The question of course is how to develop and nurture the communicative 
rationality during the process. According to Fischer (2003), the very act of 
citizen participation has the principal potential to overcome the limited 
conception of a technocratic rationality. He argued that citizen participation 
could indeed transform the current ways of organizing and knowing, 
constructing a new political culture of communicative action. The animal 
biotechnology debate in the Netherlands however demonstrates that the 
achievement of a communicative rationality that is shared amongst the 
involved social actors requires not only the participation of citizens but 
also the development of adequate deliberative structures. Section 17.1 
already argued that citizens need facilitated structures and arrangements to 
engage meaningfully in a collective process of inquiry and deliberation. The 
value labs and experimental dialogues are indeed examples of deliberative 
instruments that can facilitate a frame-reflective, communicative discourse. 
However, the achievement of communicative rationality in entire interactive 
policy making practices will require more profound, structural changes. 
Also the institutional organization of the practice of policy making has to be 
reconstructed. The case-by-case review format of the Dutch policy approach 
did not provide the appropriate structure to facilitate the democratic 
deliberation of moral issues. According to Paula (2001), the structure of 
the animal biotechnology policy process simultaneously focused on the 
preparation of decisions about biotechnological research and fostering 
the public discussion of the moral status of the animal. Of course, expert 
advice and decision-making are inevitable aspects of the practice of animal 
biotechnology policy making. However a pressing focus on decision-making 
and consensus-finding amongst experts may also obstruct the deliberation of 
a wide range of moral concerns, as is shown by the analysis of Paula (2001) as 
well as the results of the experimental dialogues discussed in this thesis.
The political character of deliberation
Practices of interactive policy making are viewed as communicative spaces 
for the confrontation, deliberation and appraisal of ideas, views and interests. 
The results of the experimental dialogues have shown that these ideas, views 
and interests are grounded in different, conflicting frames. Thus, the new 
practices of governance should find democratic ways to deal with these value 
conflicts. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, the plurality of 
perspectives is taken into account by the development and implementation 
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of procedural rules that safeguard the equality and fairness of the democratic 
process. An important role is dedicated to the Habermasian concept of 
communicative rationality. In one of his major publications on deliberative 
democracy, Habermas (1996) argued for the implementation of certain 
communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come 
into play through various forms of deliberation. The procedural rules are 
designed to exclude forms of coercion or strategic action as to enhance the 
(communicative) rationality of deliberation. Eventually, from the perspective 
of deliberative democracy, the rational deliberation of differences is thought 
to lead to a rational consensus through the force of the better argument. 
As Thompson (2002) has pointed out, in a discussion of discourse ethics, 
Habermas’ deliberative theory is tied to ideal speech situations in which 
people communicate free from power relations, strategy and deception. 
Although the experimental dialogues have shown that a structured, non-
threatening conversation environment can facilitate the mutual respect 
and initial openness, they also demonstrated that it is fairly impossible for 
participants of an ethical discussion to completely move away from their own 
moral perspective, which is deeply associated with general beliefs, values 
and ideals, without compromising their integrity. Of course, Habermas and 
his followers do not deny that the concept of a noncoercive democratic 
public sphere amounts to an ideal situation. They however assume that the 
development of procedures for rational deliberation will bring us closer to 
realizing the ideal communicative discourse. The idea that disagreements can 
eventually be resolved through the means of rational deliberation has also 
been criticized. One of the most profound criticisms is provided by Mouffe 
(1996). She argued that deliberative democracy theory denies the inevitable 
dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values in political life entails. 
According to Mouffe, the procedures for rational deliberation actually 
have the objective to make those differences irrelevant. Her argument is 
similar to Schön & Rein’s (1994) argument that there is no formal criterion 
to discriminate between ‘reasonable’ and ‘less-reasonable’ frames. By 
emphasizing the rational and universal character of the public sphere, the 
existence of conflict and difference is relegated to the sphere of the private. 
Mouffe (1996) has criticized the rationalist background implicit in theories of 
deliberative democracy for maintaining the illusion of a rational consensus. 
Instead, she argued for ‘agonistic pluralism’, a democratic model that 
celebrates pluralism instead of merely tolerating it. In the view of agonistic 
pluralism, it is vital to pluralist democracies to make room for difference. 
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The debate between deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism 
eventually comes down on the question how democratic participation and 
decision-making can be promoted without impeding the representation of 
difference. The question is central to democracy as well as to the ethics of 
animal biotechnology. Actually, value conflicts constitute the very condition 
of ethics. The moral problems that form the subject of ethical reflection and 
judgment are understood as morally problematic precisely because different 
values pertain to those problems. As Smith (2003) argued, value conflicts 
are an integral part of the moral life of individuals, groups and societies. 
They are inevitable constituents of the practices of ethics and democracy. 
Difference should therefore not be excluded but molded into a democratic 
shape. It is the challenge of pragmatist ethics and deliberative democracy 
to take Mouffe’s criticisms into account and develop new structures and 
arrangements to facilitate the creative democratic deliberation of the 
fundamental value conflicts in the animal biotechnology controversy. These 
structures and arrangements should incorporate a notion of communicative 
rationality that is aimed at achieving mutual understanding, not at achieving 
rational consensus. Ultimately, this means fostering the ability of citizens 
to recognize the reasons of others as reasons (Chambers, 2003). This is a 
form of frame-reflective awareness that would significantly contribute to the 
desired room for difference.
18.3 Pragmatist ethics for a technological culture
This thesis presented the development and implementation of two 
deliberative ethical instruments. Chapter 15 showed that the implementation 
of these instruments contributed to reflective learning, producing the 
articulation of value diversity and conflict in the animal biotechnology 
controversy. But how should we understand the contribution these ethical 
instruments can make to the repertoire of a pragmatist ethics for dealing 
with morally problematic aspects of technological cultures? What is the 
relation of those instruments to the matrix of pragmatist ethics tasks 
developed by Keulartz et al. (2004)? These authors suggested that the tasks 
of pragmatist ethics, in response to the strongly dynamic character of new 
emerging technologies, would primarily concern the domains of ‘dramatic 
rehearsal’ and ‘conflict management’. The domain of ‘dramatic rehearsal’ 
refers to the critical analysis of existing patterns, customs and vocabularies 
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and the creation of new concepts and constructs in order to understand 
future arrangements. The domain of ‘conflict management’ is understood 
as aiding the open confrontation of moral vocabularies and worldviews 
in situations of deep-seated, fundamental value conflicts. In the view of 
Keulartz et al., the ethicist’s methods to make conflicts manageable primarily 
involve the conceptual analysis and translation of moral vocabularies and 
views.
 Based on the results of the application of the value lab and 
experimental dialogues tools, we claim that, in order to make a fruitful 
contribution to one of these tasks, at first the participation of citizens in 
a collective process of inquiry and deliberation is needed. This crucial 
importance of citizen participation is related to the context of new emerging 
technologies, such as animal biotechnology. As described in part A, the 
interplay of factual uncertainty and value pluralism turns the context of 
animal biotechnology into an intractable social controversy. Schön and Rein 
(1994) have explained that it is the presence of multiple conflicting frames 
that makes intractable policy controversies so resistant to resolution. The 
existence of these multiple conflicting frames in the animal biotechnology 
controversy constitutes an unstructured policy problem that would benefit 
more from a focus on learning about the problem than a focus on problem 
solving. In the view of Keulartz et al. (2004), it is clearly the task of the 
ethicist to analyze these frames and associated moral vocabularies and to 
provide new concepts, arguments and insights that would improve the 
situation of social conflict. These authors offered the example of conceptual 
gradualization; thinking in terms of degrees instead of boundaries; for 
instance, the introduction of the concept of ‘potential wildness’ serves 
to break up the dualism between domesticated and wild animals in the 
discussion about the introduction of large herbivore in nature areas. 
We argue here that learning about intractable controversies implies that 
the variety of existing frames should be articulated and deliberated by 
citizens themselves. An intractable controversy like animal biotechnology 
is not likely to be solved by the top-down choice of a problem frame. 
Take the introduction of the intrinsic value concept in the Dutch animal 
biotechnology context as an example. ‘Intrinsic value’ was supposed to 
conceptualize the independent moral position of the animal. However, due to 
a lack of clarity about its meaning and function in the debate, its role became 
severely problematic. Various social actors appeared to frame intrinsic value 
in their own way. The deep-seated value conflicts, which should have been 
211
Implications for ethics and governance
reduced by the introduction of the new ethical concept, eventually came to 
expression through the very use of that concept. It is seriously questionable 
whether the top-down introduction of new ethical concepts will improve 
practical disputes in situations of deep-seated value conflict. Therefore, a 
successful implementation of the tasks of pragmatist ethics envisaged by 
Keulartz et al. necessitates a bottom-up process of reflective learning about 
the different problem frames. A process of reflective learning that requires 
citizen participation.
Participatory	inquiry	and	deliberation
The value lab deliberations embodied the bottom-up reconstruction 
of the value concepts citizens use to make sense of animals and the 
human-animal relationship. These value concepts, arising from moral 
experience and reflection, form the initial context of meaning in which the 
biotechnological use of animals is framed. The value lab deliberations should 
thus be interpreted as an ethical activity preceding the activity of ‘dramatic 
rehearsal’, providing the moral resources for the critique and renewal of 
moral vocabularies in animal biotechnology ethics. The role of the ethicist 
in this process is to design and facilitate processes of moral inquiry that 
lead to the reconstruction of value frames. The role of citizens is not merely 
to participate in the discussion of technology development, but to actively 
engage in moral inquiry as co-researchers. In the small group deliberations, 
citizens engaged in philosophical self-inquiry about the meaning of their 
moral experiences in the context of the human-animal relationship. 
Subsequently, our team of researchers analyzed the citizens’ reflections in 
order to reconstruct the overarching diversity of value frames. These frames 
may indeed have their contribution to ‘dramatic rehearsal’ by supporting 
a critique of existing patterns, customs and vocabularies. Rein (1983) for 
example pointed towards the potential role of frames in the critical analysis 
of policy controversies. Frame analysis may reveal the implicit assumptions 
of current habits, patterns and structures of policy and politics. Indeed, the 
articulation of value frame diversity provided empirical substantiation for a 
critique of the ‘intrinsic value’ vocabulary that dominates the Dutch practice 
of animal policy. Our study demonstrated an existing variety of frames, 
which made transparent the implicit assumptions of the policy definition and 
demonstrated its potential to exclude alternative views. 
 Also the experimental dialogues contributed to reflective learning 
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by means of citizen participation. Application of the experimental dialogues 
tool precedes the activity of ‘conflict management’. The ethicist’s role again 
is to design and facilitate the process of moral deliberation that leads to the 
exploration of reframing opportunities. The dialogues explored the possibility 
of achieving understanding and consensus for different combinations of 
frame representatives. The results indicated that frame differences at least in 
some combinations are too large for reframing, i.e. the integration of different 
views into a new and shared vision of the moral acceptability of animal 
biotechnology. Such findings inform the range of possibilities for ‘conflict 
management’. It is unlikely, for instance, that the explication or elaboration 
of the different frames in public will contribute to the resolution of deep-
seated, fundamental value conflicts. Keulartz et al. (2002a, p. 262) argued 
that “conflicting parties have to appreciate the facts that they are competing 
for primacy within the same universe of discourse with others that cannot 
beforehand be branded as unreasonable. Such reflexive awareness rejects the 
naivety of dogmatic beliefs, recognizes its own fallibility and leaves room for 
‘reasonable dissensus’”.
Ethics	as	a	creative	democracy
Ultimately, the differences between the pragmatist program of Keulartz 
et al. (2004) and the reflective learning approach developed in this thesis 
concern the relation between experts and citizens. Both approaches adopt 
a pragmatist view, starting with the hypothesis that the moral dimensions 
of new emerging technologies, such as animal biotechnology, require the 
creative reconstruction of concepts as well as the management of different 
perspectives. However, a different understanding of the relation between 
experts and citizens results in a different appreciation of the character of 
ethics and the roles and activities of ethicists in this process. Although 
Keulartz et al. do commit to a democratic approach directed towards the 
resolution of conflicts in moral life, and recognize the intractability of deep-
seated value conflicts in the practical disputes about animal biotechnology, 
they adhere to an understanding of the ethicist as an expert-advisor. The 
ethicist remains the principal source of knowledge about the structure of 
moral problems and the rightful candidate for inventing new ethical concepts 
or ways of understanding the world. Keulartz et al. foresee three types of 
activities for pragmatist ethicists: studying problem translations, sketching 
future scenarios and developing new vocabularies. These activities are 
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above all analytical activities, aiding either the confrontation of views or the 
invention of new concepts by means of conceptual analysis. They indeed 
mention the use of analytical tools, like critical analysis, the transportation 
of vocabularies to other contexts and the gradualization and decomposition 
of dualisms. The citizens that are experiencing the problems of human 
cooperation and cohabitation play a far more passive role. They are thought 
to depend on the ethicist’s expertise to learn about the structure of moral 
problems.
 The reflective learning approach developed in this thesis more 
radically changes the understanding of the role of the ethicist in the moral 
deliberation of new emerging technologies. In our view, the pragmatist 
ethicist should primarily operate as a designer and facilitator of cooperative 
processes of inquiry and deliberation. The complexity and ambiguity of the 
moral problems of a technological culture, such as the animal biotechnology 
controversy, requires that philosophers and ethicists enter the public sphere 
and engage in social experiments to contribute to the resolution of those 
problems. Exchanging the armchair for a societal laboratory, the ethicist as 
a designer/ facilitator integrates experimental philosophy with the ideal of 
participatory democracy. 
 Recognition of the democratic legitimacy of the pluralism of 
contemporary societies implies that learning about the structure of complex 
moral problems requires the active participation of a variety of citizens. 
A pragmatist ethics for dealing with the morally problematic aspects of a 
technological culture should therefore, in a Deweyan spirit, be envisioned 
as a collective experiment in which we are all engaged. Technology 
controversies, like the animal biotechnology controversy, have an inevitable 
public character. A reconstruction of animal biotechnology ethics will 
therefore only “work” when it is designed as a participatory dialogue directed 
at the development of a public morality for animal biotechnology. In such an 
experiment of participatory democracy, the values and principles, in which 
moral guidelines will be embedded, emerge through experimental inquiry 
and deliberation. 
 This thesis conceptualizes ethics as the Deweyan ideal of creative 
democracy. In Dewey’s eyes, democracy was first of all a way of associated 
living, a way of being. Participatory democracy was understood by Dewey as 
the public resolution of conflicts on the basis of argumentative deliberation 
and the reconstruction of concepts and habits. It is important to note here 
that Dewey’s concept of democracy is radically different from the concept 
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of democracy as a political ideal that, once accomplished, only needs to 
be celebrated and protected. Democracy is interpreted here as a creative 
and constructive process that citizens of a pluralist society make together. 
Minteer (2001) noted that Dewey’s philosophical project demonstrates 
a strong faith in the ability of human experience to produce from within 
itself the justification of values and beliefs. Dewey assumed that this 
creative process of public conflict resolution would generate a shared 
sense of community. Logister (2004) noted that, in Dewey’s philosophical 
pragmatism, the concept of democracy is ultimately instrumental to a society 
that is capable of the resolution of social conflicts in a way that is educative 
and therefore generating both individual and social growth.     
 Moral deliberation in this view rests on the potential of individuals 
to collectively engage in the creative-intelligent activity of moral inquiry. 
However, the pragmatist ideal of a creative democracy in which there 
is a ‘equal coexistence’ of the multiple perspectives involved, requires a 
deliberative attitude in which reflexive awareness plays an important role. It 
requires the critical appraisal of the values and beliefs of oneself and others. 
Of course, reflexive awareness is a naturally occurring phenomenon in public 
life. Thompson (2000) has indicated that citizens of pluralistic societies have 
little experience in articulating or defending personal values in relation to 
technological developments. Their moral concerns therefore often remain 
general and unarticulated. Modern societies seem not to be used to openly 
and reflexively discuss ethical issues. In the light of the cooperative resolution 
of value conflicts related to new emerging technologies, the necessary 
deliberative attitude of reflexive awareness therefore has to be explicitly 
facilitated. This is the role of pragmatist ethicists: to design and facilitate the 
collective engagement in a process of moral inquiry and open democratic 
deliberation. Beekman and Brom (2007) argued for the development of 
practical instruments, ethical tools in order to design ethics as a platform for 
value debates. The value lab and experimental dialogues tools, presented in 
this thesis, form tested examples of such deliberative instruments. As such, 
the participatory deliberations of these instruments can make a profound 
contribution to the implementation of creative democracy. These tools have 
the capacity to bring people together and enable them, in a playful way, to 
engage in a process of philosophical reflection. This, playful reflection, is 
what is needed for the creative management of different value perspectives in 
the democratic community.
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Animal biotechnology is controversial. It is one of the fastest-growing areas 
of technological innovation in the life sciences. Its rapid developments, 
ranging from new drug therapies to genetically engineered livestock, hold 
a great promise for a variety of fields of application. At the same time, 
the potentially high impact of these developments gives rise to numerous 
political and cultural concerns with regard to the distribution of risks and 
benefits. Moreover, these developments lead to concerns about wider issues 
such as the alteration of social meanings, identities and forms of life. Also 
in the Netherlands, the introduction of animal biotechnology instantly 
heated the socio-political debate. The Dutch society first came into contact 
with animal biotechnology in the 1980s when scientists from a small 
biotechnological company in Leiden introduced the later famous “Herman 
the Bull”, one of the first genetically modified animals in the world. Indeed, 
public concerns not only related to possible negative consequences for health 
and welfare of the modified animals, but also to the perceived ‘unnaturalness’ 
of the technical intervention in an animal’s genome. Animal biotechnology 
turned into a social controversy upon arrival in the public sphere. 
Animal	biotechnology’s	moral	and	social	controversy
Four features characterize the animal biotechnology controversy in the 
Netherlands. First, it has an inevitable moral dimension, because the use 
of animals is involved. In the academic field of ethics as well as in the 
public domain, it has become generally accepted that animal deserve our 
moral consideration. Second, the development of animal biotechnology is 
characterized by contingency and change. Animal biotechnology is therefore 
inherently accompanied by scientific uncertainty. Third, the development 
of animal biotechnology generates deeply entrenched disagreements about 
values. In a democratic society like the Netherlands, these value conflicts 
are at the heart of public debate and political decision making. Finally, 
changing relations between technology, politics and society seem to impair 
the democratic legitimacy of the development of animal biotechnology. The 
development of technological innovations like animal biotechnology is more 
and more contested in the public arena. 
 These features make animal biotechnology into a persistent moral 
and social problem. This thesis concerns the question how to deal with 
this controversy as a society. Which ethical approach is most suited to 
understand and evaluate animal biotechnology’s moral dimension? Which 
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policy strategy is able to shape that ethical approach? This thesis emphasizes 
an integration of ethics and policy in the approach of the problem. It argues 
that the current practices of ethics and governance in the Netherlands need 
to be reconstructed in order to enable a fruitful democratic dialogue about 
animal biotechnology in the Netherlands.
The pragmatic reconstruction of ethics and governance
The plurality of value perspectives in the animal biotechnology controversy 
challenges the traditional foundationalism of moral philosophy and ethics. 
Many approaches in animal ethics aim to ground the moral considerability 
of animals in a single, fundamental trait. This monistic tendency shapes the 
debate in animal biotechnology ethics in either deontological or utilitarian 
concerns, excluding the moral consideration of other potentially relevant 
values and ideals. Moreover, their rational foundationalism insufficiently 
recognizes the co-evolution of technology and society that is characteristic 
of the technological culture we live in. But how can we develop normative 
guidelines without disregarding the dynamics of animal biotechnology or the 
value pluralism of society? Pragmatist ethics, inspired by the philosophical 
pragmatism of John Dewey, offers a viable alternative. It recognizes the 
technological culture and embraces pluralism. Its experimental, open and 
flexible approach is better suited to accommodate the contingency and 
change of animal biotechnology. Values and principles are not carved out 
in stone, but emerge through the method of experimental inquiry and 
deliberation. Moral conflicts are addressed as practical disputes that demand 
for cooperative inquiry and deliberation rather than abstract philosophical 
debates. The focus of ethics is shifted from the justification of moral truths 
to the design and facilitation of deliberative processes and the invention 
of new moral concepts. It aims at the creative management of the multiple 
perspectives within the democratic community.   
 Also from the perspective of governance, this thesis takes a 
pragmatic turn. Although the pioneers of the policy sciences shared the 
democratic aspirations of the pragmatist movement, the field has for a 
long time been dominated by the technocratic tradition of the modernity 
project. Postpositivists however pointed towards the potential flaws of its 
instrumental rationality and objectivism in the resolution of contemporary 
policy problems. Some of these problems are too ambiguous and multi-
dimensional to solve them with straightforward, technical solutions. 
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Argumentative policy analysis provides a more promising approach to 
these problems. It starts from the recognition that multiple perspectives are 
involved in the interpretation and understanding of social reality and the 
construction of policy problems. Argumentative policy analysis assumes a 
fallibilist, pragmatist rationality, emphasizing the importance of democratic 
deliberation in the process of policy analysis. From this perspective, animal 
biotechnology is analyzed as an unstructured policy problem, characterized 
by a high degree of uncertainty about the relevant facts in combination with 
a high degree of disagreement about which values are at stake. Various policy 
actors have different, legitimate constructions of what the policy problem 
is. The appropriate policy strategy would therefore be aimed at problem 
structuring; gathering information about the problem, ultimately leading to a 
new and shared vision on what the problem actually is about. This requires a 
process of reflective learning about the different frames that play a role in the 
various constructions of the problem. 
Democratizing	animal	biotechnology
The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to a conceptual and 
methodological framework for the democratic deliberation of the animal 
biotechnology controversy. The theoretical perspectives of pragmatist ethics 
and argumentative policy analysis formed the basis of our approach. The first 
main question of this thesis was how to design a reflective learning process 
aimed at structuring the social problem of animal biotechnology. The two 
important characteristics of a reflective learning process are: frame reflection 
and citizen participation. Frame reflection is the process of becoming aware 
of one’s own frame and the frames of others. The participation of a broad 
range of citizens would enable us to examine the diverse ways in which their 
framings of the problem are discursively constructed. 
 We conducted a number of social experiments in order to find out 
how to incorporate the participation of citizens and the process of frame 
reflection into a process of reflective learning about the animal biotechnology 
controversy. The first experiment focused on the articulation of value 
diversity in the reflection on animals and the human-animal relationship. 
The second experiment focused on the articulation of value conflict in the 
context of the biotechnological use of animals. An important design element 
was the stepwise application of these experiments. This enabled the inquiry 
and deliberation of moral values and beliefs in the absence of the otherwise 
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dominant negotiation of interests. 
 Although the experiments chiefly aimed at the development of 
deliberative processes enabling reflective learning, also the content of these 
processes was relevant. An improved understanding of the structure of 
value frames and conflicts will produce more insight into the possible ways 
of creative management of the different value perspectives in the animal 
biotechnology controversy. If a reflective learning approach is to contribute 
to the resolution of the animal biotechnology controversy, it has to generate 
problem structuring. The second main research question of this thesis 
therefore concerned the possibilities for problem structuring and reframing 
of the animal biotechnology controversy in the Netherlands.
The	articulation	of	value	diversity
The first social experiment we conducted aimed to create a space for moral 
inquiry into the intuitions, values and beliefs of the cultural contexts in 
which our interactions with animals take place. The meanings of such values 
and beliefs do not exist as mental entities inside the heads of people, but are 
actively negotiated and constructed during the course of social interaction. 
Therefore we designed, applied and evaluated a deliberative instrument 
called the value lab. This tool merges the idea of social interaction in focus 
group discussions with an explicit in-depth focus on the articulation of 
underlying value frameworks. The homogeneity of the discussion groups, 
combined with the use of structured exercises and independent facilitation 
offered participants a safe, non-threatening environment to freely express 
their thoughts and concerns. Evaluation of the value lab methodology 
indicated that participants experienced an atmosphere of openness and 
respect and the opportunity for every participant to have a say. The semi-
structured design of the value lab discussions stimulated them to act as 
co-researchers, inductively reconstructing their own frames of reference 
in a process of philosophical self-inquiry. We organizes a series of group 
discussions, each consisting of a specific set of participants, selected for their 
expected ideas about animals. A thorough qualitative analysis warranted that 
the reconstructed value frameworks represented the diversity of views on the 
value of animals in the Netherlands. 
 Application of the value lab reconstructed four distinct value frames 
that were labelled after their central value concept: Use, Relation, Balance 
and Source. These four value frames constitute empirical knowledge of the 
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different ways in which a broad range of Dutch citizens thinks about the 
value of animals. Each of the frameworks produces specific and contextual 
meanings of the animal values expressed. The diversity of animal values 
observed in this study provides a strong empirical validation of moral 
pluralism in the reflection on animal issues in the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
the reconstruction of value frameworks yields an improved insight into 
the problematic aspects of the role of the intrinsic value concept in the 
current (ethical) regulation, providing empirical evidence for the pragmatist 
claim that the conceptualization of the intrinsic value concept as a fixed 
end neglects moral diversity and impedes constructive moral inquiry and 
deliberation.
The	articulation	of	value	conflict
The next step in the reflective learning approach was the articulation of 
(possible) value conflicts in the deliberation of the practical context of animal 
biotechnology. For that reason we developed a second deliberative tool, the 
experimental dialogues, in which representatives of different value frames 
discussed concrete cases of animal biotechnology together in a structured 
way. Even though consensus or compromise was not always a viable option 
due to fundamental value differences, the setting of the experimental 
dialogues did succeed to facilitate a respectful attitude of its participants. 
According to participant evaluations, the atmosphere of mutual respect may 
be attributed to specific design elements of the experimental dialogues, such 
as the conversation rules and the imaginative setting of the ‘island council’. 
Another important factor was the moderation by skilled facilitators that were 
(perceived as) independent with respect to the subject of discussion. 
 For each of the frame combinations, the experimental dialogues 
provided a differentiated account of the possibilities and impossibilities 
of achieving understanding and consensus. A true substantive consensus, 
characterized by deliberation of similarities and differences as well as the 
convergence to a shared decision, was only observed in the dialogue between 
Balance and Source representatives. Use and Relation representatives agreed 
on many values and ideals and accommodated these differences in the 
formation of a procedural consensus. Also in dialogues between Relation and 
Balance representatives, a procedural consensus was achieved. The points of 
agreement and disagreement were carefully deliberated, and accumulated in 
a list of terms and conditions. Whereas the Use and Balance dialogues and 
235
Summary
the Relation and Source dialogues also achieved convergence on terms and 
conditions, we concluded that these were examples of an artificial consensus. 
The terms and conditions were merely strategically used to avoid the 
deliberation of differences.
Frame	reflection	and	problem	structuring
The value lab and experimental dialogues tools have been specifically 
designed to nurture a safe and friendly conversation environment with a 
focus on listening and understanding. The question is however whether these 
conversations have indeed produced frame reflection and reframing of the 
problem of animal biotechnology. Individual frame reflection was of course 
limited to the participants themselves. The results of the value lab sessions 
however provide ample opportunity for the government and other policy 
actors to increase their reflexive awareness of the variety of existing frames. A 
frame-critical analysis of the major differences and similarities of the various 
frames and their potentially problematic roles in the policy arena may reveal 
the implicit assumptions and exclusion effects of current habits, patterns and 
structures of policy and politics. Furthermore, the produced frame-reflective 
knowledge may indicate options for the direction of future inquiries and 
deliberations.
 The experimental dialogues explored the possibilities for the creative 
management of social conflicts related to animal biotechnology. One of these 
possibilities is reframing, the creation of an integrative frame that constitutes 
a shared perception of the problem. The degree to which reframing of the 
problem occurred was evidently related to the levels of understanding and 
consensus that were reached. The different dialogue sessions did show a 
certain capacity for mutual learning. In some cases, this resulted in the 
achievement of a new perception of the problem, or in the achievement of 
agreement about the way to proceed in order to deal with the problem. Still, 
when frame conflicts were large, participants adhered to their own problem-
setting stories, resulting in trench warfare and at best artificial consensus. 
Nevertheless, the animal biotechnology dialogues demonstrated that 
deliberative tools do aid reflexive inquiry and deliberation.
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Implications for governance
The problems of animal biotechnology are constructed and reconstructed 
endlessly. In this strongly dynamic context, frame-reflective inquiry and 
deliberation should not be seen as fixed ends that can finally be reached. 
They should be integrated characteristics of an on-going process of policy 
making. However, policy-making also needs decisions in order to deal with 
the practical reality of animal biotechnology. At the same time, policy makers 
increasingly have to assume responsibility for their actions and products by 
participating in a political dialogue about their purposes and methods. In 
taking up this new role, policy makers may benefit from the frame-reflective 
products of the value lab discussions and experimental dialogues. This thesis 
sketches two different scenarios. The first scenario is to seek and demonstrate 
the reflexive awareness of other legitimate perspectives in the policy arena. 
The other scenario involves taking up the management of an on-going 
process of public deliberation and education.
 The first scenario entails that policy-makers acquire double vision: 
“the ability to act from a frame while cultivating awareness of alternative 
frames.” It requires what is called design rationality, a focus on practical 
problems; the capacity of frame reflection; an appreciation of the necessary 
political character of policy design and the skill of creative invention of 
new policy instruments and practices. How do policy makers acquire these 
attitudes and skills? This is the benefit of problem structuring. The products 
of the value labs and experimental dialogues provided ample material for a 
frame-critical analysis of policy constructs, habits and practices. In addition, 
policy-makers need training and education in order to be able to adopt 
design rationality and engage in participatory dialogue.  
 The second scenario goes one step further. It involves the 
reconstruction of current habits, practices and institutions and the 
arrangement of new interactive policy-making practices. It not only changes 
the role of policy makers but also the role of other actors involved in the 
policy arena. A practice of interactive policy making would imply that 
citizens, the government and a range of other actors become engaged in a 
mutual learning process. This requires the development of new arrangements 
and political spaces where a wide range of actors can meet for the 
confrontation, deliberation and appraisal of ideas, views and interests. 
 The results of the experimental dialogues have shown that these 
ideas, views and interests are grounded in different, conflicting frames. Thus, 
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new interactive practices of governance should find democratic ways to deal 
with these value conflicts. This thesis elaborates on two necessary aspects 
of these practices in the context of the animal biotechnology controversy. 
First, these practices should embody a communicative rationality, aiming at 
the achievement of mutual understanding. Second, these practices should 
recognize the inevitable political character of deliberation. Rather than 
merely safeguarding the equality and fairness of the process, interactive 
policy-making practices should represent difference. This notion is as central 
to the ethics of animal biotechnology as it is to democracy. Value conflicts 
constitute the very condition of ethics. Moral problems are understood 
as morally problematic precisely because different values pertain to those 
problems. Value conflicts are an integral part of the moral life of individuals, 
groups and societies. Difference should therefore not be excluded but 
moulded into a democratic shape. It is the challenge of pragmatist ethics 
to develop new structures and arrangements to facilitate the creative 
deliberation of fundamental value conflicts in the animal biotechnology 
controversy.
Implications for ethics 
This thesis presented the development and implementation of two 
deliberative ethical instruments, the value lab and experimental dialogue 
tools. How should we understand the contribution these ethical instruments 
make to the repertoire of a pragmatist ethics for a technological culture? 
First of all, the reflective learning approach developed in this thesis radically 
changes the understanding of the role of both the ethicist and citizens 
in dealing with social controversies surrounding life science innovations 
like animal biotechnology. In our view, the ethicist should primarily 
operate as a designer and facilitator of cooperative processes of inquiry 
and deliberation. This is the second role change implied by our reflective 
learning approach. The complexity and ambiguity of the moral problems 
of a technological culture, such as the animal biotechnology controversy, 
requires that philosophers and ethicists enter the public sphere and engage 
in social experiments to contribute to the resolution of those problems. 
Exchanging the armchair for a societal laboratory, the ethicist as a designer/ 
facilitator integrates experimental philosophy with the ideal of participatory 
democracy. A pragmatist ethics approach towards such a controversy should 
be envisioned as a collective experiment in which we are all engaged, directed 
238
Summary
at the development of a new public morality. 
 The reflective learning approach developed in this thesis 
conceptualizes ethics as the Deweyan ideal of creative democracy. 
Democracy in Dewey’s eyes was first of all a way of associated living, a way 
of being. Participatory democracy was the public resolution of conflicts on 
the basis of argumentative deliberation and the reconstruction of concepts 
and habits. Democracy is understood as a creative and constructive process 
that citizens of a pluralist society make together. This ideal of creative 
democracy requires a deliberative attitude in which reflexive awareness plays 
an important role. It requires the critical appraisal of the values and beliefs 
of oneself and others. Reflexive awareness is much more of an attitude than 
an outcome. It concerns the rejection of dogmatic beliefs, the recognition 
of pluralism and the embrace of the provisionality of all judgment. Modern 
societies seem not to be used to openly and reflexively discuss ethical issues. 
The attitude of reflexive awareness therefore has to be explicitly facilitated. 
From our point of view, this is the role of pragmatist ethicists: to design 
and facilitate collective engagement in a process of moral inquiry and open 
democratic deliberation. The value lab and experimental dialogues tools, 
presented in this thesis, form tested examples of deliberative instruments 
that can make a profound contribution to the implementation of creative 
democracy. These tools have the capacity to bring people together and enable 
them, in a playful way, to mutually engage in a process of philosophical 
reflection. This, playful reflection, is what is needed for the creative 
management of different value perspectives in the democratic community.
Nederlandse 
samenvatting
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Biotechnologie bij dieren is een maatschappelijke controverse. Sinds jaren 
vormt het een grote belofte voor diverse terreinen, uiteenlopend van de 
ontwikkeling van nieuwe medicijnen tot de verbetering van de productie 
van vlees. Tegelijkertijd geeft de technologie aanleiding tot grote morele 
bezorgdheid. Dit werd meteen duidelijk toen de Nederlandse samenleving 
in de jaren tachtig voor het eerst met biotechnologie bij dieren werd 
geconfronteerd. Een klein bedrijfje uit Leiden introduceerde de later 
beroemde ‘stier Herman’. Het maatschappelijke debat laaide onmiddellijk 
op. De zorg van het publiek betrof niet alleen de risico’s voor mens, dier en 
milieu, maar ook de morele betekenis van het ingrijpen in natuurlijk leven. 
Zo botst de ontwikkeling van biotechnologie bij dieren op de grenzen van 
levensstijlen en waarden, terwijl ze tegelijkertijd nieuwe waarden en idealen 
creëert.
 De maatschappelijke controverse rondom deze technologie wordt 
gekenmerkt door vier eigenschappen. Ten eerste is het een moreel probleem, 
omdat er sprake is van het gebruik van dieren. Sinds decennia wordt het 
zowel in de ethiek als in het publieke domein algemeen geaccepteerd dat 
dieren onze morele zorg verdienen. Ten tweede is de ontwikkeling van 
biotechnologie bij dieren een proces met een open einde, veranderlijk en 
contingent. Dit genereert een inherente wetenschappelijke onzekerheid die 
aan de technologie blijft kleven. Ten derde genereert de ontwikkeling van 
biotechnologie bij dieren allerlei diepgewortelde conflicten over morele 
waarden. In een democratische samenleving zoals de Nederlandse vormen 
deze waardeconflicten de kern van het publieke debat en het proces van 
politieke besluitvorming. Tenslotte lijken de veranderende verhoudingen 
tussen technologie, politiek en samenleving de democratische legitimiteit 
van biotechnologie bij dieren te beperken. Door een algemene daling van het 
vertrouwen in de rol van wetenschap en politiek als de oplossers van onze 
problemen, ontmoet ook de ontwikkeling van technologische innovaties 
steeds meer verzet in de publieke arena.
 Kortom, biotechnologie bij dieren is een aanhoudend moreel en 
sociaal probleem. Dit proefschrift gaat over de vraag hoe we als samenleving 
hier het beste mee kunnen omgaan. Welke ethische benadering is het meest 
geschikt om de ontwikkeling van biotechnologie bij dieren te begrijpen en 
beoordelen? Welke beleidsstrategie is in staat een dergelijke ethiek vorm te 
geven in de praktijk? Dit proefschrift beklemtoont een samengaan van ethiek 
en beleid in de aanpak van het probleem. In deel A wordt beargumenteerd 
dat de context van onzekerheid en pluralisme vraagt om een pragmatische 
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reconstructie van de huidige praktijk, zodat het mogelijk wordt een zinvolle 
democratische dialoog te voeren over biotechnologie bij dieren in Nederland.
Een pragmatische reconstructie van ethiek en beleid
De pluraliteit aan waarden en perspectieven in de Nederlandse samenleving 
vormt een niet geringe uitdaging voor de dierethiek. Traditioneel trachten 
veel benaderingen in de dierethiek de morele beschermwaardigheid van 
dieren te verankeren in een enkel, fundamenteel kenmerk. Dit zogeheten 
monisme in de ethiek leidt echter tot epistemologische en metafysische 
problemen die zich uiten in een voortdurende onenigheid onder filosofen. 
Daarnaast sluit het monistische verlangen van de ethiek de overweging 
van andere – mogelijk relevante- waarden en idealen uit. Tenslotte slaagt 
dit rationele funderingsdenken er onvoldoende in rekening te houden met 
de technologische cultuur, de co-evolutie van technologie en samenleving. 
Volgens dit proefschrift vormt de pragmatische ethiek, geïnspireerd door 
het filosofisch pragmatisme van John Dewey, een waardig alternatief. Het 
pragmatisme erkent de verwevenheid van de technologische cultuur en 
omarmt het moreel pluralisme in de samenleving. Waarden en principes zijn 
voor het pragmatisme niet in steen gehouwen, maar ontstaan via de methode 
van experiment, moreel onderzoek en debat. De pragmatische ethiek 
verlegt haar focus van de rechtvaardiging van morele waarheden naar de 
ontwikkeling en facilitatie van deliberatieve processen en de ontdekking van 
nieuwe morele concepten. Zij is gericht op een creatief management van de 
diversiteit aan perspectieven en waarden in de democratische gemeenschap. 
Maar wat betekent dit voor de aanpak van het beleid? De argumentatieve 
beleidsanalyse heeft laten zien dat technocratische oplossingen in het geval 
van complexe maatschappelijke problemen zoals biotechnologie bij dieren 
geen uitweg bieden. De context van wetenschappelijke onzekerheid en 
moreel pluralisme maakt biotechnologie bij dieren tot een ongestructureerd 
beleidsprobleem. De meest geschikte beleidsstrategie in zo’n situatie is een 
lerend beleid; gericht op het structureren van het probleem. Ook hier kiest 
dit proefschrift voor een pragmatische reconstructie van de huidige praktijk. 
De onzekere, pluralistische context van biotechnologie bij dieren vraagt om 
een beleid als reflectief leerproces ten aanzien van de verschillende waarden 
en perspectieven.
242
Samenvatting
Biotechnologie	bij	dieren	democratiseren
Het doel van dit proefschrift is een bijdrage te leveren aan de ontwikkeling 
van een conceptueel en methodologisch kader ten behoeve van de 
vormgeving van een democratische dialoog over de toepassing van 
biotechnologie bij dieren. De theoretische perspectieven van de pragmatische 
ethiek en argumentatieve beleidsanalyse vormen een eerste aanzet hiertoe. 
De belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift is hoe een reflectief 
leerproces, gericht op de structurering van het maatschappelijke probleem 
rondom biotechnologie bij dieren, moet worden ontworpen. De twee 
belangrijkste eigenschappen van zo’n reflectief leerproces zijn ‘frame 
reflection’ en burgerparticipatie, blijkt uit bovengenoemde theoretische 
perspectieven. ‘Frame reflection’ verwijst naar het proces waarin men 
zich bewust wordt van het eigen referentiekader en dat van anderen. De 
participatie van een brede verscheidenheid aan burgers is noodzakelijk om te 
onderzoeken hoe de verschillende morele referentiekaders discursief worden 
geconstrueerd. 
 Om te achterhalen hoe ‘frame reflection’ en burgerparticipatie op een 
zinvolle manier kunnen worden verwezenlijkt in een reflectief leerproces, 
zijn twee sociale experimenten ontwikkeld en uitgevoerd. Het eerste 
experiment richtte zicht op het verhelderen van de diversiteit aan waarden 
in het denken over dieren en de relatie tussen mensen en dieren. Het 
tweede experiment betrof de verheldering van mogelijke waardeconflicten 
in het gesprek over de toepassing van biotechnologie bij dieren. Een 
belangrijk ontwerpelement was dat deze experimenten stapsgewijs zijn 
toegepast. Het stapsgewijze ontwerp maakte het mogelijk morele waarden te 
onderzoeken en bespreken zonder te vervallen in een anders vaak dominante 
belangenstrijd. Alhoewel de experimenten zich voornamelijk richtten op 
de ontwikkeling van deliberatieve processen die reflectief leren mogelijk 
maken, was ook de inhoud van deze processen zeer relevant. Inzicht in 
de structuur van referentiekaders en waardeconflicten geeft namelijk aan 
welke opties er zijn voor het creatief management van de maatschappelijke 
controverse rondom biotechnologie bij dieren. De tweede hoofdvraag van dit 
onderzoek betrof daarom de eventuele mogelijkheden voor structurering en 
herstructurering van het maatschappelijke probleem rondom biotechnologie 
bij dieren.
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Het verhelderen van waarden
Het eerste sociale experiment wilde een ruimte te creëren voor gezamenlijk 
moreel onderzoek naar de intuïties, waarden en overtuigingen, aanwezig in 
de sociaal-culturele context van onze interacties met dieren. De betekenissen 
van dergelijke waarden en overtuigingen bevinden zich niet als mentale 
entiteiten in de hoofden van mensen, maar vormen de uitkomst van een 
actief proces van onderhandeling en sociale constructie. Daarom hebben 
we een deliberatief instrument ontwikkeld, het waardenlaboratorium, 
dat de sociale interactie van focusgroep discussies samenbrengt met een 
expliciete focus op de verheldering van onderliggende waardepatronen. 
Deel B van dit proefschrift presenteert methodologie en resultaten van 
het waardenlaboratorium. Homogene groepssamenstellingen, het gebruik 
van gestructureerde gespreksoefeningen en onafhankelijke gespreksleiding 
verschaften de deelnemers een veilige omgeving om vrijuit over hun 
gedachten en gevoelens te kunnen spreken. Het semigestructureerde ontwerp 
stimuleerde hen om de rol van co-onderzoeker aan te nemen, het eigen 
referentiekader reconstruerend in een proces van filosofisch zelfonderzoek. 
Er werd een serie van deze groepsdiscussies georganiseerd, elk bestaand uit 
een specifieke groep deelnemers, geselecteerd op basis van hun verwachte 
ideeën over dieren. Een grondige kwalitatieve analyse garandeerde dat de 
resulterende referentiekaders de diversiteit aan waarden en perspectieven in 
het denken over dieren in Nederland vertegenwoordigde.
 Het waardenlaboratorium produceerde vier afzonderlijke 
referentiekaders die werden vernoemd naar het centrale waardebegrip: 
Gebruik, Relatie, Balans en Oorsprong. Deze vier referentiekaders omvatten 
samen de verschillende manieren waarop Nederlandse burgers denken 
over de waarde van dieren. Elk kader geeft een specifieke en contextuele 
betekenis aan de verschillende waarden die men aan het dier toekent. 
Deze diversiteit aan waarden geeft een sterke empirische validatie van het 
moreel pluralisme in het denken over dieren. Verder geeft de reconstructie 
van morele referentiekaders inzicht in het problematische karakter van 
de rol van het ethische concept ‘intrinsieke waarde van het dier’ in het 
huidige biotechnologiebeleid. Onze empirische bevindingen leveren een 
onderbouwing voor de stelling van de pragmatische ethiek dat het gebruik 
van fundamentele verankeringen in de ethiek de diversiteit versmalt en het 
debat belemmert.
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De	verheldering	van	waardeconflicten
De volgende stap in het reflectieve leerproces was het in kaart brengen van 
mogelijke waardeconflicten die ontstaan in het gesprek over de praktische 
context van biotechnologie bij dieren. Voor dit sociale experiment 
ontwikkelden we een tweede deliberatief instrument, de experimentele 
dialogen, waarin vertegenwoordigers van verschillende referentiekaders het 
gesprek aangingen over concrete voorbeelden van biotechnologie bij dieren. 
Ook hier was het voor de kwaliteit van het gesprek van belang een veilige 
omgeving te creëren van openheid en respect. Uit de deelnemerevaluaties 
bleek dat de specifieke ontwerpelementen, zoals de gespreksregels, de 
virtuele setting van de ‘eilandraad’ en de onafhankelijke gespreksleiding, 
inderdaad hun bijdrage leverden aan een respectvolle, open sfeer. 
 De experimentele dialogen laten voor elk van de combinaties de 
mogelijkheden en onmogelijkheden zien van het bereiken van begrip en 
consensus. Een waarachtige consensus, gekenmerkt door de deliberatie van 
overeenkomsten en verschillen en het bereiken van een gedeelde beslissing, 
werd alleen waargenomen in de dialoog tussen vertegenwoordigers van het 
Balans en Oorsprong denken. Ook vertegenwoordigers van het Gebruik en 
Relatie denken vonden overeenstemming in veel waarden en idealen. Zij 
werkten hun verschillen uit in de vorming van een procedurele consensus, 
waarin de beslissing in feite wordt overgedragen aan een commissie of 
procedure. Ook in de dialogen tussen vertegenwoordigers van het Relatie en 
Balans denken werd zo’n procedurele consensus bereikt door een lijst op te 
stellen van voorwaarden en condities. Alhoewel ook de Gebruik en Balans 
dialogen en de Relatie en Oorsprong dialogen een gezamenlijke conclusie 
bereikten, werd deze aangemerkt als een artificiële consensus. In deze 
gevallen werden de voorwaarden en condities slechts strategisch ingezet om 
het werkelijk bespreken van verschillen te vermijden. De vertegenwoordigers 
van het Gebruik en Oorsprong denken, tenslotte, verschilden te veel van 
elkaar om een gezamenlijke conclusie te bereiken.
Frame	reflection,	probleem	structurering
Het waardenlaboratorium en de experimentele dialogen werden specifiek 
ontworpen om een veilige gespreksomgeving te creëren, met een focus op 
luisteren en begrijpen. Het is echter de vraag of de gevoerde gesprekken 
ook hebben bijgedragen aan frame reflection en structurering van het 
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maatschappelijke probleem van biotechnologie bij dieren. Individuele frame 
reflection was natuurlijk beperkt tot de deelnemers zelf. De resultaten van het 
waardenlaboratorium geven echter volop mogelijkheden voor de overheid 
en andere actoren in de beleidsarena om hun reflexieve bewustzijn van de 
diversiteit aan waarden en perspectieven te vergroten. Ook biedt kennis van 
de verschillende referentiekaders een mogelijkheid om impliciete aannames 
en mechanismen van uitsluiting in de huidige gewoonten, gebruiken en 
structuren van de beleidspraktijk te bekritiseren en te veranderen.
De experimentele dialogen verkenden de mogelijkheden voor het 
creatief management van sociale conflicten in de controverse rondom 
biotechnologie bij dieren. Een van deze mogelijkheden is herstructurering, 
de ontwikkeling van een nieuw referentiekader dat vorm geeft aan een 
gedeelde probleemperceptie. Uiteraard was de mate waarin herstructurering 
plaatsvond in de dialogen afhankelijk van het niveau van begrip en 
consensus. De verschillende dialogen lieten wel degelijk een zekere capaciteit 
zien voor frame reflection en gezamenlijk leren. Dit resulteerde in enkele 
gevallen in het daadwerkelijk bereiken van een nieuw inhoudelijk beeld 
van het probleem of in het bereiken van overeenstemming over de manier 
waarop het probleem moet worden opgelost. Echter, als de verschillen te 
groot zijn, hielden deelnemers vast aan hun eigen verhaal en perspectief, 
resulterend in een loopgravenoorlog of - in het beste geval- in een artificiële 
consensus. Hoe dan ook, de experimentele dialogen hebben laten zien dat het 
mogelijk is om reflectieve deliberatie te ondersteunen en stimuleren.
Implicaties voor het beleid
De maatschappelijke problemen rondom biotechnologie bij dieren worden 
telkens geconstrueerd en gereconstrueerd. In deze dynamische context 
vormen reflectief onderzoek en debat geen vast eindpunt dat uiteindelijk 
kan worden bereikt. Het zouden geïntegreerde eigenschappen moeten 
zijn van een zich ontwikkelend beleidsproces. Maar, er zijn natuurlijk 
ook beslissingen nodig om adequaat met de praktische werkelijkheid van 
biotechnologie bij dieren om te gaan. Tegelijkertijd wordt beleidsmakers 
in toenemende mate gevraagd verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor hun 
werk door te participeren in het politieke gesprek over de inrichting 
van het beleid. Beleidsmakers kunnen hier profiteren van de reflectieve 
produkten van het waardenlaboratorium en de experimentele dialogen. In 
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dit proefschrift worden hiervoor twee scenario’s uiteengezet. Het eerste richt 
zich op het ontwikkelen en tonen van een reflexief bewustzijn ten aanzien 
van andere perspectieven. Beleidsmakers zouden ‘double vision’ moeten 
ontwikkelen: het vermogen vanuit een bepaald referentiekader te handelen 
terwijl aandacht wordt geschonken aan andere bestaande perspectieven. 
Dit vraagt beleidsmakers om een praktisch georiënteerde, flexibele houding, 
het vermogen tot frame reflection, en de creatieve vaardigheid nieuwe 
instrumenten en praktijken te ontwikkelen. Hiervoor kunnen de reflectieve 
produkten van het waardenlaboratorium en de experimentele dialogen 
worden gebruikt, maar is ook training en onderwijs noodzakelijk. Het 
tweede scenario schetst een voortgaand proces van dialoog met het publiek: 
interactief beleid. Dit meer radicale scenario voorziet een reconstructie 
van de huidige gewoonten en praktijken. Hier verandert niet alleen de 
rol van de beleidsmaker, maar ook de rol van andere betrokken actoren. 
Interactief beleid betekent namelijk dat de overheid en vele andere actoren 
een gezamenlijk leerproces aangaan. Hiervoor is de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
arrangementen en publieke ruimten nodig, waar men elkaar kan ontmoeten 
voor de confrontatie en deliberatie van ideeën. 
Dit proefschrift heeft laten zien dat deze ideeën zijn verankerd in 
verschillende, conflicterende referentiekaders. Interactieve beleidspraktijken 
moeten dus een democratische manier vinden om met deze waardeconflicten 
om te gaan. Hierin zijn tenminste twee zaken van belang: het aanleren van 
een communicatieve rationaliteit, gericht op wederzijds begrip, en het 
erkennen van het onvermijdelijk politieke karakter van deliberatie. Meer 
nog dan het veiligstellen van de eerlijkheid en gelijkheid van het interactieve 
proces, moet worden gezorgd dat nieuwe interactieve praktijken ruimte 
maken voor verschil. Waardeconflicten zijn namelijk een onlosmakelijk 
onderdeel van het morele leven van individuen en samenlevingen. Sterker 
nog, zij vormen de basis van zowel de ethiek als de democratie. Het is de 
taak van de pragmatische ethiek om nieuwe structuren en arrangementen 
te ontwikkelen die de creatieve deliberatie van waardeconflicten kunnen 
faciliteren.
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Implicaties voor de ethiek
Dit proefschrift presenteert de ontwikkeling en implementatie van twee 
deliberatieve ethische instrumenten, het waardenlaboratorium en de 
experimentele dialogen. Wat is de bijdrage van deze instrumenten aan het 
repertoire van de pragmatische ethiek voor een technologische cultuur? 
Ten eerste betekent de benadering van reflectief leren, ontwikkeld in dit 
proefschrift, een radicale verandering van de rol van zowel de ethicus 
als de burger in het omgaan met maatschappelijke controverses rondom 
innovaties in de life sciences zoals biotechnologie bij dieren. De ethicus 
zou voornamelijk moeten opereren als de ontwerper/ facilitator van 
gezamenlijke processen van moreel onderzoek en deliberatie. De leunstoel 
van de filosoof verruilend voor een maatschappelijk laboratorium, 
integreert de ethicus als ontwerper/ facilitator experimentele filosofie met 
het ideaal van participatieve democratie. Dit is de tweede rolverandering 
die onze benadering impliceert. De maatschappelijke controverse rondom 
biotechnologie bij dieren heeft een onvermijdelijk publiek karakter. 
Een pragmatische ethiek van biotechnologie bij dieren moet dan ook 
gezien worden als een collectief experiment dat we gezamenlijk aangaan. 
Dit betekent een participatieve, democratische dialoog, gericht op de 
ontwikkeling van een publieke moraal voor biotechnologie bij dieren.
Dit proefschrift benadert de ethiek als het Deweyaanse ideaal van de 
creatieve democratie. In Dewey’s ogen was de democratie ten eerste 
een manier van gezamenlijk leven. Participatieve democratie was het 
gezamenlijk oplossen van politieke problemen op basis van argumentatieve 
deliberatie en de reconstructie van concepten en gewoonten. Democratie 
wordt hier begrepen als een creatief, constructief proces dat door de 
burgers van een pluralistische samenleving gezamenlijk tot stand wordt 
gebracht. Het ideaal van creatieve democratie vereist reflexief bewustzijn, 
de kritische beschouwing van de waarden en overtuigingen van jezelf en 
anderen. Reflexief bewustzijn is veel meer een houding dan een uitkomst. 
Het betreft het verwerpen van dogmatische uitgangspunten, de erkenning 
van pluralisme en het omarmen van de voorlopigheid van ieder oordeel. 
Hedendaagse samenlevingen lijken echter niet gewend om open en 
reflectief hun morele vraagstukken te bespreken. De vereiste houding van 
reflexief bewustzijn zal daarom expliciet moeten worden gefaciliteerd. 
Dit is de rol van de pragmatische ethiek: het ontwerpen en faciliteren van 
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het gezamenlijke experiment van moreel onderzoek en democratische 
deliberatie. Het waardenlaboratorium en de experimentele dialogen vormen 
beproefde voorbeelden van instrumenten die een bijdrage kunnen leveren 
aan het realiseren van de creatieve democratie. Deze instrumenten hebben 
het vermogen mensen samen te brengen en hen in staat te stellen, op speelse 
wijze, gezamenlijk het proces van filosofisch zelfonderzoek aan te gaan.
   
Nawoord
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Dit proefschrift is af. Verschillende mensen hebben daar aan bijgedragen. 
Het heeft dan ook een enigszins merkwaardige weg afgelegd. Het werk begon 
als een adviesproject voor het Ministerie van Landbouw, dat zich realiseerde 
dat er in Nederland verschillende manieren van denken over dieren bestaan. 
Deze verschillende manieren van denken hebben een grote invloed op het 
verloop van het maatschappelijke debat over de toepassing van biotechnolo-
gie bij dieren. Ons werd destijds gevraagd deze verschillende manieren van 
denken in kaart te brengen. Het resulteerde in een avontuurlijke expeditie 
langs vergaderzaaltjes in heel Nederland, waar welwillende burgers zich 
verzamelden om samen met ons te onderzoeken wat voor hen de waarde was 
van het dier.
Mijn toenmalige collega Linda en ik ontmoetten de meest uiteenlopende 
mensen. Van varkensboeren tot druïden, van wandelaars tot sportvissers, van 
kattenmevrouwen tot hondenfokkers. Maar ook dierenbeschermers, natuur-
beschermers, wetenschappers, begeleiders van politiehonden, van blindenge-
leidehonden, medewerkers van dierentuinen, van het asiel, de dierenwinkel of 
mensen die eigenlijk helemaal niet zoveel met dieren hebben. Deze mensen 
en hun ideeën bivakkeerden vervolgens maandenlang in ons hoofd. Met re-
cordsnelheid werden we een wereld ingezogen die bol stond van de verschil-
lende opvattingen, gevoelens, overtuigingen en idealen. Iedereen vanuit zijn 
eigen situatie, zijn eigen perspectief. Op talloze manieren hetzelfde en vol-
ledig anders. Het resultaat van deze filosofische zoektocht naar de waarden 
van het dier in de Nederlandse samenleving leest u in dit proefschrift. Hier 
wil ik Linda, alsook onze projectleiders Henriette en Tjard, bedanken voor 
het mooie project dat we er samen van hebben gemaakt. En natuurlijk alle 
mensen die hebben meegewerkt. Het was super om zo dicht bij jullie denken 
in de buurt te komen!
Het materiaal dat we verzamelden was te rijk en waardevol om alleen in een 
adviesrapport te verwerken. Er moesten wetenschappelijke artikelen van 
worden gemaakt. Ik wilde graag bij het Athena Instituut blijven, onder an-
dere om les te gaan geven. De beslissing was snel genomen om deze nieuwe 
uitdaging te combineren met promoveren op het ‘dierenwaarden’ project. 
Tjard de Cock Buning werd mijn promotor. Deze inspirerende man was er al 
in geslaagd om mij, nog voordat mijn tweede studie tot een goed einde was 
gebracht, naar de VU te lokken. Ik was alleen maar blij dat hij ook mijn pro-
motietraject zou gaan begeleiden. En inderdaad, Tjard, in de voorbije jaren 
heb ik veel van je geleerd. Het meest ben ik wel onder de indruk geweest van 
je vermogen om “door de dingen heen te kijken” en ongewone oplossingen 
of nieuwe invalshoeken te zien waar anderen slechts bergen van problemen 
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ontwaren. Het Wittgensteiniaanse ontwarren van conceptuele knopen is aan 
jou wel toevertrouwd. Daarnaast gaf je me tijdens het schrijven de ruimte om 
mijn eigen verhaal te maken van een project dat jij veel eerder had bedacht. 
Dank voor je vertrouwen. 
 Tegen het einde van mijn aiotijd kwam er een copromotor in beeld: 
Jacqueline Broerse. Jacqueline, je hebt me echt geholpen een aantal hoofd-
stukken, waar ik zelf nog niet tevreden over was, aan te pakken. Je leerde me 
bij het schrijven wat naïever te zijn in het begin, maar ook wat trotser aan het 
eind. Vooral dat laatste is voor mij een waardevolle les. De directrice van ons 
instituut, Joske Bunders, wil ik bedanken voor de gelegenheid om me de laat-
ste maanden, te midden van al het andere werk, volledig op mijn proefschrift 
te storten.
Sinds de tijd dat ik begon met lesgeven en artikelen schrijven, is het Athena 
Instituut ongelofelijk gegroeid. Sommige collega’s zijn al die tijd gebleven, 
anderen weggegaan of er nieuw bijgekomen. Ik bewaar veel mooie herin-
neringen aan deze tijd. De vele gesprekken met Barbara over wetenschap en 
andere toestanden. Wat leuk dat we nu ook eindelijk echt gaan samenwerken! 
En Anneloes, lotgenoot en kamergenoot! Met jou kon ik die echte aiodingen 
delen: het eerste congres, het eerste artikel… maar ook een goed gesprek 
op de ‘leukste kamer van B&S’, zoals men onze kamer noemde in die tijd. Ik 
ben blij dat jij op 30 juni één van mijn paranimfen bent. Ook bedank ik mijn 
andere kamergenoten, Roos en Dirk, voor de lol die samen hebben gehad. De 
anderen van jong B&S, club Athena of hoe we het ook noemden als we lekker 
gingen eten of na werktijd naar de kroeg. En, mijn collega Anna, die ik zo 
regelmatig op de gang of in de trein tref om de dag door te nemen.
Een proefschrift neemt, ontegenzeggelijk, een grote hap uit je leven. Vooral 
in het laatste jaar hebben dingen moeten wijken. Maar, het was mij nooit ge-
lukt te schrijven zonder dat leven buiten het schrijven. Voor mij persoonlijk 
betekent dat bezig zijn met film en theater, maar ook op pad zijn met vrien-
den waarmee ik mijn kan geest slijpen of gewoon lekker kan praten, lachen.  
 Frederique, PJ, Annerieke, Jet, Kim Jan, bedankt voor de lange avon-
den en nachten met goede gesprekken, eten en drinken. Marieke, ik hoop dat 
wij samen nog veel mooie films zullen maken, zoveel heb ik genoten van onze 
projecten over mensen en hun verhalen, dromen, filosofische vragen en witte 
onderbroeken. 
 Try-Out theater, de club die helaas niet meer bestaat, maar zoveel 
mooie interactieve voorstellingen maakte over cyberpesten en wij vs. zij. 
Eigenlijk een beetje wat ik ook op de VU deed, met mensen reflecteren, maar 
dan door het meteen uit te proberen op het toneel! 
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En mijn vrienden van het improvisatietheater, de Arrogantjes, met wie ik Ne-
derlands kampioen theatersport werd in 2007. Impro is een levenshouding. 
Ik hoop nog vele zalen met jullie plat te spelen! 
 Mannen van de mannenavond! Bas, Paul, Frikke, Willem, jullie zijn 
er altijd (als jullie niet in het buitenland zijn), om stevig bier te drinken maar 
ook om stevig mee te praten. Bedankt voor de scherpe observaties, oprechte 
gesprekken, flinke discussies, eindeloze humor en de vele ongewone strapat-
sen van de afgelopen jaren. Bas, fijn dat jij de andere paranimf bent.
Tot slot, de basis van dit alles. Mijn ouders Jan en Hillie. Jullie hebben mij 
altijd gegeven wat ik nodig had. Een heerlijke thuishaven, maar ook de vrij-
heid om mijn eigen weg te gaan. Jullie hebben mij geleerd altijd zelf te blijven 
denken. Je ziet dat ik daar inmiddels mijn werk van heb gemaakt! Zus Nina, je 
was er als ik dat nodig had. Annemarie, je bent al jaren mijn grote liefje. Van 
jouw humor, scherpte en liefde krijg ik geen genoeg. Bij jou wil ik blijven.
      
      Frank Kupper, 2009
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Frank Kupper was born in Neede on the 6th of july 1978. After graduating 
from the Staring College Gymnasium, he studied Biomedical Sciences at 
Utrecht University. During this period, his work for the student association 
and several educational boards and committees already familiarized him 
with the complexity of democratic practices. He earned a M.Sc. degree 
in Biomedical Sciences in 2002. After his Master graduation, he worked 
for a few years as a research assistant at the department of Functional 
Neurobiology of Utrecht University. An increasing interest in the context of 
science directed him towards the Faculty of Philosophy, where he received a 
M.A. degree in the Philosophy of the Life Sciences in 2005. In 2003 already, 
he was appointed as a junior researcher at the department of Biology and 
Society, the later Athena Institute, of the VU University Amsterdam. He 
worked on an advisory project about animal biotechnology and the value 
of animals, which was later to become the subject of his thesis. Formally, 
the thesis work started in 2005. In this period, he acquired an expertise in 
the development and use of interactive research methodology for public 
engagement in the context of life science innovation. From 2006, he also 
became lecturer at the Athena Institute, with a special focus on philosophy, 
science and technology studies and interactive research methods. In 2007, 
he founded his own company ‘Mens in de Maak’, which is focused on the 
use of theatre, film and dialogue as instruments of playful reflection about 
social issues. Currently, Frank still works at ‘Mens in de Maak’ and also at the 
Athena Institute as an assistant professor Biology and Society. According to 
Frank, all these activities converge into a theme: bringing people together to 
engage in reflection.
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